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ABSTRACT 
 
What is pain, what does it mean that the subject has a relationship with it, and how 
does this affect his identity and existence?  My definition of pain is derived from that 
proposed by scientists such as Melzack and Wall, and Freud. Pain is a dynamic, multi-
layered, diverse collection of experiences which impact and influence the subject throughout 
life.  Pain is a kind of conglomerate of past, traumatic, neurobiological, psychological and 
emotional imprints--pain as in suffering or being in pain. The aim of this thesis is to argue 
that it is not pain, as such, but the relationship of the subject to (his/her) pain which is most 
significant to his/her processes of life. In examining the combination of two theories of pain, 
namely, Freud’s psychosexual theory of development and Melzack’s theory of the 
Neuromatrix, my thesis endeavours to evidence my theory by using case study methodology. 
The similarities in the theories which are a hundred years apart have sparked my interest to 
propose that there is the distinct possibility for the existence of what I have named a 
Psychomatrix--patterns of pain (loss - abandonment, grief, rejection, desire) imprinted from 
infancy within an innate matrix that are specifically translated by their own ‘psychological 
and emotional neural loops’ and therefore, similar to the neuromatrix concept. As pain is 
triggered these ‘loops’ become more ingrained as information is analysed and coded to create 
a continuous (subjective) experience of suffering or being in pain. This is also true for 
positive emotions, such as love and joy, however I suggest that pain is the primary, and most 
significant emotion that needs to be understood in order to understand the others which are 
triggered by the same neural – psychological and physical – pathways as incidental emotions 
of the quality of existence.  A vast spectrum of (on-going) research has identified the impact 
of cultural, religious, social and political factors on pain and pain management. I suggest that 
all of these figure in the conglomerate. Using a psychoanalytical frame of reference this is a 
theoretical and conceptual thesis.  My final conclusion is that pain becomes an object that 
compels the subject to respond accordingly and consequently, from birth to death, defining 
his/her identity and existence.  
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"A cold in the head causes less suffering than an idea." - Renard, Jules (1864-1910). 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to argue that it is not pain, as such, but the relationship of the 
subject to (his) pain which is most significant to his processes of life.   
The first thing that comes to mind when we hear the word pain is physical pain.  The 
second thought is usually about psychological or emotional pain, but only after some 
deliberation.  Historically, research has primarily focussed on physical pain and pain 
processing.  Scientists such as Melzack and Wall (1960) developed the most recent theories 
about the neurological processing of pain, which has allowed research to progress into other 
aspects of pain, mainly into the psychological impact and the significance of the correlations 
between physical and psychological pain.  However, the main premise of pain research 
continues to be neurological and not psychological. The paradigm that ‘pain’ must have a 
neurological cause is a challenging one to surmount as those, for example with ‘chronic pain’ 
seek a solution primarily within the physical when it has been evidenced through research 
(Gamsa 1994) that much ‘chronic pain’ is situated in an individual’s psychological and 
emotional dimensions.  
Continuing the research that he and Wall began in the 1960’s Melzack (1993) 
developed the concept of the neuromatrix that situated pain processing in the brain.  Having a 
background in psychology it was inevitable that Melzack also gave significant credence to 
the impact of an individual’s psychological and emotional environment.  
Melzack and Wall (1996) proposed that pain is not simply a function that relays a 
message that there is damage to the body, but that there is also the impact of our previous 
experiences that influence the amount and quality of the pain we feel.  Our ability to 
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understand the causes of our pain and to grasp the consequences also influences our 
subjective experience of pain.  In the same source Melzack explains that ‘even the culture in 
which we have been brought up plays an essential role in how we feel and respond to pain’ 
(p: 15).   
Since it is pain that establishes its presence first in the subject’s life (i.e., loss) I would 
argue that it is pain which defines his identity. The pursuit of pleasure to avoid being in pain 
is unachievable so keeps one in a perverse cycle of repetitive behaviour. It is for this reason 
that the subject must become aware of and realise the need to establish his relationship with 
his pain.  
In order to evidence my theory I will examine Freud’s psychosexual theory of 
development, including his seminal work and his conceptualisations in his Project for a 
Scientific Psychology (1895) and Melzack’s theory of the neuromatrix as developed in the 
1990’s following his and Wall’s influential research on pain and pain processing. 
This study mainly concentrates on a psychoanalytic model of pain, the main focus of 
which is Freudian.  However, I would also like to acknowledge Lacan’s seminal 
contributions to contemporary psychoanalytic discussion and most notably post-Freudian 
developments.  It would behove me, en passant, to give credence to the Lacanian notion of 
jouissance which is apposite to my enquiry and which provides some seminal insights of this 
investigation.  Jouissance with its sexual etymology connotes more than mere enjoyment but, 
rather, the pleasure inherent in pain and the pain of too much pleasure.  Tickling and sexual 
climax would be two concrete examples that testify to the impossibility of satisfaction. Even 
here we see the emotive relational sphere being accessed within ones desire for the perfect 
pleasure 
According to professor Fry’s (2009) Yale University lecture on Lacanian theory it 
seems that Lacan’s narrative on desire is the notion of a sustaining of desire which goes 
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through a series of detours which result in a continuation of desire, resulting in an ending 
which may correspond to what Freud referred to as the desire of the subject to die in its own 
way without external pressure. We may fulfil our needs (such as physical hunger), however 
desire (fulfilling an emotional and psychological need) is an entirely different matter.  
The pain I wish to discuss in my thesis is this desire which Freud speaks of and which 
Lacan expands.  Desire is an interminable entity during the state and circumstance of human 
living. At the moment of loss the subject embarks upon a journey of desire. In other words he 
sets out to find that piece of the puzzle which will fit exactly and so perfectly into the 
space/lack so that the unity or whole would be as before, without evidence of the loss – the 
perfect pleasure that which is beyond the pain of desire.    
The complexity it seems lies in the subject’s knowledge – ‘symbolic’ knowledge which 
expresses the subject’s desire and lives in the unconscious and ‘imaginary’ knowledge which 
is narcissistic and a false sense of the self and ego. ‘Imaginary knowledge’ is knowledge 
which acts as a barrier to ‘symbolic knowledge’ which expresses the desire of the subject and 
which is considered a form of jouissance (Evans 2005, p: 94). According to Mills (2003), 
Lacan’s theory of ‘imaginary knowledge’ is that it is a ‘paranoiac knowledge’ and postulates 
that 
‘Developmentally, knowledge is paranoiac because it is acquired through our 
imaginary relation to the other as a primordial misidentification or illusory self-
recognition of autonomy, control, and mastery, thus leading to persecutory anxiety 
and self-alienation. Secondarily, through the symbolic structures of language and 
speech, desire is foisted upon us as a foreboding demand threatening to invade and 
destroy our uniquely subjective inner experiences. And finally, the process of 
knowing itself is paranoiac because it horrifically confronts the real, namely, the 
unknown. (…) paranoiac knowledge manifests itself as the desire not to know. (p: 30) 
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   As Kierkegaard (2000) has expressed that anxiety is fear of the known as well as the 
unknown. The problem, I suggest, is this very ‘desire not to know’. The mere notion of this is 
what triggers the pursuit of this knowledge. Albeit the pursuit takes many ‘detours’ (Fry 
2009) and forms, it continues throughout life. The interminable pursuit evidences the 
existence of a lack and its desire, within the unconscious of the subject. This knowledge, I 
argue, presumes a relationship between the subject and his pain, pain which is at the heart of 
desire. The subject’ relationship to his pain then, is his desire to find pleasure or more 
correctly, to pursue pleasure in spite of his knowledge.   
I would suggest that the behaviours that accompany such pursuit would fall into the 
realm of what, in psychoanalytic terms, would be categorised as neurosis, particularly as I 
consider the case samples which I have chosen to use in my thesis. The defence mechanisms 
which one employs to reach the ‘perfect’ pleasure or satisfaction and avoid pain are often 
mechanisms which bring one pain, which in turn dictates the processes to achieving this aim. 
They also dictate the amount of pain one needs in order to reach this end. As I consider the 
subject matter of my thesis it is clear that a thread which may run subtly through it is a 
suggestion that we are obsessed with our obsessions to escape our pain – actually I propose 
that we are obsessed with our pain and how to make it provide us with the ultimate pleasure 
that we seek.  This as we know brings us dangerously close to annihilation and into the realm 
of the impossibility of desire and Jouissance (Lacan 1992).  
Miller (2011) alludes to this when he reminds us of Freud’s ‘mention in the case of 
Dora that “[O]f all the clinical pictures which we meet with in clinical medicine, it is the 
phenomena of intoxication and abstinence in connection with the use of certain chronic 
poisons that most closely resemble the psychoneuroses (Freud, 1905e, p. 112)”.  
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What is most significant to this thesis is Miller’s comment in this same paragraph that 
‘upon further reflection, we are reminded that neurotic symptoms provide satisfactions 
similar to those provided by intoxicating and addictive substances’ (2011, p: 164). 
Therefore, it may be that the subject is addicted to the effects – highs and lows – of 
his choice of intoxicant. We can clearly see this in Freud’s research (1885 – 1887) in his 
Cocaine Papers.  Loose (2011) draws on this research on cocaine and writes that ‘the 
decisive factor regarding the effect of cocaine is something in the psyche of the user’ in that it 
has an indirect effect on the body ‘via a psychic variable’. And therefore, addiction is 
influenced by something within the individual (p: 4).  
As in any relational situation one is inevitably confronted with answering the question 
of what it means to have a ‘connection’ with the other, in this case pain. Part and parcel of 
this connection is fear of loss and fulfilment of desire. Pain dictates pleasure – without pain 
one knows nothing of pleasure.  If we began our lives not knowing the pain of loss there 
would be no need to seek to fulfil that loss and reunite with the lost object. It is interesting 
that when we look at the ways in which society is travelling, each individual seems to be 
involved in searching to fill some feeling of emptiness or another – in behaviour such as 
obsessive shopping, gambling, drug addiction and breakdowns in the family unit, divorce, 
homelessness, child abuse, chronic pain, war and its products such as limblessness and post 
traumatic symptoms etc.  It can be argued that it is all in the service of finding something to 
fill the void or lack. As Loose (2011) has suggested that in our society today there is a sense 
that jouissance and pleasure have become so that it is one’s ‘duty’ or as I would understand 
one’s right to have this.  He explains that it appears as if ‘[W]e have to enjoy ourselves 
because we have at our disposal and in abundance all the products (such as drugs and 
alcohol) and gadgets with which to do it’ (p: 3) 
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And therefore we stop at nothing to reach our objective. Loose argues that ‘the push 
to find solutions outside oneself for one’s problems and discontents, as well as the duty of 
enjoyment in recent times, fuel the addictification of our society’ (ibid). 
In my thesis I define pain as a conglomerate (or collection) of experiences from the 
world (reality) we perceive around us, shrouded in social constructs, laws, meanings and 
desires. When what is real (the materiality of ourselves and our misperceptions) confronts us 
it is disruptive and painful, (Felluga, 2011).  These experiences are thus imprinted on the 
unconscious. Within these experiences lies what is real and it is with this real that the subject 
must acquaint him or her self. It is this (acquaintance) relationship that is the real reality 
which establishes identity and impacts the subject’s existence.  
Outline of this thesis 
Chapter One will examine the definition and historical perspective of pain.  It will 
also examine the present day notion of pain (from a neurological perspective) as a vital sign 
of (human) life as it will serve as a further introduction to my theory of the subject/pain 
relationship.   
In Chapter Two I will discuss Freud’s 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology and 
examine its explanation of the neurological processes of pain and their physical and 
psychological impacts. This will also provide an understanding of memory, motive and 
perception, and Freud’s definition of pain – physical as well as emotional.  The next section 
will be an explanation of Melzack and Wall’s neurological definition of pain and its 
psychological and emotional correlations. This will lead to a comparison of Melzack’s theory 
of the neuromatrix and Freud’s (1895) neurological theory outlined in his Project.  
Chapter Three will further discuss my theory of the psychomatrix which I have 
derived from Freud’s explanation in his Project as well as Melzack’s theory of the 
neuromatrix.  
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             I will also  discuss the theory of pain from Freud’s Psychoanalytic perspective and in 
so doing I will endeavour to further explain the significance of my concept of the 
psychomatrix and the subject/pain relationship. Freud’s research efforts in his 1895 Project 
influenced his subsequent work and I argue that all his theories and concepts spring from his 
desire to identify human pain, its processes and its purpose. He began from a neurological 
premise which soon implicated the psychological so much so that all his subsequent work 
gave primacy to the human psyche and its cognitive and behavioural manifestations.  
                I will work toward establishing definitions of subject, relationship, identity, 
existence and pain in order to construct a frame of reference that will further inform my 
thesis.  
Chapter Four will begin the discussion and analyses of case scenarios to further 
evidence my thesis. The first case scenario, presented in this chapter, will be that of the 
phantom limb syndrome.  The phantom limb syndrome is the experience of sensations of pain 
in a limb or other part of the body, or the sense of a presence of these that do not, or no 
longer, exist.  This chapter further explores my theory of the psychomatrix and establishes the 
meaning of the metaphor of the phantom which is a manifestation of the missing object and 
an endeavour to make whole the body/self or the mind/self image or map that I will use 
throughout my thesis. In this chapter, I also begin to look at the duality of consciousness, 
phenomenological and psychological, narcissism, perversion and self-preservation, and the 
existence of the paradox of pain and pleasure. 
My exploration of the neuromatrix in chapter two will aid my discussion in this 
chapter which will be put in relation to my theory of the psychomatrix. The aim will be to 
examine the phenomenon of pain towards an explanation of the subject-pain (object) 
relationship. The Phantom Limb Syndrome, as investigated by Melzack (1993, 2006) and 
Ramachandran (1998), is pain that exists in a part of the body, particularly a limb, which no 
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longer exists – for example, a limb which has been amputated due to a disease or accident. 
The mind is fixated on the part of the body which no longer exists, suffering its loss and 
desiring to fill the empty space – as we have heard tell that ‘nature abhors a vacuum’.  The 
missing part of the body exists, at the same time, on the ‘map’ that is imprinted within the 
complex structures of the brain and the mind, (Ramachandran 1998 and Melzack 2006). 
Chapter Five will discuss the significance of the chronic pain syndrome as found in 
Fibromyalgia. Here I will discuss the conversion between psychological pain and physical 
pain. I will explore the process of the mind transforming an acute physical trauma into a 
psychological trauma, (Freud 1926 [1925] and Gamsa 1994). Physical pain triggers 
psychological trauma as dose psychological trauma trigger physical ailments that in turn 
trigger the process of chronic suffering or being in pain.  Chronic suffering is the minds 
repetition of the original trauma – not the actual physical or psychological impact or event, 
but the reaction of the mind and body matrices – provoking the state of suffering or being in 
pain as opposed to having pain.  This is by no means an attempt to discount the very reality 
of chronic pain suffering that some individuals experience as part of having a serious disease 
such as cancer or rheumatoid arthritis. It can be evidenced in this scenario, the emotional 
system of the mind striving to gain or regain unity or wholeness, which, again, is impossible 
thus, chronic suffering. 
Chapter Six will examine addiction, as defined as a set of self-destructive, repetitive, 
compulsive behaviours. I will discuss two case studies of addiction that will be examined 
from the perspective of this being another form of neurosis, of a narcissistic occupation that is 
between the subject and his pain – self-destructive, repetitive, compulsive behaviour – where, 
again, the object of desire is pain although, an addict will tell you that it is his desire for 
comfort, pleasure, escape and therefore, management of his pain or suffering. I will explore 
the subject’s desire for control of his internal and external environment, in relation to his 
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pain.  Pain, I propose, is the object that is desired by means of the drug as well as other 
compulsive self-destructive behaviour.  I will examine the behaviour of seeking and 
ingesting. We will also explore the other side of addiction from a perspective of deprivation – 
a seeking to destroy by starvation with an aim to annihilate the self that is perceived as a 
‘parasite’ and a hindrance to gaining pleasure as well as a vehicle of revenge on the object of 
desire. There is the question of self-preservation – however the more important question is 
which ‘self’, (Pontalis 1981) is being preserved, and why?  The processes of addictions 
relegate the pains of real life issues to a shadowy background that becomes a hum – that is 
deafening at times, but managed within the intoxication of indulgence or deprivation – where 
pain and pleasure lose their boundaries.  I will examine the perverse use of the body to be in 
pain, and the satisfaction of unconscious masochistic desires with the aim to achieve what is 
beyond pleasure, which is not more pleasure but pain (Freud 1920).  
My thesis is not an effort to discuss any particular type of pain or processes of pain, 
but instead it is to examine the concept of relationship.  It is an endeavour to evidence that the 
subject has a relationship with pain which is pervasive throughout the many levels and 
dimensions of his identity and existence. My concept of the psychomatrix, derived from 
Freud’s psychosexual theory and Melzack and Wall’s theory of the neuromatrix, is 
significant in that it organises the Freudian topographies within the matrix of the 
unconscious. The methodology, for the most part, is the examination of case studies from a 
Freudian psychoanalytic model of pain. 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter One  
Pain – a Vital Sign of Life? 
Introduction 
Pain has become such a vital force in the world that it is now considered to be the fifth 
vital sign.  Vital signs are an essential part of life.  They are the measures of various 
physiological statistics, often taken by health professionals, in order to assess the most basic 
body functions. This entails recording the four most essential vital signs: body temperature, 
pulse rate or heart rate, blood pressure, and respiratory rate.  
‘To improve pain management the Veterans Health Administration launched the 
“Pain as the 5th Vital Sign” initiative in 1999, requiring a pain intensity rating (0 to 
10) at all clinical encounters’ (Mularski, R. A., et al 2006, p:607). 
A conference of the International Association for the Study of Pain 
(August/September 2010) presented the conception of a fifth vital sign of life – pain.  There 
are some scientists and health care professionals who agree however, there are those who do 
not approve of this.  In accepting pain as a vital sign of life, is it right or wrong?  We do not 
know.  What is relevant is that pain exists in such a way in our world that it cannot be 
ignored, forgotten, set aside or escaped.  It is part of our minds and our brains and bodies.  
Just as we breathe, so we feel pain.  Nevertheless, is this saying that we need pain and that it 
is essential to our survival, just as we need our breath and blood to flow through us?   
It is still early days for this conception and so, the motive for it has not been 
established from my perspective. Suffice it to say that this too is, inevitably, another 
complication added to the psychological reality of our existence and sense of identity. 
Throughout my thesis I propose that pain is an essential part of our existence and our lives, 
therefore on the one hand, it is a ‘vital’ sign however, can it be added to the same categories 
of blood pressure and respiration or does it need to be assessed as a separate entity?  This is 
yet another debate that has recently taken on a new presence within the scientific community. 
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A literature search for an historical account of pain has left me with one main 
conclusion: in order to do this justice the history of pain, rich with all its religious, folkloric, 
philosophical and scientific data, would have to be set out in many volumes.  There has never 
been a period of time in the history of the world, as we know it, when the topic of pain, 
particularly chronic pain, has not been a complex and varied entity within people’s lives. Pain 
has always, as far as I can see, occupied the human race due to its elusiveness and mystery, 
terror, awe and pleasure. It has been relegated to the space of the uncanny and yet it compels 
an addictive interest. 
1.1 Historical Perspectives on Pain 
There are however, a number of authors who have delved into this and compellingly 
written about the history of the theories and mechanisms of pain.  There has been and 
continues to be various endeavours to bring clarity to the linkage between psychological and 
physical pain.  There are questions about the meaning and the significance of pain within the 
day to day lives of individuals that have only touched the surface of scientific discoveries. 
Scientists and researchers such as Melzack and Wall (1965, 1996, 1993, 2006), Merskey 
(1965, 1985), Merskey and Spear (1967), Morris (1991), Gamsa (1993),  Ramachandran 
(1994, 1998),  Rey (1995), Porter (1997), Liebeskind (1999),  Finger and  Hustwit (2003), 
Flor (2009), and numerous others have contributed to the following, brief, account of my 
findings. 
In Ancient times people believed that pain was a mysterious curse related to evil 
magic. The treatment of which was left to priests and sorcerers who were, nonetheless, well 
versed in the art of using pressure, heat, water and sun, to treat pain. Along came the Greek 
and Roman intellectual input and wisdom that proposed that pain was a sensation, and that 
the brain and nervous system played a part in producing the perception of pain.  Still a new 
concept, this did not gain much popularity until the Middle Ages.  During this period, and the 
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Renaissance, the Western world, particularly Europe, witnessed an increase in the movement 
of peoples and an increase in population.  This brought with it a boom in trading and the 
sophistication of its courts and the planning of its cities 
There was, however, a down side to all of this mingling and trading - an increase in 
diseases such as Leprosy, the Plague and the deterioration in mental health (madness).  
Scholars and medical intellects of the time categorised these illnesses into four groups: 
frenzy, mania, melancholy and fatuity (a lack of intelligence or thought combined with self-
satisfaction).  The dark and dismal Middle Ages lapsed back to a dependence on ancient 
folklore and misrepresentations of the remnants of classical learning and knowledge, ignoring 
the progress of ideologies that had been flowing along through the Ages thus far.   
Better gains were made in the Renaissance.  Intellectuals from this period disapproved 
of their predecessors, embracing, anew, the lessons and ideologies of classical Greece. They 
advanced into the new era with an enlightened understanding of how to treat pain and 
disease.  Of the curious intellectuals of the time, DaVinci (1452 -1519) proposed that the 
spinal cord was responsible for transmitting sensations to the brain, and the brain in turn was 
the central organ that was responsible for registering sensations, such as pain.   
The 17
th
 Century experienced further intellectual stimulation and saw a rise in 
philosophical ideologies.  However, this also brought about controversial debates regarding 
the understanding of the mind/body relationships.  For example, Descartes (1596 – 1650), 
who in 1664 first described a ‘pain pathway’, was first to identify the ‘Specificity Theory’ 
and the idea that pain follows one fixed pathway. Modern day research was spring boarded 
from research such as this, in spite of some misconceptions based on the specificity model.  
His theory (such as developed by Galileo) was that the body was like a machine that could be 
studied.  Another researcher, Thomas Willis (1621-1675), who has been called the founder of 
neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, attempted to map mental functions onto particular areas 
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of the brain. Thus, laying a foundation for Freud’s (1895) neurological (and psychological) 
work in his Project for a Scientific Psychology. 
 
From René Descartes. L'homme de Rene Descartes. Paris: Charles Angot (1664) 
The 18
th
 Century, known, also, as the period of ‘enlightenment’, saw many epidemics that 
raged across Europe resulting in soaring mortality rates.  In spite of this there was an air of 
heightened hope, as well.  This era came to be hailed as the ‘golden age of quackery’ though, 
as it also witnessed the rise and fall of many a medical trends lacking sound and proven 
theories, such as those of Mesmer (1734-1815) and  Animal Magnetism.  
In the 19
th
 Century most people expected to experience pain in their lives.  They 
relied on religion, faith and their own personal resilience to endure their sufferings.  Pain was 
accepted, simply, as a way of life.  For example women endured labour pain and considered 
it a spiritual experience that would make them better human beings. 
As time advanced so did scientific research and discoveries – particularly in pain 
relief.  However, people began to think outside the box of religion, folklore and faith.  They 
wanted to know what was behind their diseases as well as cures for them.  The search for a 
cure for pain, in the world of science and medicine, opened many doors not least were those 
into inquiries about the philosophies of life such as, the meaning of life and existence as seen 
in the rise in popularity of the writings of philosophers such as, Schopenhauer (1788 – 1860), 
Kierkegaard 1813-1855) and Nietzsche (1844-1900). 
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Medical scientists and researchers of the 19
th
 Century made further advances into pain 
medication and treatment. Discoveries were made into the pain relieving, benefits of drugs 
such as opium, morphine, codeine and cocaine. Felix Hoffmann (1868-1946), was a chemist 
and one such researcher who developed aspirin (sodium salicylate) which, to this day, is the 
most commonly used pain reliever.  He wished to develop an analgesic, without the side 
effects of the herbal remedies that were being used, to help his father who suffered with 
rheumatic pains.  We dare say that his father was relieved! 
Around this same period another pain killer was in development and gaining 
popularity – chloroform (nitrous oxide – laughing gas). Popular with Queen Victoria, during 
child birth as she was of the opinion, a wise one at that, that pain during child birth was not a 
necessity for the salvation of the soul.  Other anaesthetics were developed although there 
were some physicians who were not completely confident in performing surgery on a 
comatose patient.  There was, in addition, the fear of the potential risk of death from overdose 
of the anaesthetic.  
The 20
th
 Century marched to the tune of further developments in every area of 
medicine, particularly pain relieving medicine. The creativity of pharmaceutical companies 
insured that drugs were starting to be custom-designed to block specific pain mechanisms 
with fewer side-effects. Molecular structures were being manipulated to create and develop 
drugs for every kind of pain – from neuropathic to psychological pain.  By the time the 20th 
Century was shunted out there were numerous options for pain-relief.  Pain was no longer a 
necessity for the salvation of the human soul, and there was no longer the need to endure 
unnecessary pain. In fact a pain free life was the ‘right’ of the human race, and they were 
going to do whatever it took to be rid of it. 
Pain medication, such as Aspirin, was widely prescribed.  There were other drugs 
such as Aspirin-like, non-steroidal, anti-inflammatories (NSAIDS), like Ibuprofen and 
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Naproxen for mild to moderate pains.  Narcotics such as morphine and codeine continue to be 
prescribed for severe pains. 
Considering the vast progress in pharmacological remedies for pain it is clear to see 
that by now pain was believed, primarily, to be a physiological and therefore medical, 
challenge and the responsibility rested with science and the medical world to bring about a 
pain free society.   
About forty or so years ago the specificity theory dominated the study of pain.  Dr. 
Henry Beecher (1904-1976) began an investigation into the validity of this theory and the 
relationships between subjective psychological states and objective drug responses.  Much of 
his research was done while working with the severely wounded during World War II.  When 
he resumed his work and research, after the war, he discovered that a significantly fewer 
soldiers, with severe wounds in the combat hospitals, complained about intense pain that 
warranted the administration of morphine, in comparison to the higher number of trauma 
victims with less severe  wounds, who complained about intense pain that warranted the 
administration of the same drug.  
He proposed that the differences in the intensity of pain was not contingent upon the 
severity of the injury (the sensory stimulus/input), but, instead, had much to do with the 
meaning associated with the injury.  
At the time, of course, attacks of the phantom limb pain were common among 
veterans from the Vietnam War.  A significant number of veterans suffered traumatic 
amputations that caused them continuous experiences of pain in the missing limb. 
Advances in pain therapy became the focus of research.  In 1965 Melzack and Wall 
began collating historical data to progress their own extensive scientific research into the 
multidimensional phenomenon of pain.  They proposed that pain was not just something that 
happened to the body. They soon introduced their ‘Gate Control Theory’ and explained that 
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pain is modulated by past experiences.  Once a stimulus has triggered a pain it ‘opened the 
pain gate’ however, there were other factors that contributed to the perception of pain.  Their 
work went beyond Descartes’ specificity theory to evidence that the brain and the central 
nervous system played integral and active roles in receiving, modulating and transmitting 
pain impulses.  Bodily functions for pain were proposed and consequently more advanced 
pharmacological and surgical interventions were developed for the relief of pain.  It was 
Melzack and Wall’s theory that rejuvenated and progressed research from the 1970s onward 
to the many aspects of pain including physiological, psychological and emotional. 
In the 1990s Melzack’s further research brought him to his discovery of the 
neuromatrix.  He proposed that we all possess an innate ‘neuromatrix’, consisting of a large 
number of interconnected neurons (as discussed previously). These analyse sensory 
information in the brain, which in turn provides the perception of sensations – such as pain.   
The neurosignature is created in the matrix and provides the body/self unity.  It tells the brain 
that the experiences of the sensations are from the ‘self’ and translates the stimuli to be either 
a threat or a warning. The neurosignature triggers action to maintain the integrity of the 
body/self unity. Freud’s and Melzack and Wall’s neurological research urged the 
consideration of the psychological and emotional dimensions of pain and pain processing.  
The 21
st
 Century heralded in models of Cognitive Behaviour pain management due to 
increasing discoveries of the influence of the psychological functions of the mind on the body 
and the brain. Gamsa (1993) states that,  
‘[T]he study of pain as a discipline began only in the last half century. As sensory 
models of pain gave way to multi-dimensional explanations, psychological influences 
on the perception of pain came to be well accepted. The dominant schools of thought 
in the discipline of psychology gave impetus to the study of psychological factors in 
pain’ (p: 5). 
 
As we can see, pain has persisted as an integral part of our lives.  When Freud began 
his research, and work, into the complexities of the human mind his intention was, as had 
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been of scientists before him, to relieve pain.  His effort to invent a drug to relieve pain, 
(Freud’s Cocaine Papers, 1974), physical and psychological, proved to be unsuccessful.  We 
should be glad for this, as his change of direction into meta-psychology and psychoanalysis 
proved to be of vital import and continues to contribute to the excavation of new ideas and 
further comprehension of his original theories and concepts of neurology and psychology. 
The main objective of this overview of the process of establishing the vitality of pain 
through time was to evidence that the focus of any research, for a cause and remedy for pain, 
has been based on the observable, tangible symptoms.  Anything other than obvious was 
delegated, and still is to some degree, to the uncanny, unexplained and unacceptable. 
The question of the importance of pain seems to have travelled a similar path to the 
ethics and mores of sexuality and how unconscious and conscious thoughts and behaviour 
impact on our lives and daily functioning as human beings. The build-up and release of 
energy, I propose, is a key element in pain and is pervasive throughout all dimensions of 
human sexuality. In fact pain is at the heart of human sexuality.  As such, it has been part and 
parcel of the controversies which our societies have suffered and debated throughout history.  
I propose that as it became more and more evident, somewhere in the course of 
humanity’s history, that pain was a significant aspect of the quality of pleasure, a new 
paradigm began to be set, which in time needed to be ‘controlled’. Pain it seems has become 
an entity which can be used as a means to a variety of ends – whether political, social or 
personal. This is at the heart of my argument. Just as with drugs which aid in relieving acute 
pain, that also have the side effects of causing a sense of pleasure, need to be ‘controlled’. 
The subject’s relationship with his pain similarly is one of ‘control’ and ‘limitations’ which 
act as a defence against overwhelming issues in his internal as well as external environments.  
He needs his pain as a baby needs his mother, for comfort and protection. Pain is who he is 
and this impacts his existence.  
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1.2  Being in Pain versus Having Pain 
Over a hundred years ago, in 1895, when Freud set out to prove his psychological 
‘pain’ theories, he also began from a neurological premise.  In his Project for a Scientific 
Psychology he began with an attempt to develop a neurological formulation to explain the 
psychological processing of pain. However, he continued to encounter barriers in his research 
when trying to identify a (scientific) psychological processing ‘centre’ in the brain. When he 
finally abandoned the Project at the turn of the 19
th
 Century, he had discovered the 
phenomenon of the psyche which began a new trend of practice in the medical world.  His 
frustration that he was not able to explain these ‘pain’ affects from a neurological perspective 
may have been one of the reasons which drove him to psychoanalysis. It appears that he 
resolved, at the time, that there were some phenomena that could not be explained from a 
neurological perspective, although the physical and the psychological were somehow 
interconnected.  
Scientists have agreed that an individual’s psychological make-up influences how 
they experience pain – physical pain. It has also been acknowledged that psychological 
trauma of any kind impacts the emotional system resulting in a variety of mental distress and 
mental health problems which in turn affect the physical state.  Talk therapies may relieve the 
pressure of unexpressed trauma and medication may be administered to decrease 
physiological symptoms to bring about temporary psychological relief. However, as Freud 
discovered, emotional pain, caused by psychological or physical trauma, remains a part of the 
individual’s make up, bleeding through into their thoughts and behaviour, pervasive 
throughout all dimensions of functioning. 
Upon examining Melzack’s concept of the neuromatrix as well as Freud’s 
neurological concepts in his Project what I generally saw was the similarity in the 
explanations of the neurological systems of processing.  What I also identified is that Freud’s 
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concept of the mind and its topographies was an attempt to map emotional and psychological 
pain processes that could not be explained neurologically. One of the main aspects of the 
neuromatrix is the mapping of the body/self whole across the structure of the brain. It is also 
an explanation of how the neurological systems work to keep this body/self map/imprint 
intact in the brain.  If a part of the body is missing as for example, in the case of amputation, 
the system reacts in such a way so as to maintain the ‘whole’ map or imprint in the brain.  
The results of this, is a painful affect at the sight of the missing limb. The effort of the brain 
in this quest maintains not only physical pain or painful experiences, but also psychological 
distress, long after the actual trauma and physical healing, (Ramachandran 1998). The pain of 
this experience has become part of the emotional system causing distress as it is unable to be 
resolved.  The only option is to learn to manage this pain and function in spite of this. 
According to Melzack (1994) the mapping system in the brain represents an image of 
the body. In other words, this is what the body ought to look like and where every aspect of 
the body should be situated so, for example, if I need to lift something my brain will identify 
on its whole body/self map, where the lifting capabilities are assumed to be found (arms, 
hands, fingers muscles etc.) and sends a message, to lift.  I think that this brain map may be 
situated in the imaginary realm (Lacan 1977, Evans 1996) as in the mirror stage where ‘the 
baby sees its own image as whole’.   However, the baby struggles with the contrast between 
what he sees in the specular (whole and independent) image and his uncoordination (and 
dependence), which he experiences ‘as a fragmented body’. This experienced discrepancy 
creates a threat of ‘fragmentation’ to his ego, the sense of a whole self (Evans 2005, p. 115). 
The discrepancy between what exists in the brain’s mapping system and the body 
with the missing limb creates a similar threat to the body self/ego. I propose that the 
unconscious desire to maintain the real is expressed in the pain experienced in the phantom 
limb. The phantom limb, in other words becomes a metaphor or symbol of the desire for the 
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whole, which is the real of the map within the brain as well as the unconscious. Therefore, the 
real can only be expressed in the (symbolic) language of pain, as it is unknowable. 
The loss of a limb is not (willingly) accepted by the brain as it struggles to maintain 
the whole self. Therefore, even though the ‘map’ indicates that the road exists the real fact is 
that the road no longer (or never did) exists. The brain and the mind struggle to maintain its 
map and the reality of an intact body/self and ignore the loss – which in turn is, as has been 
evidence, a painful process. We are so influenced by what is acceptable or reality within 
social constructs that the loss of a limb is (emotionally and psychologically) unacceptable. It 
is also a painful reminder of the ‘original’ loss and desire which lies within the unconscious. 
My argument, after also examining Freud’s theory of the mind, its topographies and 
influence on cognitive processing and behaviour (actions/reactions), is that there may exist, 
similar to the neuromatrix, a psychomatrix.  This would be the matrix within which the 
psyche functions to maintain a certain emotional balance (or ‘whole’), allowing one to 
function. However, since we know that according to psychoanalytic theory it is impossible to 
reach this ‘whole’ or ultimate balance or ultimate pleasure, the individual continues to 
experience a certain level of ‘emotional pain’ throughout their life.  I also argue that it is 
possible that the psychomatrix functions mainly in the service of the psyche and works 
toward managing emotional pain. In connection with this, my main argument is that it is not 
the actual pain sensation, whatever the cause; it is the individual’s relationship to the pain 
that is the primary element influencing his or her behaviour.  
In cases where there is the condition that prevents an individual from experiencing 
physical pain (i.e., Congenital Insensitivity to Pain – CIP: McMurray 1975) the affect is of 
distress and a painful emotional state that physical pain is not felt. This is still pain felt even 
though it is psychological pain experienced within the desire to have pain in order to make 
sense of the physical and to understand the being in pain.  
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The similarities in the theories of Melzack and Freud, which are a hundred years 
apart, prompted me to propose that in creating his theory of the topography of ego, id and 
superego within the unconscious, Freud (1895) set out a framework for a matrix. Within this 
matrix are the innate ‘instincts’ of the life and death drives which are akin to signatures or 
patterns of psychological and emotional processing which cannot be re-created. However, in 
order to allow for the psychosignatures to be modulated to, in turn, facilitate learning and 
development/growth, the ego, id and superego, mechanisms within the matrix, act in the 
capacity of facilitators allowing this modulation. The input of information from experiences, 
from birth onwards, and output of thoughts and behaviours - actions and reactions/responses - 
are thus influenced. Freud created the topographies to facilitate an understanding of the 
psychological system and that of emotions – namely pain which is the result of ‘loss of the 
object’.  This pain appears to be akin to pain that results from a physical injury; in fact the 
reactions and affects are the same. As has been evidenced in further research (i.e. Gamsa 
1994), physical and psychological functioning is correlative. For example, as evidenced in 
Freud’s theory of hysteria, a physical symptom is the manifestation of an (unresolved, 
unconscious) emotional trauma.  
This is significant to my thesis, not because there is one type of pain or the other 
(physical or psychological) but instead, that both types of pain ‘register’ in the psychological 
system and become part of the emotional make up and in turn, influences how we respond to 
stimuli, whether it is physical or psychological.  My argument therefore, is that the initial 
response to pain registers, primarily from an emotional premise, which is the relational 
sphere of being human.  
In his Project (1895) Freud discussed the impact of and the responses to internal and 
external stimuli, through the nervous system.  He postulated that responses to stimuli are 
facilitated by permeable and impermeable neurons.  This process creates the environment that 
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allows for the formation of memory, perception and motives thereof, for example, facilitating 
the satisfaction of the ‘exigencies of life’ such as hunger, (p: 297). Satisfaction of hunger 
would be one of the innate drives, which are part of the creation of the psychosignature, and 
would work toward this end.  In the case of hunger not readily being satisfied, the ‘pain’ of 
anxiety is clear in the cries of a hungry baby. 
Freud (1895) proposed, initially, that pain was a failure of the ‘contrivances’ of the 
‘biological nature’ that have limits to their efficiency’, (p: 306). Therefore, it was the failure 
of the physical body’s protective mechanisms that caused pain. However, what of 
psychological pain? He wanted to understand the pain that was obvious in the occurrence of 
anxiety.   
In the case of an anxiety pain response there was no physical ‘peripheral stimulation’, 
however, Freud posited that perhaps there is a similarity in that ‘…the intense cathexis of 
longing which is concentrated on the missed object (a cathexis which steadily mounts up 
because it cannot be appeased) creates the same economic conditions as are created by an 
injured part of the body. Thus, the fact of the peripheral causation of physical pain can be left 
out of the account’ (ibid, p: 171).   
Pain, therefore, has its roots in (innate as well as learned) physical as well as 
psychological experiences. Therefore, when we speak of psychological and/or emotional 
pain, the answer goes beyond the awareness of a sudden or an acute event that causes 
psychological or physical impact. The definition of pain, as discussed in my thesis, is that it is 
a conglomerate of past, traumatic, neurobiological, psychological and emotional imprints that 
influence our day to day life - pain as in suffering or being in pain.   
 From these formulations, I argue that there is a distinct possibility for the existence of 
what I have named a psychomatrix within the structure of the (unconscious) mind. I 
conceptualise it as being patterns of pain (loss - abandonment, grief, rejection, desire) 
 
27 
 
imprinted in infancy which form their own psychological and emotional ‘neural loops’.  As 
pain is triggered these ‘loops’ become more ingrained, as memory triggers are translated and 
coded to create a continuous experience of suffering and being in pain on the map of our 
emotional self within the unconscious mind. This is also true for positive emotions, such as 
love and joy, however I argue that pain is the primary, and most significant, emotion that 
needs to be understood in order to understand the others that are triggered on the same neural 
– psychological and physical – pathways.   
This is based on the concept of Melzack’s neuromatrix which is within the structure 
of the brain.  I propose that regardless of how one experiences pain the experience is 
imprinted in the emotional system in the unconscious mind, and what I propose is a matrix 
within which the psychomatrix is created.  Within the psychomatrix is formed the 
psychosignature, which figure into the processing of the conglomerate of pain. As the mind 
attempts to resolve certain traumas (depending on which is triggered during the course of life) 
the emotional state is activated by the activities within the psychomatrix. Since it is not 
possible to fully resolve the trauma (to go back to the point before it took place), the pain 
continues, as emotional residues or imprints are left behind - creating a sense of suffering or 
being in pain. This brings me to my main argument, which is that it is not this feeling or 
sensation of pain as such, but the relationship – the complexities of the awareness of this 
presence - to this pain that impacts the individual’s existence as well as his or her identity.  
Freud’s Project has been reviewed and further investigated by several researchers, 
such as Pontalis (1981) and Solms (1998) and appreciated for its neurological as well as 
psychological contributions to modern day theoretical formulation. He laid the foundation for 
research which has taken us into a better understanding of the psychological and emotional 
mechanisms of human development within which rests the primary aspects of identity and 
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existence. The correlations to neurology are significant and would not be understood without 
the ‘science’ of psychology and Freud’s efforts to marry the two. 
In exploring Freud’s work, Pontalis (1981) identified that there were three phases that 
the psychoanalytic explanation of pain traversed. He acknowledged Freud’s formulation of 
object loss being the prevalent category and in the first phase, anxiety and pain have both 
been identified in relation to object loss. However, in the second phase he lists four categories 
in relation to pain: 1) Freud’s (1895) Project, identified pain as the consequence of a breach 
in the protective shield, 2) pain acts as a ‘constant instinctual excitation’, 3) pain is 
independent of the experience of need and 4) pain emanates from the ‘periphery’.  At this 
point, Freud did not connect pain to the anxiety reaction in object loss. In the third phase 
however, he states that Freud’s further research brought him to a new understanding of pain.  
Here Freud (1895) saw that the expenditure of energy would be the same ‘whether in the case 
of cathexis of longing concentrated upon the missing or lost object or in the case of cathexis 
concentrated upon an injured part of the body.’ (p: 197-198).  
The significance of this explanation to my proposal is that even in 1895 Freud 
identified that the effect of pain was the same whether it was physical or psychological.  
Freud’s scientific research, in the late 19th and early 20th  Centuries, as well as that of 
other scientists such as, Melzack and Wall (1965, 1986, 1993, 1996, 2001), Livingston 
(1976), Merskey (1967, 1978. 1985), Pontalis (1981), Gamsa (1994), Solms (1998), Pribram 
and Gill (1976, 1998) Ramachandran (1998), Schore (2001), and others today,  has shown 
that the mechanisms of the body and the brain are influenced by biologically embedded 
coding, and the endogenous development of processing mechanisms. Melzack and Wall 
(1986) acknowledge the significance of Freud’s point of view even though their research is 
neuroscientific. To validate their scientific view they acknowledge that ‘even Freud regarded 
pain with a major psychological basis as also having an organic substrate such as muscle 
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tension’ (p: 31).  The perspective that pain has to have a neurobiological component 
continues to be a paradigm that urges researchers to provide evidence for even those 
psychological phenomena that are unexplainable. The definition of psychological and 
emotional pain thus, remains elusive even in this century although, one sees suffering or 
being in pain everywhere and as Freud did in his clinical work, we continue to see our 
patients’ emotional suffering as something which needs to be investigated from an 
emotional/psychological perspective. 
I will explore these theories to map the excitatory and inhibitory processes of pain, 
including Melzack’s theory of the existence of a ‘neuromatrix’ in relation to physical and 
psychological pain processes and perception.  Melzack explains that the brain perceives the 
body as a certain ‘whole’. Even when there is a ‘cut’ or dismemberment, either from birth or 
caused during one’s life, the brain’s mechanism continues to perceive the body as a ‘whole’, 
therefore behaving as if it is a ‘whole’ (1993, p: 621).  This phenomenon, I believe, is what 
figures into the notion of ‘mourning a loss’, and the efforts of the neurological and 
psychological systems to compensate for what was once perceived as an attached, essential 
member of a dynamic subject – the body and the mind.  Melzack (1993) stated that ‘[T]he 
brain does more than detect and analyse inputs; it generates perceptual experience even when 
no external inputs occur’ (ibid, p: 628).   
This compares to what Pontalis (1981) identified as the ‘third phase’ of Freud’s 
theory of pain, as stated above. I argue that these ‘perceptual experiences’, although detected 
in the mechanisms of physiology, become part of the emotional and psychological dynamics 
of the development of the subject’s relationship with pain, where they are further translated in 
the identification of self and the meaning of existence.   
Scientific research since Freud has progressed to explain the many, if not all the 
mysteries of pain, particularly of the relationship between physical and psychological pain.  
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Further research continues into the complexities of emotions and feelings within the cognitive 
mechanisms involving pain. Since the beginning of their work in the 1960’s Melzack and 
Wall have introduced ‘The gate control theory of pain’, theories on the ‘phantom limb 
syndrome’ and the ‘neuromatrix’ (Melzack 1965 - 1993). 
Freud’s (1895) effort to create a framework to explain psychology from a scientific 
point of view and to impress the correlations and influence of neurobiology on psychology in 
his Project has not, after all, been in vain as his theory is articulated by on-going research. An 
example of this is found in Pribram’s writing suggesting that  
‘Freud emphasized not the drive basis of motivation, but its basis in the memory-
motive structure developed in the core brain (the basal forebrain), not the cortex.  
Only later, when Freud began to believe that memory became distorted by the surge 
of hormones at puberty, did he ascribe an overwhelming importance to drives (by that 
time called the id…). (…) Clark Hull took up Freud’s later emphasis on drive and 
applied it to learning…’ (1998, p: 13). 
 
Recently, in examining Freud’s 1895 Project, Schore (2001) states that Freud’s 
germinal hypotheses concerning the regulatory structures and dynamics of the system 
unconscious has translated its significance to the theory of attachment. Here is one primary 
example where the pain of object loss becomes visible and begins to enter the dimension of 
relationships which is the core element in the processes of life, particularly in the 
management of trauma - suffering/being in pain.  
This will set the stage for further discussions in this thesis and the exploration of 
Freud’s theories of the unconscious and sexuality which impact every aspect of human 
behaviour.  Throughout his works, from his all-important, ‘Project for a Scientific 
Psychology’(1895), ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ (1900), ‘Three Essays On The Theory of 
Sexuality’ (1905), ‘On Narcissism’ (1914), ‘Beyond The Pleasure Principle’ (1920), The Ego 
and The Id (1923) to ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’ (1926[1925]) and ‘Civilization and 
its Discontents’ (1930[1929]), Freud outlined the significance of the formation of 
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relationships throughout the stages of an individual’s development and its central role in 
human sexuality and the unconscious.   
The relationship between sexuality and the unconscious is an essential component in 
analysing the subject’s relationship with his pain. Pain becomes an entity in the subject’s life, 
from the first moment of the experience of loss, which evolves through the developmental 
stages.  It is an object of attention which is brought by the subject into every life event and 
circumstance.  It is an object such as a ‘partner’ – one who compels pleasure - and demands 
the same emotional attention.  It is thus a key element in the subject’s unconscious and 
sexuality as any other relational entity in the subject’s life. Therefore, pain has the power to 
inspire or destroy.   Freud has evidenced throughout his work that we are lived by our 
unconscious and its drives in the sense that they determine all human activities and the 
trajectory of each individual’s course of life. 
 Relationships seem to be the source of one’s major traumatic experiences and the 
basis of one’s psychological pain.  If we see ourselves in relation to others the question is: 
what do we see?  As a sexual being the primary view the subject has of himself, then, is 
sexual.  As relational beings we locate ourselves and the purpose of our existence through our 
connections and interactions with others.  Due to this, fear of loss (and actual loss) figures as 
the central point of one’s pain. I propose that as one develops these relationships to others 
one develops a relationship with pain.   
The dichotomy of pleasure and pain and the impossibility of satisfaction in pleasure 
will be evidenced in my discussions on Freud’s theories on loss, perversion and narcissism as 
well as his theory on the life and death instincts. The discussion will inform my argument of 
the existence of a psychomatrix and its significance and influence on the subject-pain 
relationship and behaviour. As the neuromatrix embodies the working of the body/self, the 
psychomatrix, specifically, embodies the workings of the mind/self and the conglomerate of 
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pain. In examining the subject-pain relationship it would then follow that I also acknowledge 
the notion of pain as the object (of desire). Since this notion and the significance of the 
objectification of pain, is what gives my thesis its premise, this thread will run through my 
whole investigation. 
The word ‘relationship’, by and large, has an emotional association within the varied, 
be it positive or negative, scenarios of human interactions, between the subject and his or her 
significant object or objects of attention.  For example, one’s parent, child, sexual partner and 
so on.  There are also those objects of wider relationships within society such as religious 
faiths and cultural beliefs in gods and devils – higher entities that give one a sense of 
boundaries, accountability, protection, security, escape as well as a sense of euphoria or 
despair - and other powers that influence one’s life. All of these, I propose, invariably, affect 
one’s more personal relationships but, especially the relationship with one’s pain and 
therefore one’s ‘self’ and the meaning of one’s existence.   
The relationship between subject and pain, then, is no different as it entails all the 
emotional dimensions of any other relationship including the sense of responsibility – herein 
lies the meaning of being in pain. Pain is what influences all aspects of our lives – our 
thoughts and behaviour.  However, decisions to act in spite of (or because of or due to) our 
pain is a responsibility that lies within the individual’s sphere of control.  Therefore, working 
through certain past, unresolved emotional trauma can be beneficial in gaining a better 
comprehension of why suffering/being in pain is part of our lives and the processes of our 
thoughts and behaviour.  
Psychoanalytic and psychological research has made great progress in the study of the 
self, neurosis and psychosis, the unconscious, repression, anxieties and defence mechanisms, 
human sexuality, relationships and the duality of pain and pleasure.  However, it has yet to 
take a firm stand on the subject of psychological and emotional pain. When we treat someone 
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for depression or anxieties or even, addiction, chronic pain and phantom limb syndromes, we 
fail to speak in terms of the individual being in pain. It is usually about having pain as in 
having a disease.  
A disease model is a model of chronic, enduring, persistent problems that need to be 
treated on a continuum of pathology – a process and progression of a condition that is 
separate and a deviation from the normal.  The label itself may lead to significant emotional 
trauma and distress.  The ramifications are serious and may affect certain lifestyle decisions, 
for example, decisions around having children, career choice and attitude toward oneself and 
others. The benefit of diagnosing someone as diseased would be in linking certain symptoms 
to a legitimate disease and clarification of personal responsibility, and improved access to 
appropriate health care, (Temple, McLeod, Galliger & Wright 2001, p: 807).   
To say that an individual has a disease due to his being in psychological and 
emotional pain would be to condemn him to a lifetime without hope throwing him into a 
situation that compels him to make decisions that are psychologically or physically 
unbeneficial to living a productive life. I would argue that it is essential to realise that this 
pain will impact all dimensions of one’s life. For example, a recent study indicates that 
psychological distress impacts long-term disability consistently and that ‘depression and 
stress individually were both partial mediators in the pain-disability relationship’ (Hall et al 
2011, p: 1049). 
It needs to be emphasized that, even though the scenarios I discuss in this thesis are 
those that could be said to be of individuals with diseases, I do not consider their respective 
psychological and emotional pain to be a disease.  Rather, it is to demonstrate that 
psychological and emotional pain (even though these may be caused by physical, 
psychological and or environmental trauma) can become viewed as an attribute of one’s life 
from a perspective of it being a disease that, in turn, may have a detrimental effect on a 
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person’s identity and how he views himself. I do not intend to depict pain, which I discuss in 
this thesis to be pathological and outside the ‘normal’ sphere of human existence.  On the 
contrary, in reference to Schopenhauer’s (1969) theory on pain, it is a necessary component 
of our existence, that is always with us, and needs to be understood to inspire and enrich life 
(p: 318-319).  I propose that we cannot hope to ‘understand and be inspired’ by something 
unless we have a relationship or emotional connection with it. 
Conclusion 
My curiosity is sparked by the many patients, clients and others who live rewarding 
and successful lives, in spite of pain, (physical and or psychological/emotional).  What is the 
difference between this group of people and those who cannot live with their pain and whose 
lives are destroyed with a sort of emotional paralysis of the mind? I can, at the same time, 
appreciate the fact that there are a plethora of cultural, religious, environmental, social, 
psychological, biological, organic, developmental and historical factors influencing how one 
relates to, and thinks and feels about, his own pain.  The point to stress is this – one relates to, 
thinks and feels, a certain way about his own pain. In other words the psychological and 
emotional make-up of the body, brain and mind of the individual need to be considered as a 
whole when considering a treatment process for an individual with a presenting problem of 
pain – be it a broken bone, a broken heart, a phantom limb, chronic pain or, even, an 
addiction. I view this as significant in understanding that its affect (emotional) not sensation 
(physical) is the more important and which figures in the subject/pain connection or 
relationship. 
From the beginning of our existence our unconscious has been storing imprints of 
memories from our experiences.  Into the unconscious, as Freud postulated, are repressed, 
unacceptable memories - urges and instincts, traumatic events and experiences – a 
conglomerate which I have named pain.  Pain, as such, impacts one as unpleasure or 
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suffering, not one particular experience at a time but as a conglomerate. This overshadows 
and influences the subject’s development, manifesting in its various forms, and levels of 
painful intensities, as the subject strives to achieve the opposite – pleasure.  However the pain 
persists in one’s life. As Schopenhauer (1969) postulated that at the end of the day the 
pleasure that is achieved is merely a ‘deliverance from a pain and so the desire and therefore 
the pleasure ceases’ (p: 319).   
 The duality of pain and pleasure tend to rule one’s progress through life. What is 
repressed, as Freud (1920) postulated, in the unconscious, struggles to the surface of 
consciousness only to be censored by the reality principle on its way towards some form of 
discharge, the aim being pleasure, governed by the pleasure principle and what is beyond the 
pleasure principle.  
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Chapter Two 
From Freud’s Project to Melzack’s Neuromatrix 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall examine Freud’s (1895) Project as well as Melzack and Wall’s 
research that began in the 1960s through to Melzack’s (1993, 2006) continuing research on 
pain processing focussing on his theory of the neuromatrix. There will also be references to 
other, researchers such as Pontalis (1981), Pribram and Gill (1976), Solms (1998), 
Ramachandran (1998) and Schore (2001) to evidence my thesis.  
The significance in doing so is to examine how the processing of pain, within Freud’s 
theory of his 1895 Project and Melzack’s theory of the neuromatrix in the 1990’s, influences 
my concept of the existence of the psychomatrix which figures in the subject’s relationship 
with his pain.  Here we will also see links between psychological and emotional pain and its 
development by looking at the activities of the nervous system.   
Tracing the similarities between Freud’s work in the Project and Melzack’s concept 
of the neuromatrix will be an endeavour to identify two issues: (1) that what Freud started to 
speak about and set down in his work of 1895 laid the scientific foundations for the 
discoveries that have been made today regarding the links between psychological and 
neurological pain and (2) that there are some phenomena within psychic pain that cannot be 
explained neuroscientifically. These can only be identified by the manifestations of human 
behaviour which is, I propose, contingent upon the relationship which the subject develops 
with his pain.   
I argue that Suffering or being in pain betrays the subject/pain relationship which is an 
entity that exists due to the existence of memory, motive, consciousness and perception. 
Freud’s explanations, in the end, were psychological or rather meta-psychological as he 
developed psychoanalysis as a treatment for human suffering. As Pribram and Gill (1976) 
state: ‘Clinical theory, better labelled ‘psychology’ (though Freud originally used the term 
 
37 
 
psychology for what is now called metapsychology), encompasses those formulations derived 
from observations in the analytic situation and stated in the intentional language of 
motivations and meanings; while metapsychology describes the mechanisms of such mental 
functioning’ (p: 10). 
Pain, particularly emotional pain, is an entity that has eluded definition throughout 
human history. Each age, from antiquity to our modern technological era has had, and has, its 
own perspective and definition of pain.  Be that as it may, pain, it is agreed, is a personal 
experience and each individual has his own way of contending with it.  I propose that the 
common denominator is that pain is made up of a conglomerate of each individual’s 
experiences, physical or psychological. This pain (subjective though it may be), becomes an 
entity or object akin to a life partner to be contended with throughout each individual’s life.  
According to Freud’s clinical observations his patients presented with emotional pain due to 
historical, unresolved, emotional trauma. Their pain took on a variety of forms such as 
hysterical symptom where, for example, a part of the body functioning would be affected.  
As far back in history as the period of the Greek Tragedies, as aptly described by Rey 
(1995), this ‘Pain is perceived almost as an independent being which takes possession of the 
subject, invades it and takes over,’  so ‘consuming’ and ‘devouring’ its victim’ (p:14-15). 
This period in Greek history is interesting in its depiction and dramatization of 
tragedy, pain and suffering, as pain is viewed as an awesome power. It invokes fear as well as 
excitement.   Pain is likened to a wild, ravaging animal: ‘it is not possible to tame savage pain 
because of its intensity and also because one cannot predict when and how it will occur’ 
(ibid, p: 15). The sufferer is the ‘hunted’.  ‘(…) the traditional relationship between man and 
beast is reversed: ‘pain stalks its prey and overcomes it at the most convenient moment.’ Its 
mission is to kill but before that to make its victim suffer…  In the Tragedies pain is an 
essential dimension that tells of the power of the ‘will of the gods’, leaving the sufferer with 
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no control, but to embrace his suffering, so much so that when the pain is at its worst the 
sufferer becomes the pain that invades him – he becomes lost and ‘like a diseased animal on 
the prowl’.  He attacks with unrelenting cries - his body ‘writhing’ and contorting… ‘To 
explain the terrible nature of pain, Greek texts simply say that it is unapproachable’ (ibid, p: 
15).   
Even in present day conception of pain, any pain is looked upon as an outside entity, 
an object of power to be reckoned with.  The relationship may be one of slave and master – 
subject and object of fear as well as desire – as if the suffering must be just right in order to 
appease the gods perhaps for greater gains of pleasure. However, we know, from a 
psychoanalytic point of view, this is not possible.  There are no ultimate pleasures but only 
more pain. 
Freud (1905, 1909, 1923, etc.) uses the Greek myth of Oedipus (Sophocles fifth 
century B.C.) as the perfect metaphor to his explanation of psychological and emotional pain. 
He evidences here his theory of the unconscious and sexuality. He establishes that pain is a 
component of human development from the beginning of one’s life, from birth and the loss of 
the womb, to death and loss of his life and a return to ultimate equilibrium – to that from 
which he came. Oedipus is the paradigm for the greatest of human pains, namely the 
complexities of human relationships.  Here there is fear and anxiety, abandonment, loss and 
depression, love and hate, jealously, rage, guilt and punishment. Oedipus seems to have 
traversed his whole life with nothing less than this conglomerate of pain.   
What is it that compels one to choose a certain path in life? The answer is an 
insurmountable task.  However, one thing that Freud seemed to be sure of and evidenced in 
his work is that whatever is imprinted in the unconscious impacts our decisions and 
behaviour.  The unconscious mind is the driving force in one’s life. Within it lies the 
conglomerate of experiences which make up the entity of emotional pain.  I argue that, hence 
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this is what the subject develops a relationship with.  This is what impacts the process of his 
psychological and more essentially his emotional development. 
2.1  Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology 
In the Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud proposed that the cognitive 
mechanisms of normal and abnormal mental phenomena could be explained through an 
orderly and rigorous study of brain systems. He pursued a scientific explanation for causes of 
human behavioural manifestations that were observed in his clinical work.  He set out to 
explain his scientific theory in his 1895 Project and stated that ‘[T]he intention is to furnish a 
psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as 
quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those 
processes perspicuous and free from contradiction’ (p: 295). 
According to Solms (1998), one of the academic problems that Freud faced in those 
days was that of consciousness and memory.  He quotes from Freud’s (1891/1954, p: 56) 
monograph on aphasia: 
‘What then is the physiological correlate of the simple idea emerging or reemerging? 
Obviously, nothing static, but something in the nature of a process.  This process is 
not incompatible with localization. It starts at a specific point in the cortex and from 
there it spreads over the whole cortex along certain pathways. When this event has 
taken place it leaves behind the possibility of a memory, in the part of the cortex 
affected.  It is very doubtful whether this physiological event is in any way associated 
with something psychic.  Our consciousness contains nothing that would, from the 
psychological point of view, justify the term “latent memory image.” Yet whenever 
the same cortical state is elicited again, the previous psychic event re-emerges as a 
memory’ (p: 4). 
 
Freud assumed that the ‘underlying modifications’ must be physical as he ‘could not 
conceive of the possibility that something non-conscious could be described as a “memory”.’  
It did not make sense to him, at the time, to consider the underlying ‘modifications’ had a 
psychological basis. Therefore in his Project he ‘…laid the stress in psychology on the 
somatic processes’ (ibid). 
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However, another major issue was that, at the time, there was a lack of scientific 
knowledge available linking the somatic to the psychic leaving much to ‘speculation, 
imaginings, transpositions, and guesses…’ (ibid, p: 4-5).  
When Freud made the transition from neuropsychology to psychoanalysis he had 
established in his mind that there were mental processes that could not be explained within 
the models of physiological processes yet, he hoped that one day there would be. He resigned 
to making use of what he knew first hand in his clinical observations: ‘transforming his 
clinical knowledge into a hypothetical neurological machine, Freud laid the foundation for a 
future neuropsychology, but the knowledge itself remained psychological’, (ibid, p: 8). His 
key perspective was that there were physical processes as well as psychological processes, 
some of which were conscious and some were unconscious and the unconscious processes 
could be inferred by the conscious ones.  Consciousness had two features, an external 
perception of the world and an internal perception of the inner workings of the mind, ‘which 
represents the unconscious reality that lies within us in the form of subjective states of 
awareness – such as memories, beliefs, and desires’ (ibid). 
In his Project, Freud (1895 [1950]) explains that the nervous system relies on the 
principle of inertia as well as on the ‘quantity-screens’ set up by the ‘nerve-endings’ to filter 
the impact of stimuli of the external world.  ‘All contrivances of a biological nature have 
limits to their efficiency, beyond which they fail.  This failure is manifested in phenomena 
which border on the pathological…’ (p: 306). Thus, he describes the cause of pain 
neurologically – ‘a failure of the system to protect the subject from the impact of external 
stimuli’.  Pain that remains with the subject, beyond the initial impact of a stimulus, is an 
imprint of the experience left on the memory system of the brain and the mind influencing the 
judgment process and motivation toward the satisfaction of desire.  
 
41 
 
Pribram and Gill (1976) have explained that according to the Project there are two 
types of neurons that carry stimuli - permeable and impermeable.  The permeable (φ) 
neurones allow stimuli to pass through and remain unaltered and ‘…by virtue of contact with 
the environment are primarily responsible for reception and motor discharge…’ whereas the 
impermeable (ψ) neurones resist and retain affect, ‘…on the other are those systems in 
contact with endogenous excitation which are for the most part given over to retention.’ 
Freud was most concerned with the impermeable system of neurons because, ‘…this 
selective facilitation is the basis of memory trace.’ They express Freud’s views that, ‘[A] 
psychological theory deserving any consideration must furnish an explanation of ‘memory’. 
This was described by Freud in neurological terms that all psychological retentions depend 
on the communication between the impermeable systems of neuronal ‘contact barriers’ (p: 66       
– 69). 
Pribram and Gill (1976) further discussed here that ‘repeated transmission lowers 
synaptic resistance’ to allow an increase in response to stimuli. However, there is also an 
increase in what is retained in the nervous system.  This was significant in explaining certain 
psychological activities, such as, memory which is ‘evidently one of the powers which 
determine and direct its pathway, and, if facilitation were everywhere equal, it would not be 
possible to see why one pathway should be preferred.  We can therefore say still more 
correctly that memory is represented by the differences in the facilitations between the 
impermeable neurons’ (ibid: 66-69). 
Memory and motive are then accordingly derived from the impact of internal and 
external stimuli and the responses of the physiological nervous system.  Pribram and Gill 
(1976) cite Glover (1947) who proposes ‘that the basic structural concept of psychoanalysis 
is a memory trace.’  And that: 
‘(…) memories are the retrospective aspects of the facilitations; motives the 
prospective aspects (see Pribram 1962). In retrospect, facilitations result from and 
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thus reflect the experiences of the organism; prospectively they are feed forward 
programmes that run themselves off to completion thus guiding motivating behaviour. 
We must recall in this respect that the Project was written at a time when Freud still 
believed that the verbal reports of his patients reflected accurately the actual 
occurrences they had experienced in childhood’ (p :70-71). 
Freud later modified this theory when his findings indicated the perception of his 
patients’ experiences  can be ‘distorted’ during the stage of puberty and the development of 
the drive system. 
‘These modifications took the form, foreshadowed in the Project (p: 316), of an 
increased abstraction and autonomy of that part of ψ – the ‘nuclear neurons’, the 
‘nucleus of the ψ’, a ‘sympathetic ganglion’ - which receives, in the main, the 
excitations of endogenous origin - the part which is in later writings to becomes the 
id’ (ibid).  
Freud (1895) explained that, ‘consciousness is the subjective side of one part of the 
physical processes in the nervous system, namely of the ω processes; and the omission of 
consciousness does not leave psychical events unaltered but involves the omission of the 
contribution from ω’ (p: 311).  (ω - System of perceptual neurons: Freud (1895 [1950]), p: 
294). 
The primary processes, the rapid discharge and flow of energy, can be evidenced 
within mechanisms ‘such as drive, pain, unpleasure, and the initial production of affect and 
wish’. The secondary processes are  ‘behaviour processes, from wishes which are simple 
memory-motive structures through the operation of defences and satisfaction, to behaviour 
controlled by an executive ego’ is the accumulation of or ‘bound’ energy caused by ‘barriers’ 
or ‘resistance’ to discharge. This, in turn, results in the slower discharge of energy.  This 
bound energy, then, is the cathexis that consciousness attaches itself to, (ibid, p: 28). 
The ‘nature of the ego’ is the complex of neurons, the nuclear neurons that receive 
endogenous stimuli and regulate these barriers to satisfaction of wishes. The id is part of the 
make-up of the nucleus of the permeable neuron that receives the stimuli of the ‘endogenous 
origin’ - the rapid discharge of energy without resistance. The permeable neurons are 
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subdivided to primarily allow perception of the quality of external stimuli, i.e. colour, texture, 
shape, taste and sound. The other reason is to allow for cathexis - the conduction and 
‘periodicity’ of the quantity of energy - between the permeable (φ) and impermeable (ψ) 
neurons. 
The ‘motive structure’ depends on the selectivity of contact barriers and affects the 
‘organism’s behaviour’.  Memory is influenced by both endogenous and exogenous stimuli 
which, in turn, ‘contribute to the formation of each facilitation’.   When presented with the 
‘exigencies of life’ such as hunger, respiration and sexuality, from the endogenous stimuli, 
the ‘principle of inertia is breached’ and must be satisfied by the ‘external world’- for 
example, nutrition. The linkage of motive and memory in the structure of the wish is one of 
the fundamental contributions of psychoanalysis and is significant to the ‘particular 
conditions’ that are called ‘specific actions’ that are triggered by an ‘endogenous stimuli’ 
such as hunger, (ibid, p: 71-89). 
Freud’s (1895) attempt at mapping out the structures of the nervous system which in 
turn impacted on the structures of the mechanisms of the psychological system was 
significant to the identification of the development of patterns of neuron behaviour within the 
organism.  This in turn identified patterns of pathological developments due to excessive 
stimulus and breaches, or a ‘break through’ in the fidelity of the protective mechanisms 
causing acute or chronic trauma such as physical/psychological pain or unpleasure.   
Freud’s work on the Project influenced all his subsequent work. His theory of pain is 
evidenced throughout his work and according to Pontalis (1981): 
‘…one cannot but be aware of the fact that a whole dimension, always present on the 
horizon of human experience - pain – returns time and again in the work of Freud, 
almost in spite of himself.  The key-text here is certainly ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ (1920g).  So what is this remainder, so honestly and imperatively sought by 
Freud, this something that in the end neither the pleasure principle nor even 
masochism can quite encompass? What is it that is in the proper sense, beyond the 
principle of unpleasure-pleasure, if it is not pain?’ (p: 197). 
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The pleasure principle is guided by the ‘principle of constancy’ or keeping the 
‘excitation’ in the ‘mental apparatus’ down to as low a level as possible.  The aim is to avoid 
unpleasure or stimulation over a certain limit, (Freud 1920, p: 9). Freud (1920) also spoke of 
the ‘Nirvana Principle’ that is compelled by the death instinct which is the desire of the 
organism to return to an inanimate state.  Once excitation is satisfied, however, there is a 
need or desire for further satisfaction as stimuli from life’s demands, from within and without 
the organism, exercise their various pressures. ‘The Nirvana principle’, he maintains, is to be 
attributed to the ‘death instinct’, and its modification into the pleasure principle is due to the 
influence of the ‘life instinct’ or libido’ (p: 50-56). 
A recent study published by the International Association for the Study of Pain 
suggests that the Project contains ‘surprisingly precise concepts of the possibility for memory 
to be represented by long-lasting alterations of synaptic transmission’. 
It further affirms Freud’s Project theories by stating that, 
‘the employment of mathematical models, computer simulations, and experiments on 
single cerebral neurons have for some time now confirmed Freud’s insight, indicating 
in fact how information  is better stored and retained when there is a mere variable 
degree of synaptic facilitation induced among the thousands of synapses existing in a 
given neuronal network’ (Centonze et al. 2004, p: 311). 
2.2      Melzack and Wall’s Neurological Theory of Pain 
The theory of pain has been explored from a variety of perspectives – philosophical, 
sociological, psychological, and scientific - throughout time, a challenging task that has, even 
today, been without specific, satisfactory results. However, research continues.  Melzack and 
Wall (1996, p: 44-46) have identified three possible theories: the first being that ‘pain is a 
sensory experience evoked by stimuli’ where there is ‘real or threatened tissue damage.’ 
However, this definition falls short because there can be pain whether or not these conditions 
are present.  The second theory ‘refers to a personal, private sensation of hurt’.  This, too, was 
unacceptable as it begs the question, what is ‘hurt’? The answer would be ‘pain’ and ‘a 
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circular argument’ ensues.  The third seems to be closest to a further understanding of this 
pervasive entity, and the most significant to this investigation.  These two scientists refer to 
the definition by Merskey et al. (1986), who states that, ‘pain is an unpleasant sensory and 
emotional dimension of experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage’, and 
appreciate the fact that it mentions the ‘link between injury and pain’, and acknowledges the 
emotional and sensory dimensions of the experience of pain.  
To Melzack and Wall, in 1996, the problem was the usage of the expression 
‘unpleasant’, as to them ‘unpleasant’ did not begin to express the reality of the multiple 
dimensions of this experience that is called ‘pain’.  It can make some people scream and 
fight, undergo crippling, disfiguring operations, or even commit suicide. ‘What are missing in 
the word ‘unpleasant’ are the misery, anguish, desperation and urgency that are part of some 
pain experiences. The qualities of ‘unpleasantness’ are complex and comprise multiple 
dimensions that have yet to be determined’ (1996, p: 45).   
One of these dimensions is that of emotional pain that lives in a realm of the 
psychological systems that influence thoughts and behaviours.  
Their summary of these definitions is that the word ‘pain’ represents a category of 
experiences, signifying a multitude of different, unique experiences having different causes, 
and characterized by different qualities varying along a number of sensory, affective and 
evaluative dimensions. (ibid: 46). This work represents a part of the modern day research that 
has uncovered some essential aspects of the integration of physical and psychological 
mechanisms, particularly in the study of pain, an endeavour that began with Freud’s Project 
of 1895.   
Melzack and Wall (1993) developed the concept of the ‘Gate Control Theory’ in 1965 
(not presented until 1970) that explained the ‘modulation of inputs in the spinal dorsal horns 
and the dynamic role of the brain in pain processes. (…) Psychological factors, which were 
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previously dismissed as “reaction to pain”, were now seen to be an integral part of pain 
processing…’ The significant contribution of this theory was that it emphasised the 
mechanisms of the central nervous system and to the establishment of the role of the brain as 
an active system that filters, selects and modulates inputs.  In his article, Pain: Past, Present 
and Future, Melzack explains that ‘the gate control theory of pain’ proposes that, 
‘a mechanism in the dorsal horns of the spinal cord acts like a gate which inhibits or 
facilitates transmission from the body to the brain on the basis of the diameters of the 
active peripheral fibers as well as the dynamic action of brain processes. As a result, 
psychological variables such as past experiences, attention and other cognitive 
activities have been integrated into current research and therapy on pain processes.’ 
(1993, p: 615-619).   
 
I propose that when considering the ‘gate control theory’ we may view ‘gate’ as a 
metaphor for a defence mechanism that prevents certain unconscious memories from rising to 
the surface of consciousness.  The ‘dorsal horns’ controls the quality and intensity of physical 
pain and the body’s response to external stimuli.  This could be compared to the activities of 
the ‘ego’ in modulating psychic pain, such as repression, in response to internal or external 
psychological stimuli.   
The dorsal horns were, too, not merely passive transmission stations but sites at which 
dynamic activities – inhibitions, excitations and modulation – occurred.  Melzack and Wall, 
as Freud strived to achieve, acknowledged pain as the motivating factor in subjective 
experiences and human behaviour. They stated that there are specialized systems involved in 
the ‘sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective and evaluative dimensions of pain’ (ibid, 
p: 619). 
Pribram (1993) supports Freud’s Project further for setting up certain foundations for 
future research in spite of various drawbacks.  He stated that,  
‘In the terms of the Project, Freud should have recognized that both pain and 
unpleasure are ‘qualitative’ not ‘quantitative’ conceptions since they are perceived in 
consciousness. Therefore, by his own thesis, some pattern (measurable in terms of 
quality or information) or lack of pattern must be responsible for the perception of 
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pain and unpleasure – a ‘quantitative’ energy explanation is out of place. Freud in fact 
recognized this but belatedly’ (p: 50). 
 
Further, explanations in terms of patterning in pain and unpleasure would have left the 
way open for incorporating the results of subsequent research on the neurological nature of 
pain and its control. More recent research indicates that neurons that can be excited by 
painful stimuli are also excited by ‘touch pressure or proprioceptive manipulations. A control 
process based on a negative feedback mechanism at the spinal cord level has therefore been 
proposed.  When that control is exercised by pattern, stimulation from somatosensory 
receptors, touch, pressure, etc., are perceived; when uncontrolled positive feedback produces 
oscillatory and disruptive stimulation, unpatterned pain is perceived’ (ibid). 
In this instance it seems that Freud was partially correct in proposing that an increase 
in quantity disrupts pattern and this unpatterned excitation is perceived as pain.  However, 
‘conscious awareness of pain, as is the case elsewhere, is dependent on the dimension of 
pattern – the lack of pattern in this case’ (ibid, p: 50). 
2.3       Melzack’s Theory of the Neuromatrix  
Melzack conceptualized that a unified brain mechanism ‘lies at the heart of the new 
theory’ and believes the word “neuromatrix” best characterizes it.  He implied that the matrix 
was something within which something else originates and takes form. It is a widespread 
network of neurons in the brain that make up the ‘anatomical substrate of the body-self’ – an 
imprint or map of the body-self, (1993, p: 623). 
The neuromatrix is a template of the whole unity of the body/self.  It produces the 
characteristic neural pattern for the whole body – the neurosignature. It also produces subsets 
of signature patterns that relate to events at or in different parts of the body. 
The neuromatrix is distributed throughout many areas of the brain and comprises a 
large widespread network of neurons, that consist of loops between the thalamus and the 
cortex as well as the limbic system, which, through repeated cyclical processing and 
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synthesis, generates a characteristic pattern which is the neurosignature which ultimately 
produces the pattern that is felt as a whole body.  Certain parts of the neuromatrix are 
specialised to process major sensory events such as injury, temperature change and 
stimulation of erogenous tissue which impress subsignatures on the larger neurosignature. 
Individual information from the skin, joints, muscles etc., converges to produce the 
experience of a coherent, articulated body. Besides this there are millions of nerve impulses 
at any given time, arriving at the brain, from all of the sensory systems of the body. In the 
same way a pattern or subsignature is created for sensory impulse from injurious event. The 
injury, however, is not pain.  
Pain occurs and is felt in the brain as a quality of experience.  The qualities of 
experience are inherently built in to the brain and not learned.  Meaningful experiences of 
movement, the coordination of limbs, pain in a missing limb – all occur and are felt in the 
brain.   
What is significant in Melzack and Wall’s (1993) research is their mapping of the 
brain functions to explain the impact of internal and external stimuli on the body and mind. 
Of considerable importance is their theory that the “body-self is still present in experience 
even when input from that (missing) part of the body is gone’ (Melzack, 1989).  The ‘spatial 
distribution and synaptic links are initially determined genetically and are later sculpted by 
sensory inputs’.    
These neural loops diverge to allow parallel processing in different components of 
this network. They also converge continually to allow interactions between the ‘output 
products of processing’. This cycle of ‘processing and synthesis’, of the nerve impulses 
through the neuromatrix, conveys a pattern or signature which is characteristic of these 
processes called the neurosignature.  The signature is produced by the patterns of ‘synaptic 
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connections’ or nerve impulse patterns, in the entire neuromatrix.  The signature is imparted 
on all these nerve impulse patterns that flow through the neuromatrix.  
‘All inputs from the body undergo cyclical processing and synthesis so that 
characteristic patterns are impressed on them in the neuromatrix. Portions of the 
neuromatrix are specialized to process information related to major sensory events 
(such as injury, temperature change and stimulation of erogenous tissue) and may be 
labelled as neuromodules which impress subsignatures on the larger neurosignature. 
The neurosignature, which is a continuous outflow from the body-self neuromatrix, is 
projected to areas in the brain - the sentient neural hub (SNH) - in which the stream of 
nerve impulses (the neurosignature modulated by ongoing inputs) is converted into a 
continually changing stream of awareness’(p: 621-622). . (…)  
 
The neurosignature originates and takes form in the neuromatrix and though the 
neurosignature (nerve impulse patterns) may be triggered or modulated by input, the input is 
only a ‘trigger’ and does not produce the neurosignature itself.  
Melzack proposes that there are four components of this conceptual nervous system: 
(1) the body-self neuromatrix, (2) cyclical processing and synthesis in which the 
neurosignature is produced, (3) the sentient neural hub which converts (transduce) the flow of 
neurosignatures into the flow of awareness, and (4) activation of an action neuromatrix to 
provide the pattern of movements to bring about the desired goal or behaviour (ibid). 
The neuromatrix is the central system within the brain, where the signature of specific 
patterns of behaviour originates that may be triggered by stimuli to activate certain responses.  
There is also a ‘characteristic neurosignature’ created within the neuromatrix, according to 
this theory, for the complexity of feelings experienced.   
It is unimaginable how the brain processes the enormous amount of information that it 
receives through all its senses to create the experience of a ‘whole body’.  Melzack states that 
he visualises a genetically build-in neuromatrix for the whole body, producing a 
characteristic neurosignature of the body which carries with it patterns for the innumerable 
qualities we feel.  It seems that the neuromatrix produces a ‘continuous message’ as a result 
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of its cyclical processing and synthesis. This represents the whole body in which details are 
‘differentiated within the whole as inputs come into it’ (ibid, p: 623). 
Following this assumption, ‘pain is not injury; the quality of pain experiences must 
not be confused with the physical event’ but rather ‘…the quality of experience must be 
generated by the structures of the brain’ (ibid). 
Due to the genetic nature of the creation and evolution of these imprints it is not 
necessary for a stimulus to be present for there to be a sense of an experience of pain or the 
experience of being in pain which can be identified as a quality of pain.  The triggers from 
stimuli in turn, then, motivate action towards the satisfaction of needs, wishes and desires. 
Melzack states that: ‘the neuromatrix is a psychologically meaningful unit, developed by both 
heredity and learning, that represents an entire unified entity’ (ibid, p: 625). 
 The neuromatrix unifies the body as a whole and is genetically programmed to 
operate a certain way – as the established neurosignatures dictate.  The unconscious, I 
propose, is also a matrix within which lies a network of emotions and feelings similar to the 
neural network, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
Freud was able to draw up a model for the neurological system’s processes in an 
effort to explain his psychological theory of pain processing. He discovered that the 
neurological system employed certain resistances and defences, via the two types of neurons, 
to control affect, attempting to either inhibit or excite the release of energy, causing certain 
actions and behaviours. He also observed that psychological trauma and physical trauma 
triggered a similar reaction to the experience of having pain.  There appeared to be certain 
elements present, in the systems of the mind also, that were inhibitory or excitatory, yet he 
could not set this down in scientifically tangible, processes. His assumption was that similar 
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processes as those of neuronal activity took place in the mind as well, to produce a similar 
reaction to stimuli. 
Melzack and Wall’s concept of the gate control theory implicated the psychological 
system, as the metaphor of the ‘gate’ can be applied to the ego’s regulatory mechanism. 
Melzack’s (1993) further research into neurological systems brought him to an explanation of 
pain in the absence of peripheral stimuli. This, in turn brought him to his concept of the 
neuromatrix.  This concept also takes Freud’s theory of the modulation of the movement of 
energy through the neuronal systems, perception, memory and motivation, and Wall’s theory 
of the gate control theory one step further.   
Freud wanted to explain further the concepts of consciousness, memory, motive and 
perception within his model in the Project and speculated about imprinted patterns of activity 
within the neural network that produced reaction and behaviour.  He knew that somehow this 
impacted on psychological processes and endeavoured to justify these within the neurological 
model.   
Melzack’s neuromatrix models a system within which all neurological experiences are 
imprinted, creating patterns of activity (impact, actions and reactions), which are triggered 
with each event. Within this matrix there are not only neurological patterns (neurosignature), 
but also psychological patterns.   
The one element which is clear is that pain is the quality of experience which is 
registered in the brain and the mind. On the one hand it is a breach of either the 
neurobiological system or the psychological system, and on the other hand, a protective 
factor, as it warns against harm or distress. For example, if you place your hand on a hot 
burner, pain will make you quickly take your hand away, or if a loved one dies you will feel 
the pain of loss and grief or in other cases remorse is triggered – all aid in the process of 
physical or emotional healing. 
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Freud established that pain is a component of human development within the 
complexities of human relationships.  His theory of pain processing and that of Melzack and 
Wall’s is similar in that it identifies that pain represents a multifaceted category of 
experiences of sensory, affective and evaluative dimensions.  
 A component of both theories of pain processing is that experiences are imprinted in 
the matrices of the brain and mind. These imprints create perceptions, memories and motives 
provoking impetus for either inhibiting or allowing behaviour.  My argument is that memory 
and motive are two important components triggered by an individual’s emotional suffering or 
being in pain (due to historical, unresolved, emotional trauma – physical and/or 
psychological).  The continuous actions of the neurological as well as the psychological 
systems to maintain a certain ‘whole’ create an environment of tensions and anxieties at 
subjective and varying degrees, since a ‘whole’ is not possible. I propose that the variety of 
emotional imprints stored in the unconscious becomes a conglomerate (of pain) which 
collectively affects thought and behaviour throughout the subject’s life. Although, each 
experience will have its own interpretation and manifestation when triggered by certain 
events the pain of loss, as Freud (1895) identified, lies at the heart of being in pain or 
suffering.   I argue that it is with this being in pain that the subject has a relationship and 
which influences how he views himself and his existence.  
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Chapter Three 
The Conceptualization of the Psychomatrix and the Subject-Pain Relationship 
Introduction 
     In chapter two, I discussed Freud’s (1895) theory of pain as set out in his Project 
(1985).  The theories and assumptions which he discussed in this work reverberated 
throughout the rest of his work as he spoke about the processes of mental activity. This is 
particularly evident in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) where he posits that external 
stimuli powerful enough to breach the protective shield can be described as traumatic.  The 
concept of trauma unavoidably implies that there is a connection with this kind of breach that 
fails to protect the organism against noxious stimuli. Such external traumas will, inevitably, 
‘provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism’s energy and sets 
in motion every possible defensive measure.  At the same time, the pleasure principle is for 
the moment put out of action. (…). Cathectic energy is summoned from all sides to provide 
sufficiently high cathexes of energy in environs of the breach.’ (p: 29-30) 
 In the last chapter I also discussed Melzack and Wall’s theories of pain and Melzack’s 
concept of the neuromatrix derived from further research, which began with his and Wall’s 
‘gate control theory’ of pain processing. The common denominator of these pain processing 
systems and the subject being in pain is simply that pain is a multifaceted, subjective 
phenomenon experienced by each individual. 
This chapter will examine some of Freud’s major concepts to evidence the possibility 
of a psychomatrix which functions in tandem with the neuromatrix. Most importantly the 
discussion will endeavour to lead to an understanding of the significance of the concept of the 
psychomatrix to the subject-pain relationship. 
3.1   Freud’s theory of the Unconscious 
 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious holds that a wide array of human behaviour is a 
manifestation of what is hidden within the dimensions of the mental process – the 
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unconscious.  He treated his neurotic patients, displaying certain behaviours, from this frame 
of reference. Their behaviour was meaningful in that they were manifestations of the root 
causes of their sufferings.  He believed that our words and actions were not arbitrary or 
illogical actions but had unconscious motives and meanings behind them. Freud (1923) 
states: 
‘The division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the 
fundamental premise of psycho-analysis; and it alone makes it possible for psycho-
analysis to understand the pathological processes in mental life, which are as common 
as they are important, (…).  Psycho-analysis cannot situate the essence of the 
psychical in consciousness, but is obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the 
psychical, which may be present in addition to other qualities or may be absent’ (p: 
13). 
 The unconscious has implications, then, for all human behaviour.  To use a common 
analogy the conscious has been likened to the tip of an iceberg and what lies beneath is the 
unconscious complexities of the human psyche. 
The instincts or drives are integral parts of the unconscious as they influence 
conscious behaviour.  These are the motivating energies in the mental processes and human 
behaviour.  Freud identified two main instincts – the life instinct, that influences self-
preservation and sexuality, and the death instinct that influences aggression and destruction. 
Both work in tandem to preserve the cycle of life. 
In his first topography Freud divided the mind into three systems/agencies – 
conscious (Cs), preconscious (Ps) and unconscious (Ucs). In the second topographical model 
he creates the structure of the ego, id and superego. Together these structures have been used 
to explain the complexities of the impressions and imprints of past and present of human 
experiences, the various and diverse levels of reactions to these and the multifaceted 
behaviours. These are the mechanisms that influence the processes of, and motivate human, 
actions and reactions to fulfilling desires, and dealing with issues in life, such as, loss, (Freud 
1920, 1923).   
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The unconscious is, of course, the primary concern of my thesis as it has significant 
implications in my proposal of a psychomatrix which, I argue, is a system that sits within the 
matrix of the unconscious. Its purpose is to synthesize the phenomenon of pain and its 
processes. 
3.2   The Psychomatrix  
Similar to the neuromatrix, I propose that there exists a psychomatrix that behaves 
concurrently with the systems of the body and brain. Impressions are generated from 
traumatic, unconscious emotions and repressed representations of historical events that may 
be the psychosignatures created in the matrix.  Emotional stimuli, influenced by these 
signatures, then trigger conscious responses. This, I think may also be a metaphor for Freud’s 
(1920, 1923) life and death instincts. As Melzack (1993) postulates,  the neuromatrix is 
influenced by inherent qualities, Freud has posited that instincts, as well, are inherent 
qualities of life and death that, I suggest, in turn, may facilitate the processes within a 
psychomatrix. 
Freud (1923) states that the two classes of instincts work for as well as against each 
other and that the ‘emergence of life would thus be the cause of the continuance of life and 
also at the same time the striving towards death; and life itself would be a conflict and a 
compromise between these two trends’ (1923, p: 40-41). 
 
The conflicts that Freud discusses are part and parcel of my theory of a relationship 
between the subject and his pain, the development of which, I propose, is inherent within the 
psychomatrix. I suppose that like the ‘dream space’ the unconscious is a ‘space’.  A space 
that holds representations of experiences past and present – however, this data is far from 
being static but dynamic as it morphs according to the processes of development and 
influenced by the psychosignature.   
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The main ‘nodule’ (Melzack 1993) in the psychomatrix is that of a pain signature.   In 
metapsychological terms it is the pain that goes beyond acute physical and psychological 
pain. It is the emotional suffering that influences our responses to situations and events – our 
day to day experiences.  The psychosignature is that of a desire for pain and is influenced by 
the stimuli that are received by the psychomatrix.  I propose that the unconscious is where the 
psychomatrix is situated and has been innately formed to synthesize the complexities and 
ambiguities of pain – that of suffering or ‘being in pain’ (Pontalis 1981).  It is the emotional 
imprint of what is desired as well as undesired by the brain/mind/body schema - pain, during 
a response to internal or external trauma.  
From its space in the psychomatrix, pain, has a long reaching influence on human 
rationale for actions and behaviours. As discussed earlier, research has begun to acknowledge 
the links between physical and psychological pain.  It has identified mechanisms that compel 
processes in the brain that manipulate physical as well as psychological responses. However 
the question of pain, its existence and purpose, has not been scientifically satisfactorily 
explained. 
One thing which is clear is that after an acute event has been treated and the threat has 
been removed, there continues to be pain in varying degrees that lives a complex life in the 
emotional sphere. I suppose that the impression which is left behind is a stimulus that passes 
through the psychomatrix where it is influenced and reorganised by the psychosignature 
which triggers past, emotional and unresolved traumas. Although what is triggered is not 
expressed in such language it is felt within the emotional system of the psychomatrix. This, I 
propose, is the being in pain or suffering - desire for the lost object and a sense of unity - 
which influences thoughts and behaviour.   
The response or output from the psychomatrix then, is behaviour or actions towards 
the aim of maintaining a certain circumstance or situation.  Or, even to maintain an 
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environment that attracts or provokes certain external reactions therefore, creating within the 
subject a sense of satisfaction or pleasure. There are a variety of scenarios that may evidence 
this statement.  However, the ones that I have encountered most often, in the course of my 
work, are those of chronic pain, addictions and phantom limb syndrome which will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  Consider Gamsa’s (1993) statement that: ‘The view that 
emotional states generate or exacerbate pain has a long history’ is a simple statement 
however, with complex implications for the problem of pain (p: 5). 
 Various scientists, such as Merskey (1965 and 1985), Merskey and Spear (1967), 
Szasz (1957) and Melzack and Wall (1965, 1996 and 1993) and Melzack (1993 and 2006) 
have endeavoured to answer the question, “how can there be pain if pain and organs are not 
being stimulated?” (Gamsa 1993, p: 6).  Gamsa  writes that further research by Engel in 1959 
offered a developmental theory to explain ‘psychogenic’ pain, that is, pain in the absence of 
peripheral stimulation.  From the time of birth, in Engel’s view, the individual builds a 
‘library’ of pain experiences, originating from (and associated with) pain provoked by 
peripheral stimulation. Engel postulates that throughout our developmental stages, pain 
acquires meaning contingent upon the context within which it occurs.  This meaning may 
later become a trigger or triggers for pain without peripheral stimulation. For example, a 
baby’s cry draws attention which in turn brings comfort from the mother and thus, pain 
becomes a cue for reunion with a love object. In early childhood pain is also directly linked 
with punishment which in turn serves to expiate guilt.  ‘From these early associations, some 
individuals come to use pain unconsciously to resolve developmental conflicts and to restore 
psychic balance. These early psychodynamics contribute to the development of “pain-prone” 
disorder, with the following characteristics: a) conscious and unconscious guilt with pain 
serving as atonement; b) a history of suffering, defeat, and intolerance of success, suggesting 
a masochistic character structure; c) a strong unfulfilled aggressive drive, with pain 
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substituting for aggression; and d) development of pain to replace feelings of loss or fear of 
threatened loss of a relationship’ (ibid, p: 7). 
My question then, is what is this “library”, which Engel speaks about?  I propose that 
it is the psychomatrix and where the psychosignature of pain is created.  However, I make a 
further speculation that the psychomatrix is innate and an integral part of our genetic make-
up.  In the spirit of Freud’s interest in Darwin, I would like to venture that one’s specific, 
psychic, genetic make-up can imply the development of the psychosignature.  For example, if 
we research and discover what our great grand mother or father was like, as far as dealing 
with certain situations in their lives, we may get a good explanation, of the evolution, of our 
own responses to our present circumstances. The experiences that become imprints or 
impressions within the psychomatrix, from birth, add to the subjectivity of our specific pain 
psychosignature.  The “library” scenario then is valid as it also implies that the content is 
accessible to the subject mediated by internal and external, situational stimuli.  However, the 
input is then influenced or modulated by the psychosignature, leaving the possibility that this 
causes the output of behaviour to be modified by this process.   
There are certain phenomena that cannot, at present, be explained in scientific terms 
as Freud (1895) discovered, even then, with his Project.  He put these phenomena down to 
metapsychological events.  The creation of his structures of the mind to explain levels of 
consciousness and entities that influence mental and physical behaviour is a clear indication 
of his idea of metapsychology.  This gave him the frame of reference that he needed to work, 
so effectively, from as he, at the same time, set the foundations for further research into the 
links between the processes of the brain and the mind.  One of these was the nature of 
memory.  Sacks (1998) states that Freud, 
‘…saw memory as central in hysteria (“hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences”); 
and in the Project he attempted to explicate the physiological basis of memory at 
many levels.  One physiological prerequisite for memory, he postulated, was a system 
of “contact barriers” between certain neurons – his so-called psi system (this was a 
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decade before Sherrington gave synapses their name). Freud’s contact barriers were 
capable of selective facilitation or inhibition, thus allowing permanent neuronal 
changes which corresponded to the acquisition of new information and new memories 
– (…). At a higher level, Freud regarded memory and motives as inseparable’ (p: 19). 
He posited that recollections would have no significance unless associated with 
motives.  Freud’s theory took memory far beyond the ‘local neuronal traces’. To him 
memories were primarily a dynamic, transforming and reorganising force throughout life.  
The influence of memory was the core within the formation of identity and ‘nothing more 
guaranteed one’s continuity as an individual’.  However, due to the reorganising capacity of 
memories ‘no one was more sensitive than Freud to the reconstructive potential of memory, 
the fact that memories are continually worked over and that their essence, indeed, is 
recategorization’ (ibid). 
The dynamic nature of memories is essential to the capacity of an individual to 
change or alter his or her behaviour. However, the integral piece of the puzzle to giving 
memory its quality is pain – the emotional suffering that is the make-up of the 
psychosignature.  I propose that a memory is a stimulus that enters the psychomatrix to then 
be modulated and recategorized by the psychosignature.  This would then give it the quality it 
needs to influence behaviour. Another key point that Sacks (1998) makes is that, ‘The 
potential for therapy, for change, therefore lies in the capacity to exhume such “fixated” 
material into the present so that it can be subjected to the creative process of retranscription 
and thus allow the stalled individual to grow once again and change’ (ibid, p: 20) (our italics). 
As we can see pain is a prominent figure in the subject’s life and is pervasive 
throughout all domains of existence and influences our very identity, thus my theory that 
there is a distinct possibility of the existence of a psychomatrix in the service of the subject-
pain relationship. 
 Consider this question – which is not a new question, but one that has been asked by 
greater thinkers in a variety of ways – is there a possibility that there exists a fear, in some, of 
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losing the ability to feel good, if they feel bad for too long, and in others, a need to feeling 
bad for fear that feeling good takes them to feeling a bad that they could not, emotionally, 
deal with? This, I believe, speaks to the fear of either acknowledging that pain is necessary to 
one’s life for fear of knowing nothing else as well as a fear of feeling only pleasure and 
losing sight of purpose. This is a significant aspect within the subject-pain relationship and 
one which the subject struggles with throughout life.   
A vast spectrum of (on-going) research has identified the impact of cultural, religious, 
social and political factors on pain and pain management. I will argue that all of these figure 
in the conglomerate which I call pain. Considering the meaning of pain in one’s life, there 
exists the possibility of a relationship between the subject and his pain which he experiences, 
consciously and unconsciously. Pain becomes an object that compels the subject to respond 
accordingly and consequently. These manifestations have an impact on, not only his life but, 
his surrounding environment.  
There are other recent studies, which evidence the influence and serious impact of 
psychological and emotional pain on an individual’s life, and that psychological distress 
presents as an obstacle to recovery for patients. For example, a study conducted by Hall et al. 
(2011, p: 1049) indicated that psychological distress impacts long-term disability consistently 
and showed that, ‘depression and stress individually were both partial mediators in the pain-
disability relationship. Therefore, pain measured at 6 weeks after the onset of pain indirectly 
affects future disability by influencing symptoms of depression and symptoms of stress (…)’. 
It goes on to explain that anxiety plays a major role as its affects psychological processes and 
was indicated as a mechanism to explain how (psychological and emotional) pain leads to 
subsequent disabilities.  One’s relationship with pain will influence how he reacts to having 
pain and the decisions as to how to manage this having pain.  In doing, so as in the scenario 
above, one may ‘use’ their having pain as a motive toward fulfilling a means of managing 
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certain life conditions and perpetuating an environment which may promote their physical 
condition to that end. The dichotomy is that for the subject the being in pain or suffering will 
also continue unhampered. 
3.3   Loss, Perversion and Narcissism 
Pain enters an individual’s life when he experiences loss of an object that he is 
attached to.  For the sake of this argument I refer to Schore (2001) regarding his theory on 
attachment:  
‘…in forming an attachment bond of somatically expressed emotional 
communications, the mother is synchronizing and resonating with the rhythms of the 
infant’s dynamic internal states and then regulating the arousal level of these negative 
and positive states.  Attachment is thus the dyadic (interactive) regulation of emotion 
(Sroufe 1996). (…) attachment is more than overt behaviour, it is internal, ‘being built 
into the nervous system, in the course and as a result of the infant’s experience of his 
transactions with the mother, (Ainsworth 1967)’ (p: 429).  
I think this further explains, scientifically, the rationale for trauma of loss of the 
object. It is also an indication of the relational sphere of the subject’s perception to the 
(anxiety) pain which he experiences. According to this theory and others’ such as Bowlby 
(1969, 1978), the mother is key in creating a safe and secure environment for the infant to 
grow and mature.  One of the main developmental domains is learning how to deal with loss.  
As Shore (2001) states:  ‘Regulated interactions with a familiar predictable primary caregiver 
create not only a sense of safety, but also a positively charged curiosity that fuels the 
burgeoning self’s exploration of novel socioemotional and physical environments’ (ibid). 
The experiences of childhood, when we speak about loss, are at best traumatic – 
whether or not there has been a healthy attachment to the (object) mother. The impact of 
these experiences comes in subjective and varying degrees.  The reaction to loss is pain.  The 
realisation, following the acute event of loss or the losing of ‘the object’, that there is an 
emptiness or void, is when emotional suffering begins.  Loss of the womb, loss of the breast, 
the lack of satisfaction of instincts, and later the loss of the mother, the first love object, 
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leaves a lasting impact. (Freud 1905). As Freud (1926 [1925]) discussed, loss of the object 
can provoke pain which is part of mourning and anxiety.   
The infant plays a passive part on the one hand; however, on the other, he is active, to 
some degree, in situating his own body and finding satisfaction in an object apart from the 
breast.  However, the development stages prove to be a challenge as the element of loss 
introduces itself in many guises.  Behaviours that ensue as a result of loss and pain are 
complex as has been established throughout past and present research.  A group of 
behaviours which is most pertinent to this investigation is found in what Freud (1905, 1920) 
has labelled as perverse. Since then there has been much research that has gone into the 
definition of this complex subject.   
In exploring the psychoanalytic perspectives on ‘loss’ it is clear that loss - translated 
to ‘cut’, ‘void’, ‘emptiness’ - causes pain. I propose that this empty space is where an 
individual feels a sense of annihilation.  The acute impact of the initial ‘castration’ is felt as 
shock – a paralysis that eventually gives way to the feelings of being in pain, (Freud 1905, 
1920, 1926[1925], Pontalis 1981, Stoller 1991, Gamsa 1994). 
I further venture to theorize that during this phase of paralysis a stimulus has reached 
the psychomatrix – and the output of behaviour, in its many varieties carries the impact of 
pain within.  The pain suffered by the individual, which is a subjective response, is what 
motivates his behaviour and actions.  
In Freud’s (1920) famous example of a child at play (Fort/Da), with a wooden reel 
and a piece of string, he discusses this loss and emptiness.  He states that the child played the 
first half of the game most of the time – where he throws it away. But, at times he would also 
carry the game out through to the second half where he pulls it back.  This is a repetition of a 
traumatic event where his mother had left him for the first time.  Apparently he survived the 
mother leaving without fuss – as many children do (not all, of course, as there are those who 
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cry out in protest of being left).  However, the not crying, I suggest, is the child being in 
shock. The behaviour that comes forth following this is an indication of his sense of loss and 
his need to overcome the feelings of loss.  Throwing the object away – waiting a moment – 
then pulling it back. But, as has been mentioned – most of the time he just threw the object 
away seemingly not interested in completing the action. 
It appears to be an aggressive action.  He throws it away and awaits its ‘reaction’ – 
then pulls it back not giving it an opportunity to react – so to speak.  He throws it into the 
empty ‘space’ so as to make it experience the same pain that he is in.  Then pulls it back in an 
effort to show his ‘mastery’ over the ‘object’ (his mother), and its actions, as well as control 
over his own actions. He is in control.  The pleasure in the repetitive behaviour, in the first 
place, is knowing that he has actively overcome his loss. And, secondly, to show that he does 
not have to be a ‘passive object’ to the (object of desire) mother, (p: 14-17). 
Another aspect of loss is the ‘breach’ in the protective shield’ that Freud (1920, p: 29-
30) speaks about – whether it is a breach in the protective psychological or physical shield.  
Our sense of security and safety is challenged and breached. I propose that every breach is a 
form of loss, as we lose a part of this sense of security.  The breach is a stimulus that reaches 
the psychomatrix where it is influenced by the psychosignature of pain within, adding to the 
impressions already within. The response is in the form of anxiety.  
We strive to defend ourselves from these anxieties and the pain of a sense of loss. The 
patterns of behaviour indicate that our reaction to this unpleasure is to seek out the opposite - 
pleasure. Freud stressed this certain human preoccupation of seeking pleasure throughout his 
work, particularly in The Pleasure Principle and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).   
Before pleasure is achieved, though, reality has a way of presenting itself. However, this does 
not dampen the desire for achieving pleasure indeed it may even exacerbate the need for it. 
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The human capacity to derive pleasure in the face of pain has been of interest not only 
to Freud but, also to other researchers in the field, to explain the existence of pain. In 
Mourning and Melancholia (2005 [1917]) Freud’s explanation of Melancholia is of interest 
to my thesis, as the complexities of the presence of pain and pleasure (as are love and hate) 
are clearly identified in his explanation of Melancholia: 
‘This conflict of ambivalence, now more real, now more constitutive in origin, should 
not be neglected among the preconditions of melancholia. If the love of the object, 
which cannot be abandoned while the object itself is abandoned, has fled into 
narcissistic identification, hatred goes to work on this substitute object, insulting it, 
humiliating it, making it suffer and deriving a sadistic satisfaction from that suffering.  
The indubitably pleasurable self-torment of melancholia, like the corresponding 
phenomenon of obsessive neurosis, signifies the satisfaction of tendencies of sadism 
and hatred, which are applied to an object and are thus turned back against the 
patient’s own person.  In both of these illnesses, patients manage to avenge 
themselves on the original objects along the detour of self-punishment, and to torment 
their loved ones by means of being ill, having taken to illness in order to avoid 
showing their hostility directly’ (2005 [1917], p: 211). 
 
Human beings are very creative in finding compensatory ways in which they can 
derive pleasure while still dealing with the reality of a traumatic or difficult situation.  For 
example, if a baby is hungry and food is not ready instantly he sucks his thumb or he cries 
(Freud 1905, p: 180-182).  To cope with a limb that has been amputated the brain will create 
a ‘phantom limb’ which makes itself known in the form of pain (derived from Ramachandran 
1998), or mourning the death of a loved one (Freud 2005 [1917]). 
Loss of the object implicates the many challenges of the developmental stages.  From 
what has been discussed so far it seems that these are not just challenges but, can present 
insurmountable obstacles to living a productive life in the normal sense that society has 
created.  Losing the safety and security of the mother (object) – from the trauma of birth and 
the cutting of the umbilical cord to the breast - leaves an everlasting impression.  The desire 
to‘re-find’ the object is the culprit in the many diverse and complex patterns of human 
behaviour.  While striving to achieve the aims of this primary pleasure (being part of the 
object in the womb or at the breast) the subject engages in many, complex behaviours that 
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could, at times, be labelled as perverse.  Stoller (1991) agrees with Freud (1905) when he 
states that, ‘“the perversions” are not entities but simply behaviours in which all kinds of 
folks indulge’ (p: 36). 
Freud (1905) postulates that aggressiveness and a desire to conquer is a usual element 
in most men therefore, sadism would be a link to the ‘aggressive component of the sexual 
instinct’.  He continues to explain that in day to day language the connotation of sadism 
oscillates between being characterised by ‘an active or violent attitude to the sexual object, 
and where satisfaction is entirely ‘conditional on the humiliation and maltreatment of the 
object’.  It is only the later extreme which ‘deserves to be described as a perversion’ (p: 157-
158) 
Freud has said that ‘perversions are sexual activities which either (a) extend, in an 
anatomical sense, beyond the regions of the body that are designed for sexual union, or (b) 
linger over the intermediate relations to the sexual object which should normally be traversed 
rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim’ (1905, p:150). 
Further research has offered several perspectives on perversions. In exploring the 
work of several researchers in the field of psychoanalysis Cooper (1991) has identified that 
the common denominators appear to be loss (connoting a circumstance resulting from a 
forced ‘taking away’ of something), abandonment, rejection, and loss of control where an 
individual feels a sense of helplessness (forced to be in a passive position), and a threat to life 
(a sense of annihilation).  He states that Stoller (1974) ‘melds the concept of sexuality and the 
older emphasis on castration and fetishism in forming a perversion with newer concepts 
derived from the understanding of preoedipal narcissistic and safety needs and the problem of 
separation and individuation’ (p: 20-21). 
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Stoller (1991) explains his views on perversion stating that perversion is the erotic 
form of hatred and usually a fantasy usually acted on but ‘occasionally restricted to a 
daydream’ either one’s own creation or based on others’ creations such as, pornography.   
‘It is a habitual, preferred aberration necessary for one’s full satisfaction, primarily 
motivated by hostility. By hostility I mean a state in which one wishes to harm an 
object; that differentiates it from aggression, which often implies only forcefulness.  
The hostility in perversion takes form in a fantasy of revenge hidden in the actions 
that make up the perversion and serves to convert childhood trauma to adult triumph.  
To create the greatest excitement, the perversion must also portray itself as an act of 
risk taking (Stoller 1975, 1985a)’ (p: 37).    
 
In other words, sin.  That is, excitement comes from an awareness - conscious or 
unconscious - that one is harming, needs to harm, wants to harm.  More precisely, the harm 
done is an act of humiliating in revenge for one’s having been humiliated’ (ibid). 
I propose that ‘hatred’ embodies ‘fear’- fear of loss, of security and a fear of 
annihilation.  Fear is an experience of pain as it encompasses anxiety of the known as well as 
the unknown (Kierkegaard 2000, p: 138-139).  The fear (pain) can be traced back to the 
infantile stage and to the ‘loss of the object’ (Freud 1905, 1914, 1920, 1926). 
According to Stoller’s (1991) argument above the fantasy plays a key role in the 
desire to regain the subject’s control and sense of power.  It is a space where the subject can 
be omnipotent in fulfilling his desires.  It is an internal, narcissistic space where he has 
withdrawn his libido, in part, to the ego.  Within this state of ‘self-love’ there is the need for 
‘self-preservation’.  It has features of the preoedipal stage of development where the loss of 
the object has been the primary source of pain.  It is however, not only the need for self-
preservation but also a pathological need to destroy the object that has caused this breach in 
his ‘protective shield’ (Freud 1920).  The protective shield, in this case, being his sense of 
omnipotence, where his every basic need (desire for pleasure) is fulfilled.  The breach causes 
a narcissistic concentration of all his attention (energy) on his ego where the pain is being 
experienced (Freud 1920, p: 30). 
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The awareness of loss tends to give the subject a sense of isolation and separation 
from the external world, accompanied by a sense of helplessness.  In his paper On Narcissism 
(1914) Freud states that, ‘The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has 
been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. 
(…) a person who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the 
things of the external world, in so far as they do not concern his suffering. Closer observation 
teaches us that he also withdraws libidinal interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers 
he ceases to love’ (p: 75-82). 
However, once the pain abates the libido gradually, once more, returns to the external 
world and its objects (ibid, p: 82).   
At the stage of primary narcissism the desire for self-preservation contains not only 
the ego libido, but this libido flows into the parallel system of the sexual libido.  The sexual 
instinct and that of nourishment at this point have not been differentiated.  The infant is 
absorbed in experiencing pleasure from the object (breast/mother) that he identifies with as 
part of himself.   In the object’s absence, he discovers that he can derive the same pleasure 
and satisfaction within a perfunctory awareness (autoeroticism) of his own body. In this 
process, however, he begins to realise that the object is not a part of his own body, but an 
object apart, and one that he is dependent upon for fulfilment of needs. The sense of 
separation is painful yet necessary in the further development of object choice (Treurniet 
1991). 
Freud (1905) postulates that, ‘The satisfaction of the erotogenic zone is associated in 
the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment.  To begin with, sexual 
activity attaches itself to functions serving the purpose of self-preservation and does not 
become independent of them until later’ (p: 181-182).  Primary narcissism is then the 
libidinal investment of the self and is part and parcel of normal early development. Even 
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during the process of development, in the investment in external objects, part of this 
narcissism is retained in the unconscious. It becomes a mechanism in the development of 
self-esteem and self-regard (Freud 1914).   
In contrast to primary narcissism is the mechanism of secondary narcissism which 
arises in pathological states. The subject withdraws its libido from the external world in a re 
investment of the self.  ‘This happens especially in cases of disappointment with the object or 
in mourning for a lost object; further, it occurs as a normal developmental process in 
secondary identification and where some of the libidinal investment of the admired or loved 
object is then transferred to the self as a consequence of this identification.  Finally, it also 
happens when a person lives up to his ideals’ (Treurniet 1991, p: 79). 
The development of the ego plays a primary role in the development of the subject’s 
sense of self, which evolves through the stage of infancy and early childhood.  The 
development of the ego-ideal (conscience) to which it is accountable is essential in 
establishing its ideals, (Freud 1914). 
The pathological dimension of secondary narcissism manifests in the complexities of 
perversion.  A withdrawal of the libido from external investment, as I have discussed above, 
is a pathological state and arises out of a traumatic impact.   An essential component of 
primary narcissism is the transition from ego libido to object libido and secondary 
identification that implicates the relation of the subject to the object. In encountering the 
castration complex a most significant psychic event occurs impacting on the subject’s 
development.  At this point ego instincts and libidinal instinct remain undifferentiated and the 
subject’s anxieties are focused on his own person – and the ‘cut’ or ‘void’.  
Cooper (1991) explains that,  
‘(…) the narcissistic base of perverse development I want to emphasize is that the 
core trauma in many if not all perversions is the experience of terrifying passivity in 
relation to the preoedipal mother perceived as dangerously malignant, malicious, and 
all-powerful, arousing sensations of awe and the uncanny.  The development of a 
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perversion is a miscarried repair of this injury, basically through dehumanization of 
the body and the construction of three core fantasies designed to undo the intolerable 
sense of helplessness.  Stoller and Khan have taught us about dehumanization in 
perversion and its relation to fetishism, (…).  Dehumanization is the ultimate strategy 
against the fear of human qualities – it protects against the vulnerability of loving, 
against the possibility of human unpredictability, and against the sense of 
powerlessness and passivity in comparison to other humans’ (p: 23-24). 
 
The elements of sadism are, of course, what has brought this pathological but 
interesting, developmental dimension to attention.  Sadistic tendencies, according to 
psychoanalytic, theory have an evolutionary aspect that runs through human development and 
is driven by the instincts of life and death, (Freud 1905). 
We see here that perversions are a way to manage the trauma of loss which embodies 
pain and all the complexities therein. Within the many levels and dimensions of masochism 
and sadism we see clearly the subject-pain relational phenomenon. Pain here is present as a 
facilitator of gaining that which is desired – pleasure. However, once pleasure is obtained the 
cycle of desiring pain for more and more pleasure repeats itself to no end. Even though 
aspects of this cycle of pain are part of human instincts there may become exacerbated and 
perpetuated by the many complexities of life’s processes 
3.4   Life Instinct and Death Instinct  
            Freud (1920) describes, ‘…an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an 
earlier state of things…’  He further says that, ‘all instincts tend toward the restoration of an 
earlier state of things’ (p: 36-37).  
          Take, for example, in primary narcissism the subject’s need to fulfil his desires. It is his 
wish to remain in a constant state of pleasure.  The loss of the object is a signal that this state 
has been disturbed and so, fear and anxiety arise until an ‘earlier state of things’ has been 
restored. 
          I put forward my speculations that it appears that pain in the form of conflict within the 
instincts is a fundamental element in the survival of human beings.  Pain, enables one to 
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know the limits of his existence.  And further that destruction and re-construction need each 
other to create, preserve, destroy and recreate life in a continuous repetition of cycles.  From 
here there appears to be a bi-polarity to every element, characteristic and personality within 
human beings.  The question I ask, then, is where, on that bi-polar scale does one find 
himself, during the developmental stages, which are the bases from which an understanding 
of one’s identity and existence emerge.  Psychoanalytically speaking it is from here that we 
can begin to investigate not only the pleasure principle, whose aim is pleasure, but also the 
reduction of pain.  This is influenced by the reality principle, but also what is beyond the 
pleasure principle, pain, which is influenced by the death instinct. The compulsion to repeat 
and master the sense of loss and annihilation is an aspect of the death instinct played out in 
perversion. The death instinct works in tandem with the life instinct and modified by it.  Both 
aim to preserve life by striving to regain an earlier state of being, (Freud 1920). 
         Significant elements driving the instincts are what Freud called the primary and 
secondary processes.  As described in the Project (1895) and later became a significant 
aspect of the pleasure principle are these processes.  The primary processes are the primary 
psychical processes that are unconscious.  These are where desire, drive, pain, unpleasure and 
the initial production of affect and wish are created.  These processes lead to a discharge of 
excitation.  Internal and external stimuli apply their pressures on the psychical system which, 
in turn, result in the secondary processes being activated.  The secondary processes are then 
the behavioural outputs from this stimulation driven by wishes of the primary processes.  The 
secondary process is based on a memory-motive structure, within which is the desire for 
satisfaction.  The behaviour is, however harnessed by the executive ego, (Pribram and Gill 
1976, p: 38-59). 
             Freud proposed that the aim of the pleasure principle is to work toward keeping an 
equilibrium between desire and satisfaction, ‘to free the mental apparatus entirely from 
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excitation or to keep the amount of excitation in it constant o to keep it as low as possible’. In 
order words, to ‘return to the quiescence of the inorganic world’    
 ‘..the unbound or primary processes give rise to far more intense feelings in both 
directions than the bound or secondary ones.  Moreover the primary processes are the 
earlier in time; at the beginning of mental life there are no others, and we may infer 
that if the pleasure principle had not already been operative in them it could never 
have been established for the later ones.  (…) the dominance of the pleasure principle 
(…) has no more escaped the process of taming than other instincts in general’ (1920: 
63-64). 
 
              And further according to Freud, the feeling of pleasure or unpleasure are also present 
in the secondary process.  What is pertinent to my investigation is his statement, in the same 
text, that, ‘consciousness communicates to us feelings from within not only of pleasure and 
unpleasure but also of a peculiar tension which in its turn can be either pleasurable or 
unpleasurable.’  I propose that this is part of the psychosignature that would, indeed, colour 
the quality and quantity of the cathexis.  My supposition extends further to state that the 
creation of the psychomatrix system is a dimension of the memory-motive structure as well 
as the primary and secondary processes of the systems of the mind. 
          Even though the aim of the life instinct is to realise the desire for pleasure, the pleasure 
principle serves the death instinct which is a constant sentry guarding ‘against increases of 
stimulation from within, which would make the task of living more difficult.’  This of course 
implicates the continuous struggle and play between the two instincts and the fulfilment of 
desire. All the while the object-pain relationship is played out within the emotive desire for 
pain – and pleasure. 
3.5    Defining Subject, Relationship, Identity, Existence and Pain  
         The subject is one who is seeking to attain that which he has lost. He is striving to 
realise his true self.  He is not yet a complete ‘self’ due to his loss.  The loss which he has 
experienced is the loss of his primary object that was initially looked upon and believed to be 
one and the same entity. 
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          I suggest that the concept of ‘self’ is a sense of worthiness and is based on, first of all, 
primary narcissism, as Freud (1930 [1929]) discusses, which leaves behind residues within 
our character and is never destroyed, and secondly it is derived from how well one lives up to 
his ideals (this has sociological implications within the wider community and locating one’s 
self within it) and third, our relationships with others and their reciprocity.  
Pontalis (1981) hypothesized that ‘The Freudian ‘subject’ is defined from the outset 
as a series of places which are functionally specialized: this specialization is seen in the first 
topography (differentiating the three systems Ucs, Pcs, Cs) as a succession, with the energy 
following a certain temporal path, progredient or regredient according to the order of 
systems.  In the second topography, it is seen as an interlocking (the ego is differentiated 
from the id, the superego, embedded in the id, is differentiated form the ego etc.)’ (p: 132). 
Freud created the imaginary ‘psychic apparatus’, ‘to make the complications of 
mental functioning intelligible, by dissecting the function and assigning its different 
constituents to different component parts of the apparatus.’  The ego is the representation of 
bodily sensations from internal and external stimuli.  It depends on its awareness of the body.  
The self is derived from identification to external objects, but separate from the object.  The 
subject, then, is the space within which there is the interplay of the ego and the self, (ibid). 
My supposition is that the ego strives to regulate the self, as it seeks to find – re-find – 
the object.  Initially, the infant is aware only of him ‘self’ within a narcissistic realm of 
libidinal, self-preservation. His body is the source of selfish pleasure and gratification.  The 
object is a part of this self.  The process of the object becoming a separate entity is also the 
process by which the ego comes into play as it regulates the self and its needs to seek the 
object of pleasure.  The self is the impoverished sense of the object as its fate is to be slave to 
the pleasure principle, (Freud 1920, 1905, Pontalis 1981). 
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The notion of the self  as a ‘space’ (Pontalis 1981) leaves it open to a speculation that 
the subject is left seeking to fulfil a ‘void’ left by the object. Therefore, as Pontalis 
postulated, ‘its fate is to be slave to the pleasure principle’, and constant desire to find 
pleasure within pain.  Thus, the ‘self’ and the ‘subject’ are intertwined in the desire to find – 
re-find – the object. 
Relationships, Freud stated, are what cause man the greatest pain. Humans begin with 
a narcissistic relationship to themselves gradually extending this to the outside world. It is the 
connection, bond or attachment that one develops between self and other. The issue of 
relationships and the many emotional layers, within the conscious and unconscious, and the 
questions of human sexuality, identity and existence, is the phenomenon of analysis (Freud 
1930 [1929], p: 86).  
Identification is based on our relations to others and as Freud (1921) states; it is ‘the 
earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person.  It plays a part in the early history 
of the Oedipus complex’ (p: 105). 
The Oedipus complex is implicated in early childhood development and influences 
the subject’s identity and relationships throughout his life. It is an experiential process where 
a child develops an erotic attachment to one parent and hostility toward the other parent. 
There is an emotional tension that emerges within this process that is the key element in the 
psychic development of the subject.  Here comes in the ‘castration anxiety’ for the male 
child, where the father is seen as an obstacle (as well as the law against incest) and presents a 
threat to his person in the form of castration.  With the dissolution of the Oedipus complex 
this desire for the mother is repressed. The female child on the other hand perceives herself as 
lacking the penis. Her attraction to her father is invoked by her desire to possess the penis. It 
is a hostile desire to take her mother’s place.  The dissolution of the Oedipus complex could 
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mean the strengthening of the female child’s identification with the mother (Freud 1920, 
1923). 
Again we see an evolutionary process take place in the development of identity. It is 
contingent upon ones relationship with the other which is part of the conglomerate of pain. 
As explained earlier, this conglomerate is a diverse set of experiences which are imprinted on 
the matrix of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis has explained away the multi-layered 
processes and mechanisms at work within the creation of identities. Identity is part and parcel 
of our relationships with others in our personal sphere as well as the wider sphere of 
community.  Identity is crucial to the development of the self as an endeavour to find 
meaning in one’s existence within the complexities of his relations to others. 
The narcissistic preoccupation of the self, in the form of hostility and fear of 
castration, comes into play within the perversions.  This is a state where the subject has 
developed a hostile fixation on fear of his passive position in relation to the object.  Namely, 
the mother, to the infantile lost object, which he was deprived of.   Earlier in my thesis  I  
have described Stoller’s (1991) perspective on perversion that explains this element. 
The definition of relationship is, first of all, that it is a human characteristic. Human 
beings cannot but live in states of relatedness.  It is the emotional dimension of the self that 
connects us, not only to each other, but also to the many entities in our lives. As sexual 
beings we locate our identities and existence through our relationships right from the 
beginning of our lives, (Freud 1895, 1905, 1920, 1926, 1929, Pontalis 1981 and Sacks 1998).   
Sacks (1998) postulated that, ‘(…) remembering, for Freud, though it required such local 
neuronal traces (of the sort we now call long-term potentiation), went far beyond them, and 
was essentially dynamic, transforming, reorganizing, throughout the course of life.  Nothing 
was more central for the formation of identity than the power of memory; nothing more 
guaranteed one’s continuity as an individual’ (p: 19). 
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I have, by now, discussed the notion of pain throughout this investigation.  Pain is 
based on the loss of the object, and the complexities of the re finding of the object - the 
trauma of desire to fill our need for pleasure. There is an element of narcissism in this desire, 
as it emanates from the instinct of self-preservation as well as from object-choice and object-
love (Freud 1914).  The subject’s relationship to pain can be defined upon consideration of 
the development of pain.   
Out of the trauma to resolve the loss, which spans back to the infantile and most 
impressive stage of development, arise perversions, which I have discussed earlier. There is 
an element that could arise within the perversions, which is in the form of a fetish object, 
which justifies the castration complex and the post oedipal stage of development.  A fetish 
object is created out of the child’s fear of castration.  It maintains the disavowal of the 
woman’s penis and creates a substitute for it in another part of the woman’s body.  This could 
extend to other objects that represent the substituted object and waylay the fear of castration.  
The fetish object achieves the aim of overcoming the fear of castration but also 
protection against it. However, on the other hand it remains a traumatic reminder of this fear 
and is manifested throughout the subject’s life (Freud 1927, p: 154).   
The fear of this traumatic development sets up barriers to the fulfilment of desire.  
This fetish object is incorporated within the desire of the object.  However, the reminder of 
the anxiety pain of castration proves it to be unfulfilling.  The fetish can be an ingredient in a 
perversion - the perversion being the central focus of a subject’s life. The development of 
both has the fear of castration and pain at its root.  The depth of the meaning in the fetish 
object is overcoming loss, rejection, humiliation and terror of childhood (Kaplan 1991, p: 
130). 
Acknowledging that at the base of the development of a fetish as well as perversion is 
pain I propose, that pain is the most prominent of all features within this process.  From this 
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stand point pain remains attached to all behaviour.  I further propose that pain, which is 
caused by loss manifests in all our thoughts and actions.   The experiences of pain, within 
fears and anxieties, are imprinted on the system of the psychomatrix.  Here the pain 
psychosignature modifies   internal and external inputs and acts in conjunction with the 
parallel neurological systems of the subject.  Perversion and fetishism are both mechanisms 
influenced by pain which are modified by the psychosignature. 
          I propose that the phenomenon of pain within this process acts in such a way that its 
absence would paralyse the mental functions of the subject.  The function would be depleted 
of its most essential and energetic motivation.  If the subject suddenly lost the sense of his 
fetish, considering the circumstances under which it was created, he would become paralysed 
from his capacity to function normally.  If the pervert lost his fantasy, the space within which 
he overcame the trauma of his loss and humiliation, he would be paralysed from  his normal 
functioning. In both instances a breach in the protective shield, that inhibits the formation of 
the fetish and the fantasy, would cause a sense of loss of reality.  This would surely result in a 
state of illness.   
 Pain, I suggest, is such an entity which is needed to function in the normal sphere of 
the subject’s life.  Pain, in other words, is a psychical object that is developed in the matrix of 
the psychological system, at least, as early as the primary narcissistic stage of development.  
It is this object that needs to be present in order for the subject to know the desire of pleasure.  
Therefore, the subject primarily desires pain. 
Having said this, pain remains an unexplained phenomenon that has eluded specific 
identification.  Yet, we see the many faces of it as we traverse through life.  The neurology 
and psychology of the impact of an acute event, which causes an expression of pain, has been 
researched and explained by scientist such as Freud (1895), Pribram and Gill (1976), 
Merskey (1965, 1985), Merskey and Spear (1967), Melzack and Wall (1965, 1993), Gamsa 
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(1993), Solms (1998), Ramachandran (1998), Schore (2001), and countless others.  However, 
it persists in a diverse, complex and multidimensional space within the subject and the self of 
being human. 
 Pleasure comes and goes yet pain remains faithful to the subject and his desire 
throughout his life.  Pain sits in the void created by the subject’s loss. 
Conclusion 
I propose that pain remains in the emotional sphere of the psychomatrix, even after 
the physical healing process of the body is complete and or the acute trauma has passed. This 
is due to how it is synthesized and modulated in the psychomatrix, by the pain 
psychosignature.  There, it continues to influence thought and behaviour. It remains within 
the psychomatrix as a ‘phantom’ of that acute event or experience.  
I further argue that just as a limb that has been lost continues to exist within the 
body/self matrix, the sense of self, identity, relationships and existence continue to exist in 
the matrix of the mind – beyond the trauma. Here pain maintains the unity and fidelity to the 
pain of loss and desire for pleasure – or the return to a state of equilibrium. 
Loss and desire, for re-finding the object, translate to the conglomerate of 
psychological and emotional pain.  It is a ‘cut’ and a ‘void’ that the subject, interminably, 
seeks to fulfil, throughout the development of his life. 
The next chapter will begin the case studies which will illustrate and evidence my theory of 
the psychomatrix which is based on the neuromatrix described by Melzack.  Freud’s 
speculations about the similarities and links between neurological and psychological pain are 
fundamental to my theses of the development of the phenomenon of the subjects-pain 
relationship. I propose therefore, that when one enters an analytic relationship it is, 
inevitably, to make sense of his relationship to pain and to understand why his thoughts and 
behaviours are contingent upon his unconscious desires to fulfil his needs, which are based 
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on the many aspects of his sexuality – whether it is procreation, sustenance or survival – it 
comes down to finding – re-finding the lost object. The subject is in an interminable 
relationship with his (being in) pain as it is the object which he desires in order to fulfil his 
desires – for pleasure.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Phantom Limb Syndrome 
Introduction 
 The scenario of the ‘Phantom Limb’ phenomenon is significant in relation to my 
topic. It is a metaphor for the subject’s relationship with pain as I speak of it in this thesis. 
Emotional and psychological pain is comprised of the imprints of experiences that an 
individual has from the moment he becomes a living, breathing entity.   
The concept of the ‘phantom’ is an essential characteristic of the subject’s experience 
- that is, its phenomenology.  I propose that the value of the metaphor lies in the semantics of 
pain and how the subject relates to its meaning.  The use of phantom pain as a metaphor 
describes some aspects of disembodied pain. It suggests an opening of a meta-physical or a 
met-psychological conduit into another space, a space not shared with the everyday space 
which we normally inhabit, a space that we cannot directly reach, something like an itch 
‘under the skin’ that you just can’t get at, or an itch in the phantom limb that can be relieved 
only by scratching a spot on the cheek! (Ramachandran 1999, p: 29).  Nonetheless, this is a 
space which has its own internal level and form of existence – for example: a phantom pain 
may have position, extent and location on the phantom limb or a chronic anxiety 
(psychological/emotional pain) may have position, extent and location on the lower back that, 
otherwise, has no organic, physical diagnosis.  
It is in this sense, in the context of spatiality, that I use the phantom limb phenomenon 
as a metaphor.  In this context, as well, the phantom limb syndrome has much in common 
with other chronic pain syndromes. When considering pain without an apparent reason I 
suggest, we must consider that there is the possibility of the existence of a psychomatrix in 
the psychological and emotional realm, parallel to Melzack’s, (1993) concept of the 
neuromatrix of the neurological system in the brain.  Meanings of experiences, even though 
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created in the mind within its subjective realm, are derived from the common meanings of 
words. The value of metaphor, such as the phantom limb, is that it takes the common 
understanding of the meanings of words (concepts) and associates it with a concept that is not 
so commonly understood thereby introducing a new meaning, (Grey 2000, Modell 2003). 
Modell (2003) suggests that, advances in neuroscience make it possible to view the 
construction of meaning as a biological property.  Such as, 
‘Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology in which emotion and memory form a 
seamless unified system is seen as an attempt to establish psychoanalysis as a 
neurobiology of meaning. In the unconscious construction of meaning, metaphor 
plays a salient role; metaphor is the currency of mind. I have suggested that metaphor 
functions unconsciously as a pattern detector and thus plays a dominant role in the 
organizing and categorizing of emotional memory’ (p: 255). 
 
To explain this further I will use a scenario of a thirty five year old male client who, 
in a recent session, was in emotional crisis.  It was apparent that this individual needed some 
space to speak without interjection.  It was as if he was crying uncontrollably and just needed 
to do so until he felt better and was all cried out.  He was not crying though, but speaking. He 
then stopped speaking and just sat there exhausted.  After a few minutes to allow him to 
compose himself, I asked him how he felt.  He stated, ‘a bit bewildered. Actually I feel much 
better now that all of that’s out of me.’  I then asked, ‘where is ‘all of that’?’ He right away 
pointed to the space between where he was sitting and where I was sitting.  I asked him if 
what he was pointing to had a ‘shape’, to which he answered, after a bit of thought, ‘yes’ and 
described the shape.  Surprisingly, it was the shape of a person – that of his mother!  He went 
on to say that it is ‘that’ which he has carried with him all his life, and particularly for the last 
couple of years. In a recent confrontation this crisis had been triggered. He related to this pain 
and saw himself within it as someone that he did not recognise, and in such a way that it 
paralysed him in his progress.  However, he could not or did not wish to ‘let it go’.  He 
wanted ‘revenge’ but realised, now, that somehow, by ‘possessing’ this he was ‘taking his 
anger out on himself’.  Not that he wanted to hurt his mother, physically, but, he wished that 
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he could give this ‘pain’ and emotional paralysis ‘back to her’.  This pain that he had given a 
shape and a name to was something that had controlled him to the point of emotional 
paralyses. 
When I asked him how he would release himself from it, he said that he would like to 
take control of it and to keep it ‘outside’.  This ‘shape’ was a ‘ghost’ of his past experiences 
that he did not wish to be afraid of any longer.  He spoke of this ‘ghost’ representing his 
whole life and all of his experiences.  It had influenced and impacted his sense of identity, 
and his sense of existence – ‘why’ he was alive.  He identified with being controlled by his 
mother and he ‘did not even live with her or see her that often’.  He was so consumed by his 
anger that he did not realise that he was living in a past space – where he was still a little 
child who was dependent on his mother, to the point where he felt that he could not fend for 
himself and, therefore would have to die. In other words, to avenge himself, he had even 
contemplated suicide. This enraged him further to think that he was out of control and 
powerless to protect himself. 
He, however, stated that he did not wish to die as he felt that that would be giving in 
to this ‘ghost’ and his fear of it.  He wished to move beyond this ‘space’ where he felt ‘stuck 
in time’.  
It is clear that the above discussion had a metaphorical dimension and is charged with 
emotional suffering and being in pain. He considered himself a victim of his pain and yet he 
seemed to hold on to it, the ‘ghost’, which seemed to give him this sense of excitement, and 
control over his castrated self.  The metaphor of the ‘ghost’ is the ‘currency of the mind’ 
accessing emotional memory, which symbolised his desire and in turn, caused a state of pain. 
He hung on to his pain as if it was a force that overpowered him, yet gave him a sense of a 
unity within his emotional self.   
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Melzack (2006) speaks about the brains objective in maintaining the body/self unity’ 
He visualised ‘the neuromatrix as an assembly whose connections are primarily determined 
not by experience but by the genes.  The matrix, though, could later be sculpted by 
experience, which would add or delete, strengthen or weaken existing synapses’. This 
processing would also enable the matrix to store the memory of a pain and might thus, 
account for the frequent reappearance of the same pain. (p: 55). 
The matrix is ‘prewired’ with the ‘whole self’ unity as evidenced by Melzack’s 
research of people born without limbs who experienced phantom limbs.  In comparison, to 
the concept of Melzack’s (2006) neuromatrix, I propose that the ‘assembly of connections’ of 
the psychomatrix is also genetically prewired and continues to be modulated by experiences 
(ibid). 
Historically, according to Freud, whose opinion was echoed by Rank, ‘the affect of 
anxiety is a consequence of the event of birth and a repetition of the situation then 
experienced...’ (1926:161). Rank went on to propose that,  
‘[I]t would seem that the primal anxiety-affect at birth, which remains operative 
through life, right up to the final separation from the outer world (gradually becoming 
a second mother) at death, is from the very beginning not merely an expression of the 
new-born child’s physiological injuries (dyspnoea-constriction-anxiety), but in 
consequence of the change from a highly pleasurable situation to an extremely painful 
one, immediately acquires a “psychical” quality of feeling. This experienced anxiety 
is thus the first content of perception, the first psychical act, so to say, to set up 
barriers; and in these we must recognise the primal repression against the already 
powerful tendency to re-establish the pleasurable situation just left’ (1993:187).   
 
I suggest that the dichotomy of the foetal space, being a space of conflict (pain) as 
well as a space of comfort (pleasure), continues into the development of the individual – for 
example, the mother’s presence is a source of comfort as well as the source of conflict. This 
conflict, it seems, continues beyond the birthing event and experience at the end of which the 
baby is ‘cut away’ and separated from its mother. The trauma and anxieties of loss, fear of 
rejection, annihilation and loss of control and power over one’s own life – fear of the known 
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and the unknown - continue throughout the subject’s developmental stages and beyond.  The 
debate on whether or not a foetus can experience pain, at any level and, if it does, at what 
stage of gestation, is on-going and will not be discussed in this thesis.  Suffice it to say that if 
there is a possibility of a foetus experiencing pain – physical and or emotional - within any 
dimension of its existence, there is a possibility of this experience impacting on the 
psychosignature as well as the neurosignature of ‘pain’, identity and existence - which is 
created within the prewired matrices. 
This scenario, I believe, can also be perceived as a metaphor for life that the 
individual is born into the struggle to survive in general, the striving for independence in 
cutting/breaking away from the dependence of ‘mother’, ‘family’ or one’s own attitude. It 
appears to be the same dichotomy of the life instinct and the death instinct, as discussed by 
Freud (1920) - the pain and pleasure of striving for self-preservation, and gratification and 
the striving toward the goal where there is no longer a desire to strive for self-preservation 
and gratification, as all desire is fulfilled within the final equilibrium of reaching the place 
where it all began – death. 
Before the end though, and as the subject travels through his developmental phases 
the phantom of loss already experienced, consciously as well as unconsciously, takes 
definition and influences thoughts, emotions and behaviour - from attachment as an infant to 
attachment as an adult.  Holmes (2010) explains his perspective on Bowlby’s attachment 
theory in that the bond between mother and child is a psychological bond in its own right  and 
agrees with Bowlby (1973) who has opined that this bond ‘provides a language’ within which 
to express the consciousness and existence of this state. Attachment is a ‘primary 
motivational system’ with its own workings and interface with other motivational systems’ 
(p: 63). 
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The human infant, I propose, is born with an innate sense of desire for attachment. 
Modell (2003) postulates that the infant is born with the capacity to create attachments, 
‘[T]he human infant is innately predisposed to find meaning in touch, proprioception, and 
pre-eminently in the affective responsiveness of its caregivers’ (p: 556). 
Consequently, I assume that the human infant, having been exposed to such 
experiences, when ‘attached’ to the mother, is predisposed, undoubtedly, to re-finding the 
object, as a separated entity, through the senses such as touch. He has a body/self image 
imprinted within his neuromatrix where the imprint is created as the neurosignature unique to 
that particular individual. Parallel to this neurological system is the emotional and 
psychological system of the psychomatrix within which is created a particular 
psychosignature. The imprint of the initial attachment is within this matrix as is the imprint of 
the initial separation from the mother.  The phantom of the psychological and emotional state 
of being which was once a secure whole self continues to exist in the psychomatrix, hence 
making the subject predisposed to the state of being in pain due to loss of that, and the desire 
to satisfy that loss of the once attached object which was part of the body/mind/self unity or 
whole.  
I propose that the sense of being in pain or suffering is a synthesis of the mind/self 
processes which modulate the psychosignature (of pain) created within the psychomatrix. 
Freud stated that:  
‘...the remarkable fact that, when there is a psychical diversion brought about by some 
other interest, even the most intense physical pains fail to arise (...) can be accounted 
for by there being a concentration of cathexis on the psychical representative of the 
part of the body which is giving pain.  I think it is here that we shall find the point of 
analogy which has made it possible to carry sensations of pain over to the mental 
sphere.  For the intense cathexis of longing which is concentrated on the missed or 
lost object (...) creates the same economic conditions as are created by the cathexis of 
pain which is concentrated on the injured part of the body’ (1926, p:171). 
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Here in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety he examines evidence that there are 
parallel mechanisms present, physical pain and psychological pain that lead to emotional 
suffering, however that the two are destined to interact in order to differentiate the 
experiential states of having pain and that of being in pain or suffering.  Earlier in this same 
text he stated that, 
‘(…) the line of development which connects this first danger-situation and 
determinant of anxiety with all the later ones, and we have seen that they all retain a common 
quality in so far as they signify in a certain sense a separation from the mother - at first only 
in a biological sense, next as a direct loss of object and later as a loss of object incurred 
indirectly’ (p: 151). 
Freud, as we have already discussed, began to make the connection, between the 
neurological systems of the body and psychological systems of the mind in his Project for a 
Scientific Psychology (1895). Since science has progressed to prove this connection, the 
significance of his research remains as a foundation to study the phantom (experience/pain) 
syndrome. The subject gives the phantom, a companion for life, substance according to his 
own experiences. It is, as research has seen, the ‘primary motivational system’ with its own 
workings and interface with other motivational systems’ (Bowlby, 1973a). 
4.1  The Phantom Limb Syndrome 
I will continue to explore The Phantom Limb Syndrome, in this chapter, as a 
metaphor for psychological and emotional pain, a sense of being in pain which is present in 
the subject’s life, even though there is no evidence of an immediate, acute trauma or stimulus. 
I will discuss further the possibility of a psychomatrix similar to the neuromatrix as well as 
the duality of consciousness pertaining to the sense of being in pain. 
The phantom limb syndrome is the experience of sensations of pain in a limb or other 
part of the body, or the sense of a presence of these that do not, or no longer, exist.  This is 
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generally reported by amputees as (a) sensations that are not painful - perceptions such as that 
of movement and the sensation from external stimuli such as, touch, pressure and itching; and 
(b) by sensations that are painful, such as the perception of burning, tingling, or shooting 
pains.  
 An article by Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998) explores the perception of phantom 
limbs.  They suggest that the sensation of the phantom can be triggered by ‘map expansion 
neuroplasticity’ in which the local brain region that once specialized in controlling the 
function of the amputated limb, and which is reflected as a discrete “map” in the cerebral 
cortex of the brain, is taken over by an adjacent brain map such as the face map, thereby 
expanding the face map. The acquisition of a part of the unused phantom map by the face 
map results in the perception of sensation in the amputated limb when the face is touched (p: 
1603-30). 
 Further research has evidenced that the phantom limb syndrome is not only found in 
persons whose limbs or other body parts have been amputated, but are also seen in a small 
percentage of patients with congenitally missing arms or legs.  This suggests that at least the 
basic imprint or map for one's body may be innately specified. The phenomenon provides a 
valuable opportunity to investigate how nature and nurture interact in the construction of 
body image by the brain. A patient with leprosy whose hand gets whittled away gradually 
with progressive sensory loss does not have a phantom hand. But if the stump is then 
amputated, what emerges is not a phantom stump but a whole phantom hand. It is as though 
the original image of the hand had survived but was inhibited by the stump, only to be 
resurrected when the stump is amputated (ibid).    
4.2  Historical significance 
The phenomenon of the phantom Limb has been a subject of fascination, but also of 
ambiguity, awe and fear, since limblessness has been an inevitable consequence of certain 
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diseases, accidents, genetic disorders and human activity, such as war, violence and torture 
which, as we know, have always been part of society. It is a subject that was neglected and, 
perhaps, pushed to the realm of the uncanny until about the 16
th
 Century. There are accounts 
of the French military surgeon Ambroise Paré, in the 16
th
 Century who was said to be the first 
to document his observations of this phenomenon. He was aware of phantom limb pain when 
he wrote in 1551 about the patients who suffered extreme pain in the leg that was no longer 
present, many months after it had been cut away. These patients imagined that they still had 
their entire limb.  There are accounts written by Descartes where he described phantom 
sensations in several of his writings, both private and public. One was a letter written to 
Fromondus on October 3, 1637. Fromondus had been critical of a passage in Descartes’ 
Optics, and Descartes now responded to the criticism. His specific purpose was to argue 
against a “faculty of feeling in the skin or [nerve] membranes”; he believed that sensation 
must involve the machinery of the brain. Central to his thinking was his belief that 
perception, which, unlike simple sensation, involves consciousness and understanding, is a 
distinctly human attribute. It requires the interaction of the immaterial soul with the material 
brain, which receives basic sensory information from the nerves, (Finger and Hustwit 2003, 
p: 677).   
William Porterfield, a prominent Scottish physician who lived from 1696 to 1771, 
was possibly the first physician to write about his own experiences after having a leg 
amputated. He described and interpreted the feelings in his own missing leg. He considered 
that sensations projected to the missing leg were no more remarkable than colours projected 
to external objects. For example, Doyle explains, including a quote from Porterfield’s diary: 
‘“All things perceived must therefore be present with the mind and in the sensorium 
where the mind resides… the sense of feeling is diffused thro’ all the body. Nay, in some 
cases it behived to be extended beyond the body itself as in the case of amputations… Having 
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had this misfortune myself, I can the better vouch for the truth of this fact from my own 
experience, for I sometimes still feel pains and itchings, as if in my tows, heel or ancle and 
tho it be several years since my leg was taken off.”’ 
Before then most papers had relied on second - or third-hand reports. Not 
surprisingly, ‘Porterfield saw similarities between the visual sensation and that experienced 
after amputation. He graphically described the sensations of pain and itching, but for some 
reason did not refer to the papers and reports of others, including Déscartes who, so 
eloquently, described the suffering of a girl after a limb amputation’ (Doyle 2010). 
Phantom limb pain is described in Herman Melville's novel Moby Dick, which was 
first published in 1851. Captain Ahab, who had lost his leg in a skirmish with the great white 
whale, stated, ‘A dismasted man never entirely loses the feeling of his old spar. . . And I still 
feel the smart of my crushed leg, though it be now so long dissolved’. The classical 
description of phantom limb pain, the most detailed available in the English language is that 
by Weir Mitchell in 1871. He used the term “sensory hallucinations” to characterize this 
phenomenon. There are also other examples such as found in the short story “The Case of 
George Dedlow” in 1866.  It is a tale of a young soldier who had undergone surgery due to an 
injury received in battle. He was unaware when he awoke that his legs had been amputated. 
He was experiencing cramps in his ‘legs’ and asked an orderly to massage them to relieve the 
cramping! As mentioned above, Silas Weir Mitchell, in 1871, described the first post-surgical 
‘ghost’ occurring in an amputee.  He was the first to use the expression ‘phantom limb’.  He 
reported that phantom limb pains, after a traumatic amputation, such as caused by an accident 
or disaster, were often the same as the pain at the time of the trauma, (Ramachandran and 
Blakeslee 1998, Melzack and Wall 1996).  
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This, I propose, is akin to a psychological trauma.  The initial traumatic loss of 
something or someone significant tends to remain in the emotional system at a similar level 
of intensity, long after the actual event.  Even if the details are not remembered the pain is. 
The phantom limb has been as elusive as pain itself. To explain the mysteries of the 
existence of pain, people through the ages have been known to resort to a variety of belief 
systems such as religion and folklore. 
According to Halligan (2002), Price and Twombly (1978) came across references to 
folklore accounts, while reviewing the historical literature on phantom limbs, describing the 
loss and miraculous restoration of body parts, stating that these descriptions were ‘‘present in 
folklore of all kinds the world over, from ancient to modern times’’, but importantly 
comprised the central theme of many documented miracle accounts extending back to the 
10th century.  
During the initial stages of the research, Price became aware that the body parts most 
often considered were those commonly found to be associated with phantom phenomena 
(limbs, lip, tongue, nose, eye, penis, breast and nipple, teeth, and viscera). Sensing the 
possibility that some of these miracle accounts were metaphorical or symbolic allusions to 
phantom limb phenomena, Price and Twombly commenced a detailed and critical review of 
75 historical descriptions.  
Accounts where the details were indicative of known phantom limb phenomena and 
where their inclusion in the story did not fulfil any obvious logical or narrative function were 
considered illustrations of this medical-historical hypothesis. ‘Most of these were of the 
lower limb, and a common miracle involved the leg transplantation by Saint Cosmas and 
Saint Damian (…) which dates from the 15th century. Explaining the phenomenological 
experience of a phantom limb as the product of a miraculous limb restoration therefore 
represented a metaphorical way that was congruent with religious belief and avoided a direct 
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challenge to folk conceptions of how it was possible to feel a body part that was no longer 
present. This review enabled Price and Twombly to push back the recorded history of 
phantom limb phenomena as far back as the 10th century’ (p: 256).  
Throughout history there have been many attempts to explain the presence of the 
ghost of a formally alive limb or part of the body. In ignoring the presence of this 
phenomenon, as something that could be explored to explain certain mind, body and self 
issues, researchers almost missed a significant piece of the puzzle. It goes beyond the 
mind/body puzzle and reaches the mind/self experiences of the being in pain conundrum.  
Psychological and emotional pain or suffering seems to be the constant in any given 
individual’s life.  As pointed out by Ramachandran and Hirstein (1998):  
‘Although patients with this syndrome have been studied extensively since the turn of 
the century, there has been a tendency among physicians to regard them as enigmatic, 
clinical curiosities. This neglect of a striking and potentially informative condition is 
all the more surprising given that research over the past decade has shown that 
phantom limbs can provide fundamental insights into the functional organisation of 
the normal human brain and (. . .) serve as perceptual markers for tracking neural 
plasticity in the adult brain’ (p:252). 
 
People throughout the ages have also looked to religion and folkloric traditions to 
explain the existence of pain and suffering in general.  In my experience with patients and 
clients who are suffering with psychological and emotional pain I see their desire for an 
escape from their pain, whether it means believing that it is an ‘Act of God’(for the good of 
something, the pain to gain pleasure/recompense) or the Devil (there is evil afoot, guilt and 
punishment/penance). It seems too painful to look at the state of one’s own existence and to 
know that the control really lives inside of them as does their pain. Hence, here again we see 
the emotive subject-pain relational entity and that no matter the explanation for the existence 
of pain there is always a desire to hold it in awe.  Emotional pain continues to be placed 
within the realm of the uncanny where it has the power to provoke excitement and a desire 
for the other – pain and pleasure beyond or within the pain. 
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4.3  The Phantom Limb: A Metaphor  
Why does psychological pain continue to exist in the subject’s emotional system, so 
much so that a past experience is triggered by some stimulus in the present? For example, an 
altercation at work where one has not been able to express one’s concerns or distress about 
being bullied, and experiences a sense of being rejected, isolated, degraded and devalued.  
There is also a physiological reaction such as increased heart rate and perspiration and/or 
physical weakness or pains in certain parts of the body i.e., legs, stomach, back and  feelings 
of anxiety, fear and panic. This scenario may evidence past traumatic experiences of a similar 
circumstance.  The ‘phantom’ of that past event is triggered by this present situation.  As 
Freud has postulated: 
‘A humiliation that was experienced thirty years ago acts exactly like a fresh one 
throughout the thirty years, as soon as it has obtained access to the unconscious 
sources of emotion. As soon as the memory of it is touched, it springs into life again 
and shows itself cathected with excitation which finds a motor discharge in an attack’ 
(1900, p: 578). 
 
To explain ‘plasticity’ in the unconscious, emotional system of the mind, as discussed 
in neuroscience regarding certain phenomena involved in the Phantom Limb Syndrome, it 
would be valuable to examine Freud’s (1899) theory on ‘screen memories’. In the process of 
repression a significant (traumatic) memory is suppressed while a less important memory is 
created to protect the subject from the original memory.  I propose that the space that is left 
in the process of the repression is filled by the screen memory. This would act, in my opinion, 
as the phantom of the original memory.  
Freud stated that ‘(…) instead of the mnemic image which would have been justified 
by the original event, another is produced which has been to some degree associatively 
displaced from the former one.’  He further explained that the substituted memory would lack 
the ‘important elements’ of the original memory. He also said that ‘It is a case of 
displacement on to something associated by continuity; or, looking at the process as a whole, 
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a case of repression accompanied by the substitution of something in the neighbourhood 
(whether in space or time)’ (1899, p: 307-308). 
A screen memory is a compromise between repressed elements and the defence 
against them. Like forgetting important facts that are not retained but, instead, the 
psychological or psychic significance is displaced onto something that is closely allied or 
connected, but with less important details. Displacement is the key mechanism at work in 
screen memories. Freud compared screen memories and dreams.  He expressed that because 
both had visual representations to the subject it was possible that they contained mnemic 
traces albeit in the form of ‘dream-thoughts’.  An analysis of dreams and screen memories 
allows access to the reality of the true picture of the experiences of the past. He stated that 
they retained ‘all of what is essential. . . . They represent the forgotten years of childhood as 
adequately as the manifest content of a dream represents the dream-thoughts’ (1914, p: 148). 
What is further relevant to this thesis is that in the Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality Freud added a note that drew a parallel between screen memories and the fetish, 
‘(…) that behind the first recollection of the fetish’s appearance there lies a submerged and 
forgotten phase of sexual development.  The fetish, like a ‘screen-memory’, represents this 
phase and is thus a remnant and precipitate of it’ (1920, p: 154). 
The fetishistic aspect of screen memories as with mnemic symbols and images that 
have been censored, clearly presage Freud’s later perspective of fetishism.  If a screen 
memory can be fetishistic then can pain not fulfil the same desire?  This is a question which 
will be examined subsequently. 
Consequently, when these memories, just as other memories, are triggered by an 
event or experience in the present and bring the original painful experience flooding back it is 
like the pain of the phantom limb.  The pain of the phantom is the same intensity, then, as the 
original experience of pain in the physical realm as in the psychical realm. There is something 
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that exists even though it does not. However, the pain of the phantom is the same intensity – 
but, there is no limb! Is pain the phantom or is it the (missing) limb?  There is a sense of a 
limb – as there is a sense of an event or experience (in the past) – a conscious awareness of 
what has been buried in the unconscious. 
I propose that in this case the subject’s relationship with (phantom) pain is a type of 
defence mechanism to ward of the memory of a past traumatic or tragic event. Fetishistic in 
nature, pain fulfils the aspect of disavowal, of possessing that which is lost and the pleasure 
inherent within that pain. This element of disavowal is to be found in psychoanalytic theory. 
Freud identifies this as a defence mechanism where ‘the subject’ refuses ‘to recognise the 
reality of a traumatic perception’. He relates this to the ‘castration complex’ where the 
‘traumatic perception’ occurs at the first sight of the female genitalia. Children disavow the 
absence of a penis and believe that they do see one all the same (Evans 2005 p: 43).  
In Lacan’s account the realisation that the cause of desire is always a lack is that 
which disavowal concerns. Disavowal is the failure to accept that lack which causes desire 
and the belief that desire is caused by a presence (e.g. the fetish)’ (Evans, 2005, p: 44). 
The neuromatrix theory is that (physical/neurological) pain is caused as the brain 
attempts to maintain the fidelity of the body/self unity. Similarly, the psychomatrix theory is 
that (emotional/psychological) pain is caused as the mind attempts to maintain the integrity of 
the self without the lack, when in fact there is a lack – desire for the lost object and the desire 
of the other. 
The Phantom limb syndrome is the sensation that a limb persists despite its 
having been amputated. Whilst extremely common – 60-80% of amputees report the 
experience – it is often felt as extremely painful. One of the interesting things to note 
when we think about this syndrome using the theory of the mirror stage is that one of 
the most effective treatments for this pain involves the therapeutic use of mirrors. Apart 
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from it referring to a libidinal relationship with the body image, an element of Lacan’s 
mirror stage theory is its referral to a dual relationship between the ego and the body, 
however it also refers to a link between the Imaginary and the Real.  The visual identity 
which is given from the mirror provides an imaginary ‘whole’ to the experience of a 
fragmented real.  The mirror stage describes the formation of the Ego via the process of 
identification. In this case the Ego is the result of identifying with one’s own specular 
image (Lacan, 1953, 1992 and 2006). 
 Keeping this in mind we may be able to understand the emotional effect of the so-
called mirror box experiment created by Ramachandran. This was and still is a treatment 
which involves a patient inserting both his good and ‘phantom’ limb into a box divided into 
two, the sections separated by a mirror. (Ramachandran 1998). When the patient moves his 
good limb, he sees in the mirror next to it the reflected image of a symmetrical limb in the 
place where he feels his phantom limb. By this method the patient is able to alleviate the 
feelings reported by many sufferers – that their phantom limb is clenched or contorted in a 
painful position.  
‘From a Lacanian perspective we might wonder whether this kind of visual-
kinaesthetic feedback is not replicating exactly the kind of motor mastery over the 
“fragmented” body, the corps morcelé, that Lacan describes as the experience of the 
infant prior to the mirror stage? (Lacan (online article) 2010).  
 
The article goes on to suggest that indeed, Lacan makes a reference to phantom limb 
syndrome in ‘Some Reflections on the Ego’ in 1951: 
“The meaning of the phenomenon called’ phantom limb’ is still far from being 
exhausted. The aspect which seems to me especially worthy of notice is that such 
experiences are essentially related to the continuation of a pain which can no longer 
be explained by local irritation; it is as if one caught a glimpse here of the existential 
relation of a man with his body-image in this relationship with such a narcissistic 
object as the lack of a limb…[‘phantom limb’ syndrome] leads us to suspect that the 
cerebral cortex functions like a mirror, and that it is the site where the images are 
integrated in the libidinal relationship which is hinted at in the theory of narcissism” 
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(Lacan, Some Reflections of the Ego, reproduced in Influential Papers from the 
1950s, Karnac, 2003, p.298, accessed, August 10, 2010). 
          For the purposes of our thesis this is a valid perspective of the phantom limb syndrome. 
Ramachandran (1998, p: 46-47) created the ‘mirror box’ experiment and proved it useful in 
eliminating, for the most part, the pain or cramping or paralysis of the phantom limb. The 
brain (optics) and body as well as the mind interaction is clear, as he evidences that a ‘learned 
paralysis can be unlearned’ by engaging the phantom and fulfilling the desire of the brain 
processes – for the arm to ‘move’. This is done by sending a visual message to the phantom 
arm to a reflection of the existing arm. The phantom arm is ‘hidden’ behind a mirror which is 
actually reflecting the existing arm on the opposite side. The reflection makes it appear as if 
the phantom arm exists and is real. The visual message is sent to the reflection tricking the 
brain into believing that this was, actually, the missing arm.  The existing arm is moved 
making it appear that the phantom is moving therefore, making the brain assume that the 
phantom arm that was ‘paralysed’ is now able to move. The neuromatrix theory holds its 
value as the substrate of the whole body is kept ‘intact’ by bringing meaning to the image in 
the mirror - a metaphor with emotional connotations that has implications for the possibility 
of a psychomatrix. 
Pain is temporarily relieved when desire is satisfied, but returns once more as this 
diminishes and brings a renewed desire, (Schopenhauer 1966, p: 318-319).  I assume then, 
that the phantom of the real object of desire can never be eliminated as the presence of the 
phantom limb can never be eliminated as long as the desire for the real (object) limb remains.  
The relationship of the subject and his body then, speaks of the subject’s relationship 
with his pain.  It is a narcissistic desire for that which is lost in order to be ‘complete’ 
knowing that this is an impossibility.  This very knowledge, which is painful, is in itself a 
pleasure as excitement of the search continues to fill the void that has been created by loss. 
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4.4  Duality of Consciousness  
According to Freud the conscious mind is everything that we are aware of and the 
mental processes of thinking and expressing oneself in rational language. Consciousness, he 
explained, is a ‘particular function’ of the mental processes.  At that time he explained that 
when the conscious system becomes aware of an experience there is no imprint left on its 
system: ‘Thus we should be able to say that the excitatory process becomes conscious in the 
systems Cs. but leaves no permanent trace behind there.’  However the imprint is actually left 
on the adjacent system (of the unconscious) (1920, p: 25). The key element is the ‘excitatory 
process’.  It seems that there are other elements at work that cause emotional experiences to 
be tucked away in the unconscious. 
Referring back to his work in the Project (1895) Freud explains that consciousness is 
not the only system that leaves traces or imprints behind.  He discusses further that this is the 
process by which memory (and motive) is created. Stimulus from external and internal 
environments cause ‘excitations’ in the other systems of the individual not just in the 
conscious system, which  impact memory and leave behind traces and imprints. He stated that 
the memory traces left behind thus ‘have nothing to do with the fact of becoming conscious; 
indeed they are often most powerful and most enduring when the process which left them 
behind was one which never entered consciousness’ (1920, p: 24-26).  
More recent studies are not far off from Freud’s hypotheses, as consciousness is 
understood in many different ways such as the state of being awake, of being aware of 
oneself or one’s surroundings, being able to focus our attention or to make voluntary 
decisions.  It is a ‘highly subjective quality of experience’ (Chalmers 1997).  The question of 
duality comes into view as we consider our previous discussion about the experience of pain, 
physical and psychological – having pain and being in pain.  It seems that this would bring 
into perspective the notion of duality.  According to Chalmers the problem of consciousness 
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begs a discussion and focuses in on the concepts of the mind.  Mainly there are two concepts 
of mind, phenomenological, ‘conscious experience’ and psychological, ‘causal or explanatory 
basis for behaviour’. At the heart of consciousness lies the concept of experience. He says 
that ‘we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel - an associated 
quality of experience.  These qualitative feelings are also known as phenomenal qualities or 
qualia for short’ (1997, p: 3-4). 
There are, according to this research, several types of conscious experiences, among 
them being the experience of pain, other bodily sensations, conscious thought, emotions and 
the sense of self.  The experience of pain is most prominent of experiences as it is distinct 
from all other experience and can include sensory experiences from ‘fierce burns’ to ‘sharp 
pricks to dull aches’. Pain can also be allied to sensations of ‘hunger pangs, itches’ and 
‘tickles’.  There are other types of bodily sensations such as experiences associated with 
‘orgasm, or the feeling of hitting one’s funny bone’. Emotions can include the experiences of 
happiness or sadness and depression and anger and pleasure that encompass our experiences. 
The more cognitive aspects of emotions are those that involve anxiety, pent up tension and a 
sudden release of pleasure (ibid, p: 9). 
Of the experience of the sense of self Chalmers states that ‘one sometimes feels that 
there is something to conscious experience that transcends all these specific elements: a kind 
of background hum, for instance, that is somehow fundamental to consciousness and that is 
there even when the other components are not.  This phenomenology of self is so deep and 
intangible that it sometimes seems illusory, consisting in nothing over and above specific 
elements such as those listed above. Still, there seems to be something to the phenomenology 
of self, even if it is very hard to pin down’ (1997, p: 10). 
The concept of consciousness, as well as the unconscious, is significant to the 
phantom limb scenario as we consider it as a metaphor for the self/mind unity and the 
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subject/pain relationship.  The subject is conscious of his pain be it physical or psychological, 
within the duality of phenomenological and psychological dimensions of his existence. As 
Chalmers states above that ‘the phenomenology of self is so deep and intangible that it 
sometimes seems illusory…’ (ibid), pain brings to consciousness an orchestration of 
sensations that do not always ‘sound’ harmonious to the unities of body, brain and mind. 
However, within all of that there is the ‘background hum’ of the experience of the self and its 
relationship with pain.  The subject is conscious of his relationship as a ‘hum’ that tells him 
that he exists. Not always in the sphere of the conscious, indeed it is mostly unconscious, and 
as Freud (1923) has said that what is conscious is only the tip of the iceberg.  
Part of the conscious mind includes our memory which is not always part of 
consciousness but, can be retrieved easily at any time and brought into our awareness. Freud 
called this ordinary memory the preconscious. In contrast the unconscious is a collection of 
experiences and of feelings, thoughts, urges, and memories that are present outside of our 
conscious awareness. Within the unconscious lie the representations of memories that are 
mostly feelings of pain, anxiety and conflict that are unacceptable or unpleasant.  According 
to Freud, the unconscious consists of all that is repressed and continues to influence our 
behaviour and experience, even though we are unaware of these underlying influences.  My 
question here is that if the unconscious holds what is repressed, feelings of pain, anxiety and 
conflict that are unacceptable or unpleasant, is it not feasible that this is the seat of the 
psychomatrix within which is created the psychosignature of pain?   
Freud proposed that, 
‘…we have arrived at the term or concept of the unconscious along another path, by 
considering certain experiences in which mental dynamics play a part.  We have 
found – that is, we have been obliged to assume – that very powerful mental processes 
or ideas exist (and here a quantitative or economic factor comes into question for the 
first time) which can produce all the effects in mental life that ordinary ideas do 
(including effects that can in their turn become conscious as ideas), though they 
themselves do not become conscious’ (1923, p: 14).  
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The mental processes that Freud speaks of above, I would argue, are what essentially 
create the psychosignature of pain.  I propose that pain is the ‘economic factor’ in 
consciousness however pain is also the qualitative aspect of consciousness.  
Freud (1915) explains that there are two different kinds of unconscious. He said that 
although what is repressed is unconscious, it is not so simple as to say that the unconscious is 
all that is repressed: He states that ‘…the repressed is part of the unconscious’ (p: 166).   
‘The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, acts which are merely latent, 
temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones and, on the 
other hand, processes such as repressed ones, which if they were to become conscious would 
be bound to stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious processes” (ibid, p: 
172).  
The unconscious holds representations of our every experience, some of those that are 
repressed manifest in various forms of behaviour and others do not. Albeit there are 
experiences that are negative there are also those that are positive. What is negative, though, 
it appears, tends to impact the conscious state, and what is significant is that the impact on the 
unconscious, from all experiences, is undoubtedly imprinted on many levels. Take for 
example, the process of repression and the many mechanisms to maintain it – such as denial - 
and its ensuing manifestations within the anxieties. And when we consider the profundity of 
pain and its capacity to permeate every aspect of human existence we can only begin to gauge 
the power (and need) of its existence, especially when we consider that another dimension of 
pain is pleasure. In his explanation of the theory of the ‘pleasure principle’ in his beyond the 
pleasure principle Freud (1920) stated that whatever has been repressed will find its way out 
or manifest itself in one way or another.  He speaks of the compulsion to repeat as one such 
manifestation. An experience that was unacceptable to the consciousness of the subject is 
repressed in his unconscious, however in seeking an outlet for expression it shows itself in 
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repetitive behaviour, demanding to be heeded. Freud explained as well that it is not the 
unconscious that is resisting the exposition of what is within.  The resistance he states: 
‘…arises from the same higher strata and systems of the mind which originally carried out 
repression’ (ibid, p: 19).  
This brings to mind a mechanism that is akin to Melzack and Wall’s theory of the 
‘gate control system’ within the central nervous system.  There are certain neuronal cells that 
allow the gate to open to allow certain stimuli in, while other cells act to close the gate to 
prevent other stimuli to enter thus controlling the level and quality of pain. The many 
domains of the individual’s environment, inevitably, impact on their tolerance level. The 
emotive aspect of pain is, I argue, imprinted in the parallel system of the psychomatrix within 
the unconscious becoming part of the conglomerate. Within the systems of the unconscious a 
similar activity implicating the ego, allow or prevent certain ideas into the conscious 
manifesting in certain behaviours.  The repetitive quality of these behaviours is thus 
influenced.  
Freud discusses the evidence in the act of repetition of a behaviour or thought in order 
to gain pleasure as in the child’s play of hide and seek or of the appearance and 
disappearance of a ‘wooden spool via a piece of string’. We have the ability to allow or 
disallow a painful event into the realm of our reality via our desire to find pleasure from the 
pain of loss - which is like a ‘piece of string’ that we have a hold on. Adults indulge in 
similar behaviours that can also manifest within the process of therapy. Once something is 
brought to the forefront or into conscious awareness it needs to be worked through in order to 
alleviate the trauma attached to it.  Freud points out that, ‘[T]his is convincing proof that, 
even under the dominance of the pleasure principle, there are ways and means enough of 
making what is in itself unpleasurable into a subject to be recollected and worked over in the 
mind’ (1920, p: 17). 
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The unconscious systems of the mind, I have proposed is the seat of the psychomatrix 
and where the psychosignature of pain is innately created and modulated by experiences.  
The experience of being in pain is the ‘phantom’ of the collection of repressed experiences 
that impact the subject’s existence and identity. Pain, unlike pleasure, is an entity that 
remains within the subject’s emotional make up, within the unconscious, in one aspect or 
another.  This pain has a powerful and dramatic effect on, not only, the body/self (somatic 
dimension) unity but also, and especially, the subject/object (psychic/emotional dimension) 
relationship. The phantom of pain remains as a phenomenal experience in the subject’s 
consciousness – like a ‘hum’ in the background it is there, like a companion, in every thought 
and behaviour, (Chalmers 1997). 
Since Hoffman’s (1954)  review on the literature on the phantom limb syndrome there 
have been advancements in science to facilitate  further understanding of this phenomenon 
For example, Melzack’s (1993) neuromatrix theory. However, in this article he adds an 
important psychological and psychoanalytical perspective to explain that, 
‘The pattern of body image consists of processes which construct and build up with 
the help of sensations and perceptions, but the emotional processes are the force and 
the source of energy of these constructive processes, and they direct them. (…) The 
phantom of an amputated person is, therefore, the reactivation of a given perceptive 
pattern by emotional forces’ (ibid, p: 264). 
 
How the subject reacts to loss of his limb is contingent upon how they perceive their 
own body, or body image.  The subject’s perception of his or her body or their ‘self-
evaluation’ is influenced by their environment. Therefore, it is possible that ‘“the psychical 
origin” of pain may be projected into some peripheral area. One’s position or status, so to 
speak, in life is in a good share dependent on his self-evaluation in and on his environment’ 
(ibid). 
Hoffman (1954) suggested that,  
‘[T]he phantom limb represents a narcissistic inability to renounce the integrity of the 
body or acknowledge the symbolic castration and thereby accept a relatively inferior 
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position and/or separation from the world. (…) The final picture of a phantom is, to a 
great extent, dependent on the emotional factors in the life situation.  The phantom is 
a model of how psychic life in general is going on. The interaction (between the 
periphery and the centre) is based upon the playful multiplication of psychic 
experiences. (…) The body and each portion has connected with it some emotional 
significance derived from early familial conditioning and of the later cultural values 
(…)’ (ibid, p: 265). 
 
I propose that loss of a limb or body part brings to the forefront the reality of object-
loss and the traumatic reminder of the threat of castration. The depth and complexity of loss 
disallows one to fill the emptiness with anything other than what is lost, hence, the 
‘phantom’, which is a representation of that which is lost.  
As Freud had evidenced throughout his clinical work at the turn of the 19
th
 Century, 
so it is still true. Regardless of the plethora of research in the field of psychology, it has been 
established that our thoughts, feelings and consequent behaviour are motivated (and inspired) 
by our brain’s (neurological) and our mind’s (psychological and emotional) ability to store 
memories.   However, it is not just the storing of memories, but the censorship of what is 
stored that is significant.  Freud postulated that in the unconscious is stored the 
representations of our experiences.  The very statement that there are ‘representations’, is 
clear, that most things that we remember are not exact details of the actual events.  It may feel 
as if it is the exact, same experience, as it happened in the past however, it is our mind’s 
desire to maintain an integrity of the experience.  This is the ‘phantom’ that remains with us.  
A phantom of the real event, however it has no substance except what we individually allow 
it to have.  What substance we allow it to have is contingent upon our innate psychomatrix 
and the signature that is created within it. The psychosignature that is particular to the 
individual’s being in pain or suffering.  
Modell’s (2003, p: 556) statement that ‘as the emotional interchanges that occur 
between infants and their caretakers are repetitive, these repetitions form recognizable 
patterns of feeling states that are invariably backed by memory and will serve later as 
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templates of relatedness’, is an example of the creation of the psychosignature.  This is the 
state of being that the subject finds himself in and this is what he needs to contend with.   
The phantom pain is a conscious experience, with neurological explanations however, 
the quality of the pain springs from unconscious wishes and fantasies which seem to fill the 
lack and desire for the lost object – an effort to save the self from a disintegration of the 
whole. 
4.5 Pain as an object 
A trauma or tragic experience is a breach in the emotional systems of the mind and 
adds to the sense of loss which throws the subject into a state of suffering or being in pain 
which consequently initiates a mourning state. This however, has the potential to develop into 
the state of depression or as Freud (1917) termed it, ‘melancholia’.  
In observing patients who are in therapy I am curious to know, ‘why he does not want 
to ‘know’ his suffering or his pain?  Or maybe he knows and is rejecting it so as to prolong 
his state of having pain – why?  To have pain is to know something about the external 
‘torturer’ – pain that is being inflicted in contrast to being in pain or suffering is to know 
something of the ‘internal torturer’.  The concern here is with this ‘internal torturer’. In either 
case there is an element of pain being inflicted, pain used as an instrument or a thing - a 
perverse manifestation. As Abel-Hirsch (2006) states:  
‘[T]he differentiation of pain as a felt thing that is used and pain that is suffered and 
thence discovered by the person is consistent with the parallel development of thought on 
perversion that looks at the way disavowal or misrepresentation of reality can both be 
regarded as constructions rather than discoveries” (p:101). 
I propose that the subject’s relationship with pain is seen within his perception of the 
reality of pain within his perverse relationship to reality. I propose that pain is an object 
libidinally cathected by the subject. Pain is the object that is within the space carved out by 
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that which was lost. Pain is desire for that which is lost as well as the representation of what 
is lost.  Therefore, seeking fulfilment is to find pleasure within pain. It is an object used to 
provoke an experience of having pain – pain felt as something externally inflicted, or to 
invoke an internal experience of suffering or being in pain.   
In examining the phenomenon of phantom pain we can identify a something that fills 
the lack in the whole – body or the psyche.  Pain is what is left within the space where a 
‘breach’ has occurred. What exactly is pain, specifically psychological and emotional pain is 
a question that presents a problem.  For in the effort to describe this pain the significance of 
the experience of pain is lost. We use the analogy of Pontalis’ theory of the dream-object 
within the dream that is likened to a vessel or container. He states that his ‘hypothesis is that 
every dream, as an object in the analysis, refers to the maternal body. (…). Dreaming is 
above all the attempt to maintain an impossible union with the mother, to preserve an 
undivided whole, to move in a space prior to time’ (1981, p: 29). 
Pain, then, can be constructed as an object to be used upon the body and or the 
psyche, to have pain or to be in pain.  The experience of pain is subjective and so is 
experienced, first of all in, the narcissistic dimension of the subject. It is the object that fills 
the desire of the lost object. Abel-Hirsch quotes Britton, “[T]he suffering is felt to arise 
within the self as a consequence of something missing” (2006, p: 100-101).  
Whether it is physical pain or psychic pain there is a merging of the two states 
especially in individuals that experience severe circumstances, such as amputations and 
chronic pain syndromes, or other extreme life events such as war and terrorism, disease or 
childhood sexual abuse.  Moreover, it is the state of having pain that transforms to the state of 
suffering or being in pain as the experience of an event passes through the psychomatrix and 
is modulated by the psychosignature.  Here suffering becomes the staying entity, the memory, 
in the (unconscious) mind which, in turn, influences one’s state of existence and their sense 
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of identity. The aspects of identity and existence which are impacted by the state of being in 
pain, go back to infantile loss and desire for self-preservation, primary desire to return to a 
state of pleasure and possession of the object and secondary narcissism – the development of 
a sense of self, independent of the object yet, retaining some aspects of the primary 
narcissism. 
To examine the theory of pain as an object I would argue here that it is in this 
objectification that we can identify the formulation of the fetishistic object.  As stated by 
Abel-Hirsch: ‘It is widely recognized that perversion is not limited to a person’s sexual 
behaviour, but may influence all of an individual’s experiences, relations, and attitudes to 
reality’ (ibid, p: 99). Therefore, the experience of pain whether it is physical as in having 
pain, or psychological as in being in pain, may be constructed and objectified to be used in 
the perverse sphere of experience.   
As Freud discussed in his Project (1895) and carried forward in his subsequent work, 
pain in the physical system of the body can be imprinted in the parallel systems of the 
emotional or psychological systems of the mind.  Pain thus imprinted is recategorized to that 
of suffering and the phantom of a previous experience, physical or psychological.  However, 
a differentiation is irrelevant as, in either case there is, as Abel-Hirsch suggested, a ‘parallel 
development of thought on perversion that looks at the way disavowal or misrepresentation 
can be used to obscure an unwanted discovery of reality.  The misuse of pain and the 
misrepresentation of reality can both be regarded as constructions…’ (ibid, p: 101). 
4.6     The Matrix 
 As discussed earlier in this thesis, the matrix is defined as ‘“an array of circuit 
elements … for performing a specific function as interconnected”’.  This array of neurons in 
a neuromatrix, Melzack (1993) suggests is genetically programmed.  ‘The neuromatrix 
distributed throughout many areas of the brain, comprise a widespread network of neurons 
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which generate patterns, processes information that flows through it, and ultimately produces 
the pattern that is felt as a whole body.’ The patterns vary according to individual subjectivity 
however the neurosignature of the ‘whole body’ remains constant maintaining the sense of a 
body/self unity, (p: 622-623). 
The brain/body/mind relationship exists in order to maintain the integrity of the unity 
of the ‘whole’. This relationship has a historical significance to survival and self-
preservation.  As described by Melzack, the neuromatrix is inherent to an individual’s make 
up and functioning.  It is within this matrix that is created, by the impressions of historical 
experience, cognitive and behavioural responses to day to day events that are essential to 
functioning.  As Melzack stated:  
‘The output of the body neuromatrix, (…), is directed at two systems: (1) the 
neuromatrix that produces awareness of the output, and (2) a neuromatrix involved in overt 
action patterns. In this discussion, it is important to keep in mind that just as there is a steady 
stream of awareness (even during the dream episodes of sleep), there is also a steady output 
of behaviour (including movements during sleep)’ (1993, p: 625). 
 The neurosignature that is created within the neuromatrix is a structure that governs 
the processes and systems of the body including the body/brain relationship in order to 
maintain the integrity for this unity.  If there is a breach in this integrity, such as loss of a 
limb, it reacts in such a way to attempt to recreate or reconstruct this unity.  In further 
consideration of this I argue  that this system and process of maintaining a whole is a 
metaphor for the subject’s desire: (a) for a union with that which he has lost (the mother) and 
so overcoming the trauma of loss, to belong, and to overcome the fear of annihilation, and (b) 
for seeking pleasure beyond pain.  The subject’s desire to maintain that which is not possible 
(pain), in a sense of wholeness (state of pleasure without desire), is what drives his thoughts 
and behaviours that attempt to bring equilibrium to his existence.    
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          Maintaining the integrity of the mind/self or body/self unity could be at the expense of 
certain realities – an example of having pain, ‘I know that my leg is not there however, it is 
there as the pain tells me that it exists’ or another example of being in pain, a forty year old 
patient stated, as he had a number of times, throughout his therapy, ‘my father is dead now, 
but he was a cruel man. I remember his abuse and I hate him now as I did then.  I realise that 
he does not have the power to control my life anymore, but I live in that place, and I still 
suffer and feel emotionally paralysed.  This suffering, in the first place reminds me that I do 
not wish to be like him.’  In response to a question he stated that he enjoys being aggressive 
and ‘letting ignorant people know how I feel about their stupidity’.  The phantom of his past 
experience clearly fills the place of loss in the form of pain that manifests in aggression, and a 
need for revenge. The further he ‘runs away’ from wanting to be like his father the close he 
gets to it.  
The emotional state of pain, of being in pain, is one that does not ‘go away’ and is a 
‘phantom’ of one’s past.  Just as there is a relationship between the brain and the body/self 
unity to explain the existence of a phantom limb, there is a relationship between the 
conscious and the unconscious to explain the existence of the subject-pain relationship.  
The phantom limb syndrome was of interest to the research of Melzack (1993) due to 
his previous studies and his theory of brain functions.  The problem that fascinated him was 
that the absence of a limb, due to amputation or genetic dysfunctions, did not preclude having 
pain in that ‘limb’.  This was a phantom that he wanted to pursue to understand the workings 
of the brain and the implications of the imprinting of experiences, particularly those of pain. 
This neurosignature of the body, created within the neuromatrix, responds to any signal that 
deviates from its body/self image and unity.   
The fascination is with the phenomenon of the presence of pain when there is no, 
acute physical, psychological and emotional, stimuli. Following the physical experience of 
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the sense of having pain, the experience of being in pain, that of suffering continues in the 
subject’s emotional and psychic dimension. It is the same circumstance when an emotional or 
psychological trauma has passed.  The suffering remains manifesting in behaviour or physical 
symptoms. The subject-pain relationship, in this case is to satisfy the mourning, loss and 
ambiguity of what was once or should be or should have been a whole unit.  Pain here is the 
object which fills this void. 
It would be the cathexis that the ego cannot execute, therefore remains a perverse 
feature of the ego’s desire – the subject’s unconscious, masochistic need to have pain, and to 
manipulate it, in order to be in pain in order to sustain the possibility of regaining what was 
lost, or creating a fantasy of what it should be. In reading Merleau-Ponty (2002) I came 
across a statement that adds to the already discussed perspectives.  He says,  
‘[W]hat it is in us which refuses mutilation and disablement is an I committed to a 
certain physical and inter-human world, who continues to tend toward his world 
despite handicaps and amputations and who, to this extent, does not recognize them 
de jure. The refusal of the deficiency is only the obverse of our inherence in a world, 
the implicit negation of what runs counter to the natural momentum which throws us 
into our tasks, our cares, our situation, our familiar horizons. To have a phantom arm 
is to remain open to all the actions of which the arm alone is capable: it is to retain the 
practical field which one enjoyed before mutilation’ (p: 94). 
 
          I take it one step further to say that besides the desire ‘to retain the practical field which 
one enjoyed before mutilation’ there is also a desire to obtain that kind of enjoyment or 
pleasure, the possibility of such a circumstance or to have that which one imagines or thinks 
one should have.  Therefore, ‘to have a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of 
which the arm alone is capable’ – and I suggest that the phantom limb is a metaphor for the 
phantom of an emotional attachment from the past. It is also a means of avenging that which 
caused the fear of annihilation.  Pain is the phantom of what is locked away in the 
unconscious – loss of object.  It is the object. The motive of the subject’s alliance with pain is 
to cause the (maternal) object pain by his being in pain. Pain is then, not only a defence 
against the loss but also a reminder of that which was lost. 
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I saw in my patients a dimension of pleasure in their desire to retain the ‘possibility of 
possibilities’ (Kierkegaard 2000, p: 138-139) - the anxiety that gave substance to their 
relationship to (their) pain meant that the possibility of achieving that which they desired 
existed. Equally the possibility of the opposite was also present however this anxiety was 
‘worth having’ if the former were to materialise. 
The theory of the neuromatrix also implicates the psychological dimensions of pain.  
Melzack (1993) postulates that the brain ‘generates perceptual experience even when no 
external inputs occur’ (p: 628). As discussed earlier, it is clear when we consider a matrix 
within the network of the brain function that is in continual and cyclical transmission.   
According to Melzack’s (1993) article on the Phantom Limb there are three major neural 
circuits in the brain that are influenced to create the qualities of experiences.  These are the 
‘sensory pathway passing through the thalamus to the somatosensory cortex. A second 
system must consist of the pathways leading through the reticular formation of the brain stem 
to the limbic system, which is critical for emotion and motivation.  A final system consists of 
cortical regions important to recognition of the self and to the evaluation of sensory signals.  
A major part of this system is the parietal lobe, which in studies of brain-damaged patients 
has been shown to be essential to the sense of self’ (ibid, p: 54-55). 
Suffering or the sense of being in pain is retained, in a parallel system, as a reminder 
of that which is lost and to maintain the possibility of fulfilment. The possibility that there is 
also created, simultaneously, a psychomatrix within the unconscious from within which a 
psychosignature, specific to  emotional pain, as discussed, becomes increasingly viable.   
Melzack (1993) stated that, ‘… experience would enable the matrix to store the 
memory of a pain from a gangrenous ulcer and might thus account for the frequent 
reappearance of the same pain in phantom limbs’ (ibid). Even though impressions of such an 
event are stored as impressions on the neuro-circuitry of the brain I suggest that the emotional 
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meaning of this can only be stored in the psychological processes, which would, in turn, 
confirm the existence and significance of a parallel matrix, in the emotional, unconscious 
system, which is specific to pain.  
Even though the neuromatrix affects the processing of body, brain and psychological 
functioning, it does not account for the persistent presence of psychological and emotional 
pain.  I will argue that here is where the concept of a psychomatrix could play a role.  
Because, being in pain, even though connected to having pain, is an independent process.  As 
such, the neuromatrix and psychomatrix integrate and cooperates to create the unity of 
function – mind and brain (and body).  The emotional and psychological self is, I propose, 
essential in the development of the subject’s identity and sense of existence. 
In reading Kierkegaard the essential factor to emotional survival and growth is, what I 
would name, the anxiety factor.  It is accepted that there is a dimension of fear within anxiety, 
however Kierkegaard states that anxiety differs in that it (anxiety) ‘is freedom’s actuality as 
the possibility of possibility’ (2000, p: 139). 
He goes on to posit that anxiety has psychological ambivalence: ‘…anxiety is a 
sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy…’, and further that it is an essential 
developmental process.  He states that ‘[T]his anxiety belongs so essentially to the child that 
he cannot do without it.  Though, it captivates him by its pleasing anxiousness [beaengstelse]’ 
(ibid).  He relates the example from a Grimm’s fairy tale about a young man’s curiosity about 
anxiety that takes him on an adventure of discovery only to prove that ‘this is an adventure 
that every human being must go through – to learn to be anxious in order that he may not 
perish either by never having been in anxiety or by succumbing in anxiety.  Whoever has 
leaned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate’ (ibid, p: 153). 
From our primal history this could be one ‘phantom’ that has its use! It could possibly 
be an explanation for the phenomenological presence of being in pain or suffering. In treating 
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my clients presenting with a variety of issues I observe that the core of their illness is pain, 
which is the core factor in anxiety. However, it is where they have ‘succumbed in anxiety’ 
which is similar to ‘discovering pain’ which Bion (1970) speaks about.  My speculation is 
that this ‘succumbing in anxiety’ is a breach to the emotional and psychological system and 
circuitry within the psychomatrix.  I propose that just as when a limb is amputated the 
neuromatrix attempts to normalize the body/self image, by continuous transmission of 
messages in spite of no response from the site of the previously attached limb, so it is when 
there is a breach in emotional stability, the psychomatrix struggles to maintain the mind/self 
unity by an increase in feelings of anxiety. However, when the emotional response 
mechanism is paralyzed due to acute trauma it creates a ‘phantom’ in the form of a behavior 
such as, aggression, chronic pain, or addiction or no action at all. The psychosignature 
continues to modulate inputs from the experience and respond in such a way that the 
cognitive and behavioral outputs are those of an acute increase in having pain that may be 
perceived as being in pain or suffering.  It is similar to what Ramachandran calls ‘a learned 
paralysis’ (1999, p: 47). 
The sense of having pain in a phantom limb then, is really an expression of being in 
pain. There is no real limb to provide the physical sensation of having pain; however the 
body/self unity within the neuromatrix continues to relay messages to the missing limb.  
However, the messages are not only relayed to that part of the limb of the body they also 
traverse the imprint or the signature within the matrix, hence, the sense of the presence of the 
limb as it was before amputation.  It is an attempt of the brain to maintain the whole body 
integrity (Ramachandran 1999).  I propose that it is an effort on the part of a relationship that 
is created between the brain and the body/self unity, as in the case of the relationship between 
the subject and pain.   
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I propose that as with the body, when no emotional or psychological stimulus is 
present, the mind/self system fills the lack, to maintain the ‘phantom’, through manifestations 
of neurotic symptoms such as anxieties, obsessions and addictions – grounded in desire and 
loss.  The phantom limb syndrome thus remains a metaphor for the experience of being in 
pain. 
 Further observation, in patients, has evidenced that similar to the phantom limb being 
felt as a real object (in the brain), emotional and psychological pain is a phantom, in the 
mind, causing the subject to be in pain or suffer.   
These are the misrepresentations and disavowal that Steiner (1995) discusses and 
states, “I believe that these misrepresentations are central to our understanding of perversions 
and that they arise from a quite specific mechanism in which contradictory versions of reality 
are allowed to exist simultaneously” (p: 90). 
Pain has the power to take over the subject’s life by becoming the object and creating 
the distance needed, which allows the subject-pain relationship to function.  This 
objectification allows pain to be that which is desired. Pain becomes the object that fills the 
loss but it is also a reminder of the loss and the desire to regain that which was lost.  As long 
as pain poses the possibility of pleasure and filling the loss, pain remains the fetish object that 
is (unconsciously) sought.  
The following is a case scenario of phantom limb syndrome. As a metaphor, I hope to 
apply it to explain my theory of the subject pain relationship and its impact on identity and 
existence.   
4.7   The case of Y 
I would like to examine the case of Y as it had an array of multifaceted dimensions 
which were interesting mainly due to her psychotic illness. In many ways Y’s gradual mental 
deterioration put her into a different ‘world’.  Her reality was that of being a ‘slave’ and 
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‘imprisoned’ in a place where she had very few choices.  She had however, reconciled to this 
reality by setting up defenses to protect herself. For example, her refusal to bathe or take 
medication was her way to keep her ‘slave masters’ at bay. The loss of her leg became part of 
her enslavement as for her, having the freedom to walk was like having the freedom to ‘walk 
away’ a sense of freedom that (at that time) she did not have.   
When she complained of having pains in the (amputated) leg, or when she felt 
itchiness in that same leg or on any other part of her body, it was the only time she 
experienced her body.  This experience seemed to be the only time she felt ‘free’ of her sense 
of slavery and felt instead a sense of omnipotence over the reality (her environment), which 
was influenced by the doctors, nurses and social workers reminding her that she needed to 
bathe, eat and take medication because of her circumstances – limb loss, pain, diabetes, loss 
of her daughter etc.  This was a time when the ‘phantom’ of her existence was her closest 
ally, and her means to fulfilling her (self-preservative and sexual) desire.  
My theory of the psychomatrix and phantom pain is evidenced in Y’s relationship 
with her pain – the reason for its existence in her life - and how this has impacted on her 
sense of identity and existence.  This case was of interest to my thesis due to the dual aspects 
of Y’s diagnosis: her psychotic illness as well as her neurotic symptoms. The disavowal 
mechanism in Y’s case, harkens back to a Freudian perspective where he links it to psychosis 
as well as fetishism and as Evans (2006) suggests that  
‘in these clinical conditions, disavowal is always accompanied by the opposite 
attitude (acceptance of reality), since it is ‘rarely or perhaps never’ possible for ‘the 
ego’s detachment from reality to be carried through completely’ (Freud 1940a:SE 
XXIII, 201). The coexistence in the ego of these two contradictory attitudes to reality 
leads to what Freud term ‘the splitting of the ego’ (p: 44)  
 
Historical background 
 Y was a female in her mid-fifties, of African origin, and generally of good humour. 
She had travelled to the UK to escape the traumas of war and poverty. After a period of 
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physical and psychological deterioration, and subsequent hospitalization and treatment, Y 
was placed in a nursing home for respite care for an extended period of recuperation and 
further assessment.  Ten years earlier Y’s twelve year old child had died in a roadside 
accident. Reports indicated that this event had triggered the late onset of a psychotic 
breakdown that had progressed into an enduring, persistent, psychotic, disorder categorized 
as schizophrenia. This resulted in her being on anti-psychotic medication ever since.  Prior to 
her hospitalization which brought this case to my attention, Y had lived independently, and 
had a routine that she followed religiously every day.  She was well known in her community 
and had a boyfriend who visited her daily as she did not want him to live with her. Part of her 
routine was that she would allow him to bathe her once a week.   
While in the nursing home, Y recuperated for a while from the acute illness (disease 
progression, and surgery due to phantom leg pains). Soon she began to refuse her medications 
except for medication for the pain in her phantom limb. As time went on she also began to 
refused to wash, bathe, change her clothes and look after her basic hygiene and eat the food 
that was served to her in the home. 
During lucid moments, where she seemed to be engaging, Y would, repeatedly and 
sorrowfully, relate the story of how she lost her child and the blame that she placed on herself 
for not being able to prevent the accident.   
The significance of this case is that Y developed many symptoms such as, severe, all 
over itching, heart problems, weight gain, circulatory problems, depression and type II 
diabetes and fungal infection in her feet.   This resulted in gangrene setting in on one of her 
legs, below her knee.  Failed attempts to slow the gangrene resulted in a below the knee 
amputation to stop the spread of further infection and deterioration.  At the time of my 
contact with Y she was presenting psychotic symptoms as well as neurotic tendencies. 
Presenting symptoms 
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Y was clinically diagnosed with schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder, in her thirties.  
There were positive symptoms such as delusions as well as negative symptom such as a 
degree of poverty of speech and of thought content, anhedonia (the absence of pleasure or the 
ability to experience it), flat affect, avolition (loss of motivation).  She had a history of 
depression and bizarre behaviour (details unavailable) that were exacerbated by the loss of 
her daughter prior to her diagnoses. Her presenting symptoms were primarily pain in her 
‘phantom leg’ (from the below the left knee amputation), all over body itching, paranoiac 
delusions around washing/bathing and changing her clothes, a need to be isolated and lack of 
desire to engage with others. (Information extracted from case notes, referenced to DSM-IV-
TR 2000). 
Two years after the amputation Y continued to experience phantom limb pain and 
later, a quite prominent symptom of itchy skin. When she was experiencing this itch it was 
quite prominent in her phantom limb.  It was also clearly present during periods when she 
spoke of her child and would cry out, ‘my leg, my leg, it hurts too much.  Please, please it 
hurts…’  
Y would speak to people, but was suspicious and would only give answers that she 
felt were necessary.  She would repeatedly, ‘shrug’ her left shoulder which seemed to be an 
involuntary movement when she was approached and could be assumed to be an action (a 
form of a ‘tick’ triggered by stress) that waylaid her anxiety of having to interact with others.  
Y would sit in her wheel chair singing to herself appearing oblivious to her environment, 
until someone asked her how she was.  She would laugh if the person speaking to her 
laughed.  As if she was imitating the person – however her laugh was without affect. She 
would look at them suspiciously then cry out, ‘my leg, my leg, it hurts too much.  Please, 
please it hurts…’ She would continue to speak in the same tone saying, ‘my daughter, my 
daughter gone, please it hurts.’  It was as if she felt that she was expected to have a complaint 
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about her health.  The ‘ailment’ seemed to be most easily expressed in terms of pain and the 
most obvious cause was her missing leg. There was, no doubt, that she was experiencing 
some sort of sensations in her phantom and explained it as pain although there may also have 
been the discomfort of pain, as is inevitable in phantom leg syndrome. The expression of 
having pain seemed to be her expression of suffering or of being in pain.  Although, there 
were period of time, throughout the day, when she would complain of pain in ‘the leg that is 
not there’, she refused medication due to a paranoia that she would be poisoned.  
The neurotic symptoms that Y displayed were those of shrugging her shoulder, crying 
out repeatedly about her leg and her daughter, but of most significant interest was her 
scratching her skin to relieve an, allusive, ‘itch’. 
The symptom of itching and scratching was so prominent that it presented as some 
form of gratification or satisfaction of desire.  In Freud’s (1905), Three Essays On The 
Theory of Sexuality there is an interesting explanation of the presence and role of an ‘itch’.  In 
order to again achieve a previous satisfaction, a desire or compulsion to repeat a certain 
behavior is present – due to past experience. He has proposed that, 
‘[T]he state of being in need of a repetition of the satisfaction reveals itself in two 
ways: by a peculiar feeling of tension, possessing, rather, the character of unpleasure, 
and by a sensation of itching or stimulation which is centrally conditioned and 
projected on to the peripheral erotogenic zone.  We can therefore formulate a sexual 
aim in another way: it consists in replacing the projected sensation of stimulation in 
the erotogenic zone by an external stimulus which removes that sensation by 
producing a feeling of satisfaction’ (p: 184). 
I realise here that it is no surprise that an itch is a result of a buildup of energy resulting 
in a need for relief.  In recent research it has been discovered that the sensation of itch 
and that of pain run on common neural pathways. There is progress toward further 
investigation of itching as it has been found to follow in the footsteps of chronic pain.  
Studies so far have shown that severe and chronic itch ‘disrupts sleep and other aspects 
of life and carries a heavy economic and social burden’ (Carsten 2009, p: 73). We need 
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to note that as with pain, itch plays positive as well as negative roles. It could act as a 
warning as well as cause extensive exacerbation of other problems such an increase in 
pain and disruption in day to day life. (ibid) However, the feeling of satisfaction gained 
from relieving an itch by scratching is undeniable.  
It is undeniable that Jouissance (Lacan 1992) with its sexual etymology connotes the 
pleasure inherent in pain and the pain of too much pleasure.  Tickling and sexual climax are 
two examples that testify to the impossibility of satisfaction.  The aim of the pleasure 
principle (Freud 1920) is to work toward maintaining equilibrium (to keep pleasure to a 
minimum) and therefore, a ‘prohibition’ of Jouissance. Beyond the limits of the pleasure 
principle and beyond the limits of pleasure that the subject can bare is pain. Beyond this limit 
pleasure becomes pain or an experience of ‘pleasurable pain’. Jouissance then, is this 
‘suffering’ and ‘expresses the paradoxical satisfaction that the subject derives from his 
symptom, or to put it another way, the suffering that he derives from his own satisfaction 
(Freud’s ‘primary gain from illness’) (Evans 2005, p: 91-92). 
There is evidence then in the case of Y when she began scratching herself saying that 
she has an itch. Itching and scratching, as observed in Y, albeit, part of her psychosis seemed 
to serve as a means to sexual gratification. During these periods of time she was oblivious to 
where she was or who was present, completely absorbed in this activity which she repeated 
several times during the day. It needs to be noted that at the end of this activity Y body was 
notably marked and sore from the exertion. 
Freud stated that in neurosis the piece of reality that is cut off ‘takes flight’ and in 
psychosis that piece of reality is ‘remodeled’. Neurosis does not disavow the reality, it only 
ignores it however, psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it. Here then it is ‘no longer 
autoplastic but alloplastic’ ((1924, p: 184-185). 
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Autoplastic (repair the internal environment with matter from another part of that 
environment) and alloplastic (to replace or change the internal environment) are terms used 
in psychoanalysis to explain the interaction with the external reality in an attempt to repair or 
replace a part of the internal reality. These terms can also be referred to the term plasticity 
used to describe a process that occurs (not exclusively) within phantom limb syndrome 
(pain), the brain’s ability to reorganize itself in order to maintain the body/self integrity 
(Ramachandran 1994) as we have discussed earlier in this chapter 
Analysis 
It seemed that Y’s experience of phantom limb pain and that of the loss of her child 
had somehow become entangled in her psychic make up and were as one. I propose here that 
the phantom limb pain was an attempt at repairing the pain of the reality of her loss. The 
phantom limb can also be applied as a metaphor for her internal experiences of being in pain. 
I would go so far as to venture that not only her phantom limb but also her itch were types of 
screen memories created by her mind as an attempt to repair the breach in her psychological 
processing. Her sense of loss was thus expressed as were her desire for sexual gratification 
and an autoerotic act of (infantile, narcissistic) self-preservation.   
The fear of being poisoned was a fear of punishment from the external world, an 
obsessive thought process, for the loss of her daughter.  Y had clearly created another reality 
to satisfy the loss of the real world which was evidenced in her rationalizations. Her paranoia 
it seemed, replaced her feeling of guilt and loss. 
As long as she was not compelled to engage she was content, clearly, with herself.  
She was engaged in her private world.  There were times when she sang and laughed, to 
herself.  At other times she would experience itching that she had throughout the day, at 
various intensities.  During periods of heightened anxiety she would scratch herself until her 
skin was quite sore, clearly distressed, and no amount of creams or other solutions (she, 
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mostly, refused all treatments) would placate her need to scratch herself.  There had been 
several medical investigations to rule out any physical or physiological problems or illness.  
Upon observation it was clear that she found a sort of comfort, even pleasure in scratching.  
As in the case of someone being bitten by a mosquito and the resulting need to scratch the 
area, her expression would turn from distress to relief. 
The itch, I propose, is a form of, and part of, the physical, as well as the emotional, 
phantom pain that Y experienced.  The only relief she seemed to attain was by scratching. Y 
had been known to express that she liked to scratch herself whether or not she feels an itch. 
At times it has been observed that Y laughed and giggled as she scratched her body.  At these 
times she would refuse to engage and would ignore any interaction or conversation.  In these 
instances the scratching appeared to be a route to sexual gratification.  I would argue that Y 
had found a spot on her upper body to relieve the itching in her phantom leg.  It could also be 
that Y scratched herself to provoke pain in order to illicit a pleasurable sensation.  It appeared 
that relieving the ‘itch’ brought Y a degree of pleasure in the form of release of built up of 
energy, such as an orgasm, or as scratching an itchy spot does where also there is a build-up 
of energy and release (if you get the right spot!)?  This, I suggest, is a good example of pain, 
in the form of an itch, being used in the service of self-gratification and pleasure – a desire 
for self-preservation within an ego-cathexis. Y created her own object in creating pain (an 
itch) that she used to gain pleasure. 
Y was also diagnosed with was depression, however it seemed that this was due to the 
fact that she did not wish to engage with anyone, except when she was crying about the pain 
in her leg and the loss of her daughter, not wanting to bathe and change her clothes and her 
paranoia around being poisoned by the medication, as well as the fear of bathing as if it was a 
fear of losing control to others who may take something away from her. She also refused to 
eat which may have been part of her paranoia. However, this did not appear to be a primary 
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concern considering the fact that she ate very well when her friend brought food for her and 
that her weight was stable.  Her crying out was only under the circumstances discussed 
above. I propose that this apparent state of depression was her wish to be left alone, and a 
symptom of her psychosis. She would only speak to someone if she was in need of something 
– such as assistance with her wheelchair and being wheeled to another area. She was happy to 
engage with herself and to be ‘cut’ off from reality.   
Y had created a reality within certain memory traces that were seemingly distorted 
however; it seemed to be a way for her to rationalize her fears.  For example she lived in a 
world where she was a ‘slave’.  She said that her family before her were slaves and did not 
bathe themselves so she would not either. She stated that she had read about this when she 
was in school and in other books. On those occasions when her carers succeeded in 
convincing her that this was necessary for good hygiene, as well as to avoid further 
infections, she would be quite upset and would insist on putting on her soiled clothing.   
She refused to discuss the issue further as the distress of having to ‘give up’ her 
clothing was unbearable and she could not comprehend why people wished to ‘make her 
change’. Y wished to maintain some level of control over her life and the ‘world’ she found 
herself in. When attempts were made to bring the reality of the situation to Y she retaliated 
with aggression, as this presented a threat to her reality.    
Her reaction was an effort to ward of further trauma from her external environment 
and what remained was the reality of the phantom of her past trauma – her need to itch and be 
in pain.  This was her experience in reality as she knew it.  Her narcissistic existence was an 
effort toward self-preservation. 
 Due to her disconnection with reality, and the lack of desire for relating to her 
external world, I assumed that Y was content to find pleasure without any inhibitions 
pertaining to the external world.  Her scratching herself was a perverse manifestation of her 
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creating an ‘object’ to gain pleasure through.  It evidences the subject’s relationship with pain 
as it exists within her perception of the reality of pain within her perverse relationship to 
reality. I propose that pain, in Y’s case, the ‘itch’, is an object libidinally cathected by her 
(the subject). 
Y was a person who had a good sense of humour when she was lucid and knew how 
to joke, particularly, about her situation.  She would say, for example, ‘I wanta scratch de leg 
dat’s not dere but you see dere is no leg, why me think dere is a leg’, and she would then 
laugh at her own joke. At first it seemed to be a sort of pathetic statement yet, we can relate it 
to Freud’s statement: 
‘Like jokes and the comic, humour has something liberating about it; but it also has 
something of grandeur and elevation, (…). The grandeur in it clearly lies in the 
triumph of narcissism, the victorious assertion of the ego’s invulnerability. The ego 
refuses to be distressed by the provocation of reality, to let itself be compelled to 
suffer. It insists that it cannot be affected by the traumas of the external world. It 
shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more than occasions for it to gain pleasure’ 
(1927, p: 162). 
 
According to this, Y certainly appeared to laugh at her predicament seemingly not 
affected by its tragedy and behaved in such a manner as to avoid the trauma of her situation. 
It was also observed that Y would begin to scratch when under stressful situations. Within 
Y’s psychotic state It was clear that the ego was detached from reality and saw only its own 
need to be isolated from the external world. It perceived the external world’s demand as 
intrusive resulting in her becoming paranoid that manifested in aggressive behaviour. The 
scratching seemed to make her focus on her body as the object of her pleasure, an ego-
cathexis, and gave her a certain degree of control over the stressful or painful moments.  She 
scratched, creating the ‘itch’ as a perverse object to be used to gain some kind of pleasurable 
relief.  This appeared to be an autoerotic behaviour that could be traced back to the stage of 
infantile sexuality and behaviour such as thumb sucking to relieve the loss of the object and 
an attempt at self-preservation, (Freud, 1905, p: 170). 
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When Y was initially engaged in conversation she would begin with saying, ‘pain, 
pain, all de time pain.  It never stops.  In me leg – de one dat is not dere.’  She would look at 
the other person as if she was waiting for a reaction.  At the same time she would refuse her 
pain medication or any other suggestions to relieve the ‘pain’.  Y’s pain was her only relief 
from the reality of the loss of her daughter, her home, her limb, and her independence in her 
community. This, it appeared, was her suffering. However, due to her psychosis, the reality of 
her sense of being in pain and suffering had been distorted, creating paranoia and a need to 
protect herself at all cost.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to recapitulate my proposal that the psychomatrix is 
specific to emotions and feelings generated by memories of experiences imprinted in the 
matrices. The psychomatrix and neuromatrix work together to create a working unity of the 
body, brain and mind.  
A breach in the psychological, as well as neurological protective mechanisms creates 
a state of being in pain or suffering – that is, the matrices work in the service of trying to 
maintain the unity of the whole. The signatures modulate or re-constitute stimuli that enter 
the matrices to respond to experiences and promote learning.  In Y’s case the reorganising of 
her psychomatrix was to respond to her internal and external world as far as her psychotic 
state of mind allowed. 
Dimensions of perversion and fetishism are present in these circumstances as the ego 
attempts to re-establish the emotional whole self.  The ego cathected with the self uses pain to 
overcome the sense of loss of the whole (self and reality). Pain, in the form of an itch, 
appears to be used as a defence mechanism to cover up the breach in the loss of reality within 
psychosis. It is the substitute that fills the space created by the loss in an effort toward self-
preservation and sexual satisfaction.   
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The phantom limb (pain) syndrome has a neurological as well as psychological 
significance and is also acknowledged as a phenomenon that could explain certain brain, as 
well as, mind functions.   
I have argued that this phenomenon is a metaphor for the experience of being in pain 
or suffering.  I have applied it to fetishism within perversion – such as disavowal.  The space 
left by an emotional loss is filled by pain.  Pain, within anxiety, is also a reminder of that 
which is lost.  Therefore, pain is an object constructed from the subject’s desire to fill the 
space caused by a loss.  Suffering is a consequence of loss and the patient may feel pain, 
purposefully, inflicted by an external source. Pain felt as a “thing” inflicted rather than 
suffered can also be inflicted by a person on him or herself…’  (Abel-Hirsch, 2006:101).  
As a thing that is apart from one’s physical or psychological being, it is assumed to be 
easier to get rid of or to cut out. As an object it can also be manipulated and used to fulfil 
certain desires of pleasure and self-preservation.  The subject-pain relationship is the desire 
for pleasure and self-preservation and exists within the emotional sphere. I propose that the 
subject-pain relationship is an inseparable state, creating the premise for all human behaviour. 
As an object, distance is created where pain becomes the desired and being in pain thus, may 
be used as a defence against a traumatic situation.  
Pain, I have proposed, is the acknowledgement as well as denial of that which is 
desired, a misrepresentation central to an understanding of perversion and arises from quite a 
specific mechanism in which contradictory versions of reality are allowed to coexist 
simultaneously. (Abel-Hirsch 2006:102). 
To conclude this chapter it is important to stress that the neuromatrix and the 
psychomatrix work in tandem to create a sense of existence - physical and psychological. The 
significance of the subject-pain relationship is key in gaining an understanding of his 
existence and identity, in relation to his own reality, as well as in relation to others.  
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Phantom pain has been seen to be a type of chronic pain syndrome and over time 
changes in intensity and shape. However, as with any chronic pain, its complexity lies in the 
many dimensions of the psychological and emotional system of the mind.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Chronic Pain Syndrome 
Introduction 
Chronic pain implies that a pain has been noxious and persistently present for some 
time.  How did chronic pain become such an attention seeking entity in the midst of society?  
And not only in the Western world but, clearly, and sadly, throughout the world particularly 
seen in developing countries where pain medicine and pain management is not a priority for 
the bureaucratic systems that govern health services, (Sessle 2007, p: 27, Rajagopal 2009, p: 
312-318).  
Chronic pain, like the phantom limb, is a neurologically and psychologically 
controversial subject area. It is a topic that has been researched from many different 
perspectives and the conclusions arrived at continue to leave the debate on-going over the 
questions of ‘where exactly is the pain situated in the body?’ and ‘why can it not be treated 
successfully, so that the patient can maintain a pain free existence?’  It is like a ‘phantom’ 
being tracked.  In the last fifty or so years researchers have attempted to focus in on certain 
characteristics and personalities of certain demographical groups of individuals, who suffer 
with similar types of chronic pain, in a variety of circumstances.  At the same time there is a 
movement towards a wider perspective of causation and etymology of pain which remains, 
even after the acute pain has been treated. 
‘Studies based on psychological theories attempted to show that patients with 
intractable pain shared certain personality characteristics which predisposed them to 
pain. Underlying this body of work were the following assumptions: (a) pain is caused 
by either organic or psychological factors; (b) pain which does not correspond to 
known physical pathology is psychological in origin: and (c) patients with 
undiagnosed intractable pain are a psychologically homogeneous group. In the past 
10-15 years, the dualistic conceptions and linear causal views which buttressed these 
assumptions have been cogently challenged. During the same time, research has been 
criticized for weak methodology, inconsistent findings, biased interpretations of data, 
and questionable conceptualizations’ (Gamsa 1993, p: 17). 
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However, in spite of the controversy, and for the purposes of my thesis, it is 
significant to keep in mind the ‘assumptions’ as stated in the quote above. Not because there 
has been concrete evidence that chronic pain is psychological but because the sufferer of 
chronic pain, as equally with physical pain, suffers psychologically and emotionally. There 
are those who present with symptoms of chronic pain with a desire to find an organic cause – 
or evidence - in an effort to obtain medical relief and/or, as evidenced in research, for other 
motives.  However, I also know of people, in the general public, who present to their doctors 
with conditions other than physical pain. Investigations usually lead to and uncover levels of 
stress and anxieties that disrupt daily activities – not necessarily as a chronic pain in the 
physical domain.  If untreated, though, this type of pain, no matter what the reason or motive, 
manifests itself within the many dimensions of the individual’s life. Pain research has 
progressed to find some, quite, convincing indications, primarily, that psychological factors 
commonly manifest as chronic pain syndrome, such as fibromyalgia, and is not less actual or 
painful than pain from physical, internal or external sources.  Though, the debate continues to 
be viewed through controversial lenses as it evades definitive explanations. Chronic pain, 
such as fibromyalgia, raises speculations into the motivating factors of the subject’s 
complaints, and presents many environmental – psychological, physical, cultural and 
developmental – complications for aetiology and diagnoses.   
The above assumptions seem controversial particularly that of those who suffer 
chronic pain are ‘a psychologically homogenous group’.  There are studies which do verify 
this assertion, on the one hand and other studies which show that this may not be the case. 
Either way it is clear that chronic pain, even though, may have an organic or physical origin, 
becomes established in the psychological and emotional systems of the mind, at varying 
degrees, due to each individual’s innate psychological matrix, and as Flor (2009) states that 
‘learning influences subjective, behvioral, neuro-pychological, and biochemical aspects of 
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pain that outlast the phase of acute pain and may contribute to an enhanced experience of 
chronic pain’ (p: 234).   
It has been shown that those who are living with physical pain such as that caused by 
arthritis, rheumatism, cancers, and other diseases experience pain at varying subjective 
intensities contingent upon his or her emotional and psychological state. Clauw and Abdin 
(2009) state that the ‘role of psychological distress in triggering FM and related illnesses has 
been accepted almost as dogma for some time, based on the observations of high level of 
distress among these patients, the abnormalities observed in the stress response systems 
among these patients, and the general feeling of “stress” experienced by physicians caring for 
these patients’ (p: 256).  There have been innumerable studies conducted to find specific 
links between psychological stress to a variety of related conditions such as those caused by 
motor accidents, HIV, osteoarthritis, and catastrophic events such as terrorism and other man-
made and other disasters, to name only a few.  The controversies, however, are an indication 
of the sensitivities of this topic particularly as it appears to be a problem that is on the 
increase in societies around the world.  
Learning and plasticity seem to have a great influence in the progression of chronic 
pain. It has been show in research that the development of chronic pain syndrome is a learned 
process, (Flor 2009, Huber et al 2010).  The meaning behind the pain and what is causing it is 
also seen to be significant. Therefore, the assumptions, of course, are drawn from evidence 
gained from previous investigations and in an effort to narrow the field of research.   
These scientific attempts will, of course, continue in order to find a concrete, scientific 
structure within which to diagnose and treat pain as a disease.  
The first two assumptions appear to be stating the obvious.  All three assumptions 
seem to be the ‘unmentionable’ and unvoiced due to the politics of ‘judgmentalism’ (Rogers 
2004).  However, there are researchers who have taken a brave stance and gone beyond the 
 
128 
 
irritation of chronic pain complaints to look at what is behind the complaints.  In the spirit of 
‘active listening’ (Rogers 2004), chronic pain is now being seen as a symptom of something 
that runs deeper and through every dimension of an individual’s life.  As Rey (1995) states 
that, ‘when pain is intense and persistent or simply chronic, it always involves the entire 
being. It does not only limit itself to the painful region, but it is the whole person as an 
individual entity who then becomes affected as a result; his entire personality becomes 
doleful and his intellect becomes dulled’ (p: 3). 
We understand the assumptions are referring to a group of individuals who are 
essentially alike and who have similar psychological traits, characteristics and who present in 
a similar manner.  Albeit, there are certain groups of people who can be categorised for the 
sake of scientific research, we suggest that chronic pain or pain that is rooted in the 
psychological and emotional system, is evasive due to its subjective complexity.  The 
meaning behind one’s pain is what is in question and meaning is not something that can be 
categorised. It may be like saying that those who have issues with their mothers or those who 
step on ants have unconscious, perverse, sadistic tendencies! This pretty much includes 
everyone.  
Within the context of this thesis it is important to keep in mind that I am proposing 
that any one individual has the potential of developing what is known as chronic pain 
syndrome.  Pain that persists beyond an organic cause or noxious external stimuli is pain that 
each one of us has. The assumptions, of course, we need to understand are an effort to narrow 
the field of research in an attempt to find a structure within which to diagnose and treat pain 
as a disease. For example, the July/August 2010 issue of the Journal of Pain Research & 
Management published a research project conducted by Huber, Kunz, Artelt and 
Lautenbacher. The research was ‘to assess maladaptive attentional and emotional 
mechanisms of pain processing and their related factors’. It was a highly scientific research 
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using ‘a structural equation approach’. A group of 92 young, healthy men and women 
participants were used to measure maladaptive, attentional and emotional pain processing. 
This was done using a set of self-report measures. ‘The comprehensive set of predictor 
variables included measures of affective and bodily distress’ such as depression, anxiety and 
somatisation. Not surprisingly, the conclusions indicated that anxiety and depression, as well 
as somatisation, contributed to this maladaptive behaviour.  It was found that,  
‘Pain hypervigilance, pain-related anxiety and pain catastrophizing have been found 
to be strongly intercorrelated constructs, and are all part of contemporary avoidance 
models of pain. (…)  refer to attentional and emotional processes, through which 
certain individuals focus exclusively on as well as exaggerate the threat value of pain 
or pain-related stimuli.  (…) might predispose these individuals to develop or 
maintain chronic pain’   (p: 229). 
 
Research is still lacking in evidence identifying potentially related factors that might 
cause this behaviour. Why some individual do and others do not show maladaptive 
processing of pain is a question that lies unanswered.  Nevertheless, what is relevant to this 
thesis is that all individuals display certain behaviours according to their own subjective 
perception of their pain.  And further, I argue, this behaviour is contingent upon the 
relationship that exists between the subject and his or her pain.  The behaviour is also 
indicative of the impact that this relationship has on their sense of identity and their sense of 
existence.   
Chronic pain such as fibromyalgia, I argue, is evasive as it is based in the emotive 
sphere of the individual’s functioning, be it physical or psychological.  As discussed in 
previous chapters, pain from any source of experience becomes imprinted within the 
unconscious. Here, becoming part of the conglomerate of pain, it impacts behaviour through 
the mechanisms of the psychomatrix within which is created patterns or psychosignatures 
specific to emotional pain. I will present a scenario, which will be discussed, further in this 
chapter, as with the previous chapter, will act as an example to evidence my theory.   
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So far, the mystery of pain and the questions of who really suffers and why remains, 
as science continuous on its quest for a concrete diagnosis.  It is, seemingly, the demand of 
society in general – ‘here is my problem, it is a pain, fix it’ – to discuss the possibility of pain 
being the symptom of a deeper, underlying psychological or emotional issue means that the 
‘quick fix’ of pain medication, or acquisition of another demand, is delayed.  It could also 
mean, for example, that the attention gained from ‘being ill’ is taken away, or the justification 
for taking extended time off from work is removed, or a carer may feel that they are no 
longer ‘needed’.  I will argue that as with the issue of perversion, we all have the capacity to 
fall into these circumstances however, what influences the aetiology of chronic pain is motive 
and memory coupled with the subject-pain relationship. It is not the sensation or feeling pain 
or having pain but the being in pain. It is the experience within the emotive relational sphere 
of desire. 
A discussion in the Pain journal, on the subject of ‘Tertiary Gain and Chronic Pain’, 
examined the opinion of doctors and other medical professionals who were dealing with 
chronic pain patients. They were recognizing the existence of factors, other than observable 
physical factors, which influenced these patients and maintained their complaints of pain. It 
goes on to suggest that research in the psychiatric field has identified occurrences of ‘primary 
or secondary gain’ identified by Dansak (1973).  
Primary gain occurs in the psychological mechanism as a defence mechanism against 
‘unacceptable affect or conflict’. Secondary gain is the relational or ‘environmental 
advantage supplied by a symptom(s)’.  ‘Tertiary’ gain is also an interpersonal occurrence 
however, it is when someone else other than the patient benefits or may seek to benefit from 
the person’s illness (Bokan et al 1981, p: 331). 
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 At the conclusion of the discussion paper it is stated: 
‘It is imperative that those dealing with pain patients include in the evaluation 
the social context of the patient.  The social context includes not only the 
patient’s family, work, etc., but also the physician or health care system. Gain 
is a useful way to conceive and communicate certain aspects that are active in 
the situation, exacerbation, complication, evaluation, and rehabilitation of 
chronic pain’ (ibid, p: 335). 
          This indeed makes sense, as in diagnosing any illness or problem and would be 
beneficial to evaluate a person from a systemic perspective; however pain does not go away.  
It seems that chronic pain, as we see in fibromyalgia and the phantom limb syndrome, remain 
true as part of the mechanism of defence. 
Historically psychological perspectives have been applied erratically to chronic pain 
without an obvious physical or organic basis. However, during the second half of the last 
century, research into the problem of chronic pain made a decisive turn due to many reasons, 
however, mainly due to various, but persistent, opinions, of several researchers, about the 
impact of emotional and psychological factors on this topic.  
Gamsa’s (1993) research into this area has examined Merskey and Spear’s (1967) 
comprehensive historical compilation of the literature on the psychological aspects of pain 
from as far back as the 1700’s.  Scientist such as Livingston (1943), Szasz (1957), Engel 
(1959) Wall (1979), and Melzack and Wall 1986, 1996) have contributed to research into the 
emotional, psychological and psychoanalytical implications of chronic pain. 
There are other investigators such as Pontalis (1981), Clyman (1991), Morris (1993), 
Rey (1995), Akhtar (2000), Flor (2009), Clauw and Ablin (2009) and Huber et al. (2010) who 
continue to examine various other perspectives on chronic pain or pain that persists beyond 
an acute phase, and have examined the dimensions of psychological suffering.  The questions 
that continue to arise are: what purpose of chronic pain? 
I start with the premise that ‘[P]ain is an effraction, it supposes the existence of limits: 
limits of the body, limits of the ego, it brings about an internal discharge, which could be 
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called an implosion effect’ (Pontalis 1981, p: 196).  And as recently stated by Gamsa (1993), 
‘[I]t is now generally recognized that psychological factors play an important role in chronic 
pain’ (p: 5). 
When considering the psychoanalytic perspective of pleasure inherent in pain or 
pleasure hidden in suffering we can trace the psychological and emotional aspects of chronic 
pain in a subject in analysis where ‘we find suffering and the movement of the treatment 
consists in discovering and showing by what detours this suffering is produced, induced, 
unconsciously sought by the individual himself, in order to obtain a premium of pleasure in 
some other intrapsychic place’ (Pontalis, 1981:197). 
Here again, I propose that an emotive relational aspect may be detected within the 
dimensions of desire where pain is the desired object through which a ‘premium of pleasure’ 
may be achieved. 
5.1   Elements of Chronic Pain 
Chronic pain is pain that does not go away. The protective value of an acute pain that 
alerts us of tissue damage or the risk of damage or a warning to avoid certain situations where 
this damage can occur, is lost in chronic pain.  It is defined as symptoms of unremitting pain 
that last for six months or more. There are a variety of aspects of chronic pain which are not 
yet understood. Chronic pain may be associated with a variety of circumstances, illnesses and 
disabilities such as phantom limb syndrome, cancer and arthritis. There are some types of 
chronic pain that begin after an injury and persist over time. Other types of chronic pain 
include fibromyalgia and neuropathic pain.  In some cases, the cause of chronic pain is 
known, however more commonly the cause is not known. There is an increasing number of 
chronic pain suffers, according to statistics from research funded and conducted by 
organisations such as the International Association for the Study of Pain. The direct and 
indirect costs associated with chronic pain are staggering. Chronic pain affects both sexes 
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however; it has been found, the rates are slightly higher in women. Chronic pain also has the 
aspect of psychological problems such as anxieties and depression and can disrupt sleep, 
reduce energy and impair work and social activities and have a negative impact on financial 
security and in some cases it can contribute to alcohol or drug abuse. Chronic pain has also 
been seen to be a culprit in disrupting marital and family relationships (Sessle 2007, 
Glombiewski 2010,  Flor 2009).  
Pain is invisible and draws the individual into a clouded space. The chronic sufferer 
can feel alone and isolated and misunderstood and many find that the legitimacy of their pain 
is questioned. Then there are those who believe that the pain is all in their heads which, 
indeed, has a ring of truth because the brain (as well as the mind) is very actively involved in 
this experience – physical or phenomenological or psychological.  We know, through 
research, that what happens in one's mind is inherently tied to what happens in one's brain 
and body, as well as the other way round. Given the impact pain can have on quality of life it 
is not surprising that more than a quarter of people who experience chronic pain also 
experience significant depression or anxiety. Other areas where deficits have been found are 
attention, memory, mental flexibility such as problem solving and information processing 
speed – independent of mood. The primary problem, with chronic pain, such as fibromyalgia, 
is that often sensory input is absent as with the pain in a phantom limb. Chronic pain has a 
developmental and historical aspect that has been recently explored and evidence shows that 
it is ‘determined to a large extent by learning and memory processes’ (Flor 2009, p: 221).  
Of course the above conclusion is an extension of Freud’s (1895) research in his 
Project as well as Melzack’s (1993) neuromatrix theory. Our innate abilities are modulated 
by our experiences and thus determine the processes of learning and memory. Since pain is 
the primary and vital element in our development and functioning it is feasible that it is 
processed, not only through our neurological and psychological systems but, also throughout 
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our emotional system. Human behaviour, as Freud first ‘scientifically’ acknowledged over a 
hundred years ago, revolves around human relations.  The pain that is the cause and effect of 
these human relations is the primary focus as it is the core of all interactions. The subject-
pain relationship is derived from human relationships from the emotional premise of desire. 
The experience of chronic pain is a desire for the lost object.  Pain fills that void and 
remains as a constant reminder, but it also becomes the object within and a means to gain 
pleasure. 
5.2   Chronic pain, a chronic suffering    
My argument is that chronic pain is the phantom of past trauma, just as I have 
discussed is the case in the phantom limb syndrome.  The difference is that instead of pain 
being in a part of the body that does not exist pain is experienced in areas of the body that 
very much exist. The uncanny notion is that pain of this sort, in most cases, is not actually 
caused by anything physical that has sent a message to the brain to interpret or register as 
physical pain. However, in spite of this the individual experiences having pain in a part of the 
body and determined to find a remedy.  
Chronic pain has sometimes been diagnosed as a hysterical symptom of a conversion 
disorder. That is to say that a past, unresolved sexual trauma is converted to or manifests as a 
physical pain.  Individuals who suffer chronic pain have also been labelled as ‘neurotic’ when 
there is no apparent organic cause. Freud (1905 [1901]), wisely, proposed an organic subtlety 
in the psychological and chronic pains of hysteria, ‘[N]o one, probably, will be inclined to 
deny the sexual function the character of an organic factor, and it is the sexual function that I 
look upon as the foundation of hysteria and of the psychoneuroses in general’ (p: 113). 
 In my practice I have come across several patients experiencing chronic headaches 
and lower back pain with no apparent physical cause. For example, a forty five year old 
woman who has a very sheltered upbringing and who looked after her aging parents until 
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they died had complained of chronic headaches or migraines for a number of years.  She had 
admittedly never been in an intimate relationship and devoted her times to works of charity. 
Her conversations revealed that as a child she had wanted to get married and have children 
however, due to her parents’ illness and caring for them, this wish had not materialised.  Sex 
outside of a marriage had always been an unthinkable thing, which she had abstained from. 
Her conversations revolved around her head aches, the process that she went through, every 
time, to detect them and manage them and what she did to manage them, which was injecting 
herself with a strong migraine medication.  She carried the injections in her bag so that she 
could have them at hand if needed. 
This patient admitted that she never drank water unless she was at home and near a 
toilet, as she was fearful of needing to pass urine and not having access to a clean toilet.  
It was discovered, however, that she was suffering dehydration which in turn impacted the 
functioning of her (brain) electrolytes, causing her to have pain in her head.  In spite of this 
finding my patient insisted that it was more than that because she believed that she drank 
enough water and never felt thirsty.  She further insisted that she needed her injection. 
She had stated at one point, ‘as soon as I feel a headache coming on I must get the 
needle ready.  As soon as the pain gets to a certain point I give myself the injection and 
straight away I feel relief’.  It was curious this explanation as it had a prominent bearing on 
her desire to find a release from her ‘headache’ which I believe was rooted in her childhood 
desire to marry and her thwarted sexual desire.  Sexuality and sex, being such a taboo topic in 
her life, was converted to a migraine, maintained by her lack of hydration and momentarily 
satisfied by the injection.    
The subject-pain relationship is clear - pain is the object that my patient sought in 
order to gain a measure of pleasure and self-preservation.  It is therefore correct that the 
‘psychological basis of pain is often subtle and complex, with multiple interacting 
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mechanisms that preclude simple causal labels, (Pilowsky 1994)’ (Melzack and Wall 2008 
[1982], p: 256). 
Pain has its own language and each individual who has experienced the presence of 
his pain, expresses it in his own way.  ‘Whether it is a cry, a sob, or a tensing of features… 
(…) coloured by subjective considerations’ (Rey, 1995: 4-5), 
‘The relationship between physical pain and emotional distress has been recognized 
for some time.  In Genesis Chapter 3, when the pain of child-birth is inflicted upon the 
human race, the Bible state: “In sorrow thou shalt bring forth children”, indicating an 
interchangeable relationship between pain and sorrow.  Although pain and emotional 
distress are inextricably linked by scientists, clinicians, and lay persons, this 
relationship is much more complicated than simple cause and effect’ (Clauw and 
Ablin, 2009, p: 245). 
 
Suffering or being in pain as we have previously discussed are rooted in the emotional 
and psychological system of our unconscious mind. From the memories of representations of 
experiences here, suffering tends to influence one’s life and its processes, such as, learning to 
survive and procreate, instinctually.  However, apart from this psychological aspect suffering 
or being in pain has a phenomenological proponent – the conscious mind.  The duality of the 
existence of pain is necessary in discussing chronic pain syndrome as it was when discussing 
the phantom limb syndrome.  The link between pain and the emotions and psychological 
system has been established, as evidenced from research.  However, what evades knowledge 
and comprehension is why does it exist, where is it situated and how to eliminate it/manage 
or treat it. 
Research continues to facilitate further knowledge and understanding of this 
phenomenon and has discovered that there are a variety of treatments indicated for chronic 
pain such as fibromyalgia.  However, again, there is not one that affords a lasting relief.  As 
with the phantom limb, the pain returns.   
Recent research by Glombiewski et al. (2010) on chronic pain treatments, evidences 
this and the necessity for on-going research. It discusses that psychological interventions are 
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known to be effective in treating various pain disorder such as chronic pain in fibromyalgia. 
However, only a few systematic reviews on this subject exist. In sum, it remains unclear 
whether psychological treatments, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, are effective in 
reducing symptoms of chronic pain such as fibromyalgia. (p: 280-281). 
 
Pharmacological treatments have been used with some success; however these, as 
well, fail to be long term remedies. It is increasingly recognised that pharmacological along 
with psychological interventions are needed, in a balanced program, in order to treat chronic 
pain to some degree of success. Nevertheless, in spite of there being a variety of interventions 
being used the symptoms of chronic pain, including - unremitting pain in various parts of the 
body, anxieties, depression, fatigue, demotivation for activity etc., return.   
Recent research has evidenced that chronic pain is largely determined by learning 
processes that are accompanied by ‘plastic changes at multiple levels of the nervous system. 
‘A fundamental distinction can be made between implicit (or nondeclarative) and 
explicit (or declarative) memory processes. Implicit memory processes refer to 
changes in behaviour that develop - often unconsciously - as a consequence of 
experience. (…) nonassociative learning processes such as, habituation and 
sensitization, as well as associative processes such as, operant and respondent 
conditioning. Explicit learning (…) semantic and episodic memory processes that rely 
on the conscious reproduction of an encoded memory item. (…)’ (Flor 2009, p: 222). 
 
Implicit memory is the more significant, it seems, of the two, as pain has a high 
biological relevance, with roots in human evolution and survival – needing automatic, 
instinctual decision making ability such as in the ‘fight or flee’ scenarios. 
In 1895 Freud’s Project indicated a similar hypothesis as well as that emotion and 
memory operate within a seamless system. Summarising a report by Rapaport (1950), it 
seems that an experience is imprinted in the memory, but not before it is influenced by 
previously stored material. There are instinctual impulses which originate in the systems of 
the unconscious that are triggered and impact thought and behaviour. Thus ‘selective forces 
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of instinctual origin and process of habituation are interlaced in memory function, producing 
(…) impenetrable memory’ (Pribram and Gill 1976, p: 70). 
Pribram and Gill (976) further explain Freud’s theory from the Project stating that 
memory and motive are both processes based on selective facilitation of impermeable 
neurons. As with ‘implicit and explicit’ ‘memory processes he hypothesised that memories 
are the retrospective aspects of facilitation; and motives the prospective aspect’ (p: 70). 
Therefore, learning and conditioning take place as a result of innate abilities and 
experience, however according to Freud’s theory, ‘experiences can be distorted by the 
subsequent development of the drive system at puberty’. Motive and memory are then, linked 
to provide the structure of the ‘wish’ which is a fundamental psychoanalytical contribution 
(ibid, p: 70-71).  
Chronic pain, we propose stems from these mechanisms of memory and motive which 
are influenced by the emotional workings of the mind.  Learning is based on memory and 
motive and manifests in certain behaviours. As Flor (2009) suggest that ‘implicit learning 
processes change an individual’s behavior without his or her conscious awareness’ and 
presents challenges in the development of effective interventions (p: 222). 
We know from research that the emotional state of an individual has an impact and 
may generate or exacerbate the state of pain chronicity.  Psychoanalytical perspectives 
propose that pain that exists without an organic explanation is a ‘defence against unconscious 
psychic conflict’ where it is displaced onto the body’ (Gamsa1993, p: 6).   Psychological pain 
is more difficult to explain and evidence than pain situated in a part of the body. I suggest 
that it is easier to say that one has a chronic pain in the lower back and other muscles that will 
not go away, rather than take the risk of explaining that one is traumatised from domestic 
violence or childhood abuse and abandonment issues. Further research suggests that those 
suffering with chronic pain suffer unresolved, unconscious conflicts. Pain is a manifestation 
 
139 
 
of those conflicts and ‘attributed to problems such as repressed hostility and aggression, rigid 
superego, guilt, resentment, defense against loss or threatened loss, early childhood 
deprivation or trauma, masked depression, neuroticism, and various personality disorders 
(Bond and Pearson 1969; Parkes 1973; Lese 974; Hughes and Zimm 978; Merskey and Boyd 
1978; Swanson 1984; Violon 1982)’. These appear to be a broad range of ideas loosely 
connected to psychoanalytic theory and hold the common view that emotional disturbance 
finds expression in pain. (ibid, p: 6). 
5.3   Chronic pain and the psychomatrix 
 My view is that the problem of chronic pain rests within the creation of the 
psychomatrix.  We know from previous exploration that the neurological system has the 
propensity for plasticity, as evidenced in the phantom limb phenomenon. There is this 
propensity in the psychological and emotional systems as well, particularly seen in chronic 
pain syndrome. According to Flor (2009), 
‘We have shown that learning influences subjective, behvioral, neuro-physiological, 
and biochemical aspects of pain that outlast the phase of acute pain and may 
contribute to an enhanced experience of chronic pain. (…) learning history must be 
assessed and addressed in treatment’ (p: 234). 
 
I have proposed that our experiences, right from the beginnings of life, are imprinted 
on the neurological as well as the psychological mapping systems. The neuromatrix creates 
the neurosignature for the neurological system and parallel to this, I propose, in the 
unconscious, lies the psychomatrix within which is created the psychosignature. Working in 
tandem they create the subject’s sense of the body/mind/self unity. 
As stimuli, internal or external experiences, travel through the matrices the signatures 
are modulated and impact on responses that manifest in certain actions and behaviour.  This 
response is in an effort to maintain the integrity of the body/self or the mind/self unities, as 
we have explored in the previous chapter. Due to the processes of plasticity those areas of the 
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matrices continue to be aware of either a limb or the sense of a whole emotional self and 
demand that the map maintain its integrity. Pain that remains beyond the acute phase is pain 
that has ‘moved’ into that area or space of the body/self map that is attached to the image of 
an intact limb. In case of the mind/self map there is a similar movement to an empty space 
triggered by an event that threatens to bring the unconscious material into the conscious 
therefore, causing a sense of increased pain to fill the space. This maintains the integrity of 
the whole emotional self.  There is now created the phantom pain which is the sense of being 
in pain. Within the empty space is pain. It is a representation of that which is lost, as well as a 
desire to fill that space with the same. 
5.4   The case of X 
The following is an example of chronic pain syndrome in a person diagnosed with 
fibromyalgia. Having failed to establish a particular organic cause for the unremitting pain 
and unsuccessful pharmacological interventions, the patient’s general practitioner had 
referred her on for psychological assessment and intervention mainly due to her symptoms of 
anxieties that accompanied her presentation of physical pain. 
The patient, X, was in her early forties, married with one child. X had gained a 
morbid amount of weight, since the birth of her child, which seemed to be a factor 
influencing her on-going problem with lower back pain.  She was however, experiencing pain 
in various other parts of her body, such as her fingers and knee joints, and pains in her leg 
muscles and neck, accompanied by increased amounts of fatigue and anxiety.  Over a period 
of about five years she had gone through various investigations to identify the cause of her 
physical pain. 
Historical background 
Over the course of our sessions she related the following history:  She had been raised 
by a mother who was on the one hand supportive and encouraging. However, as X entered 
 
141 
 
adulthood this turned to criticism and expressions of disappointment, especially around the 
time when she began dating.  She described her relationship with her mother as anxiety 
ridden and she felt as if nothing she did was ever going to be good enough for her. At one 
point she even remarked that she felt that her mother was jealous of her, due to the fact that 
her father was an emotionally abusive man, and that she felt that she had no option but to stay 
in the marriage. She stated that her ‘mother struggled within a loveless marriage’. This 
hostility was at times directed toward her.  She eventually moved out of her parents’ home.  
She did not date many men but, eventually, fell in love with a man with whom she became 
pregnant.  However, due to the extremely volatile situation with her mother that would have 
been perpetuated by the extreme differences in her partner’s and her culture she decided to 
terminate the pregnancy and the relationship. 
After a period of depression she returned to university to complete her degree in the 
sciences and began her career in the public health sector.  She met her present husband who 
was working with her at the time, and they decided to get married shortly thereafter.  She 
disclosed that she had been married for over ten years to this man who, shortly after their 
child was born, started to become verbally and emotionally abusive.  She was very happy to 
be pregnant yet she had many fears due to her advanced age at the time.   
She stated that she had developed arthritis in her late teens which became worse 
during her pregnancy with the weight gain.  She managed to lose most of the weight 
following the birth of her child. Yet, she began to develop lower back pain.  By the time I met 
X she had been suffering with arthritic pain as well as back pain for about ten years.  A year 
before she came to see us she said that she had been attending a very good fitness centre and 
had employed a trainer, and was also seeing a nutritionist, and had finally lost all the weight.  
She had been looking as she did when she first got married and was ‘on top of the world’. At 
presentation, though, she was not attending the fitness centre and her nutrition and exercise 
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routines were non-existent due to the pain that had returned.  She said that it had never really 
stopped completely but she tried ‘not to think of it’.  However, it was now to the point where 
she felt ‘evicted from her body’.  She worked long hours while also looking after her 
daughter who was nine years old.  She explained how important it was for her to make sure 
that she looked after her daughter and her schedule was completely full with school runs 
morning and afternoon, daily lunches that she would have with her daughter, after school 
programmes and planned weekend activities. X’s friends were other children’s mothers 
whom she met at her daughter’s school during the day.  Other than that she did not seem to 
have any meaningful friendships.   
Even though she related numerous instances where her husband was abusive towards 
her and her pain and distress over this, she would say that they were ‘working on their 
marriage’ or ‘he had agreed to go to some couple’s therapy’. She stated that she did not 
understand why she had put on all this weight. She was, at the time of counselling, morbidly 
overweight. She complained of anxiety and fatigue and not being able to perform any of the 
day to day chores, which meant that her home, unlike in the past, ‘looked like a disaster 
zone’. 
Presenting symptoms 
The referral from X’s doctor detailed the various investigations that she had gone 
through and apart from a mild arthritis in her thumb joints there was no other indication of 
trauma or disease.  Her physiology was, in general, functioning at a normal level.  She had 
been prescribed various pain and antianxiety medication that, she reported, worked only for 
short periods of time.  She said that the pain returned ‘with a vengeance’. 
There were five elements derived from the twenty four sessions with X: (1) her pain 
was concentrated in her lower back and fingers; (2) her pain ‘returned with a vengeance’ 
whenever she had had an abusive encounter with her husband; (3) her pain was peculiarly 
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present, just as intense, when she had had an encounter with her mother; and (4) she never 
failed to say that she had to try harder to manage her feelings towards her mother, since she 
could at times be supportive; and towards her husband because her marriage was very 
important to her.  To be divorced would be a sign that she had failed and she was not going to 
allow this. And (5) was her insistence that she was very comfortable with her body and she 
pointed out that her husband, even though at times  ridiculed her and was verbally abusive 
toward her, was happy with her ‘just the way she was’. 
Analysis 
X, it seems, had repressed the reality of her past traumatic life as well she was in 
denial about her present experiences that were equally painful.  The psychological impact of 
this pain was manifested in symptoms of chronic pain.  Gamsa’s research in conjunction with 
Bond and Pearson (1969); Parkes (1973); Lesse (1974); Hughes and Zimin (1978); Merskey 
and Boyd (1978); Swanson (1984) and Violon (1982) detailed a psychoanalytic view of 
Freud’s (1905) conversion theory.   She discusses as described above, the psychoanalytic 
formulations, postulating the view that chronic and unremitting pain with no organic 
explanation is rooted in a desire to escape.  It is a defense against emotional pain caused by 
unconscious psychic conflict.  Pain is attributed to problems such as repressed hostility and 
aggression, rigid superego, guilt, resentment, defense against loss or threatened loss, early 
childhood deprivation or trauma, masked depression, neuroticism, and various personality 
disorders’ (1993, p: 3-6).   
Gamsa (1993) explores Szasz’s (1957) theory, proposing that the ego perceives the 
body as an object, such that the individual reacts to the body as something or someone 
outside the self. Thus, feelings are projected onto the body as though onto another person, 
with pain experienced as a hostile attack inflicted by the body on the suffering individual. 
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(…) pain also substitutes for grief over the loss of a loved one, or in the case of an 
amputation, for the loss of the limb.’  
Pain, I agree, also diverts the sufferer’s attention from the real loss, and a means to 
compensate for feelings of desire, guilt and shame. Chronic Pain could be considered as an 
expression of suffering – the individual’s being in pain.  Another theory discussed in 
Gamsa’s article, that has been referred to previously, is Engel’s (1959) who discussed the 
possibility of the individual developing a ‘“library of pain experiences” originating from (and 
associated with) pain provoked by peripheral stimulation’ (1993, p: 7).  In this way meaning 
is derived, throughout development, from the context in which it was experienced. Engle 
(1959) further explained that these meanings could themselves become triggers for pain 
without peripheral stimulation.  Engel’s theory speaks to Freud theory of repression as well 
as Melzacks original theory of the neuromatrix.  
Referring back to Melzack and Wall’s studies from the 1960s to the present, the 
problem of the experience of pain without the presence of sensory inputs does not correlate.  
However, Melzack’s (2006) theory of the neuromatrix seems to be significant to this 
phenomenon as well as my proposal of the possibility of a coexisting psychomatrix that has 
been generating complex sub-signatures (modulated by the psychosignature) of emotional 
processes caused by a history of repressed traumas and other negative events. 
X’s chronic pain (fibromyalgia) was the focus of our discussions, yet it was as if pain 
was her only consolation.  She presented arguments to oppose any suggestion of alternate 
treatments such as returning to her ‘self-care’ routine of finding time to exercise, better 
nutrition and spending time with her friends.   
It seems, increasingly, that there is another dimension that evades identification – that 
of the relationship which an individual has with his/her pain.  This relationship, considering 
these various hypotheses and propositions, could possibly be motivational and embedded in 
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the emotional and memory processes of the unconscious compelling human behaviours.  For 
example Moddell states: ‘The earliest psychoanalytic theories can be viewed as an 
explanation of the psychopathology of feelings and memory’ (2003, p: 558). He also 
reminded us of Freud’s (1893) assumption that ‘hysterics suffered from reminiscences’ and 
that the ‘root cause of hysteria was the memory of the trauma that acted as an unassimilated 
foreign body in the psyche or mental apparatus’ (ibid). 
In X’s case I realized that she gave an excuse (reason) for why she was not able to 
make changes to her life or lifestyle, which could be assumed to be a neurotic formulation. 
An underlying complaint was that her husband was abusively critical of her body and sexual 
attributes. This, we believe, was a primary factor in her weight gain, apart from the pain.  She 
expressed her failure in her relationship by turning to food, an oral fixation, which was an 
attempt at self-preservation, and to fulfil her sense of loss and emptiness. She was a person 
with psychic suffering, she was in pain. Her pain was there as a barrier to protect herself from 
her repressed memories and on-going relationship traumas. It was also a deterrent to further 
disappointment; and to distance herself, just enough, from the real issues to maintain control 
over other elements in her life that she felt needed to be sustained, such as, her career and the 
care of her daughter. In other words she needed her pain in order to survive her 
circumstances.   
It was as if X took her pain everywhere she went and needed the validation that she 
had fibromyalgia and simply ‘could not do certain things because it hurt too much’.  It was 
her constant companion and she derived a perverse pleasure from the attention that she 
gained. X was in an isolated place, alone with her pain.  It was a narcissistic ego cathexis as it 
was clear from her narrative that she derived little or no pleasurable satisfaction from the 
relationship with her husband, familial and other relationships.   
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The relationship with her mother was one of resentment and anger as she continued to 
feel unsupported and unsatisfied by her.  One aspect of her past which she discussed was the 
‘lack of attention’ she received from her mother who, she felt, favoured her other siblings.  X 
felt repeatedly deprived of attention from her mother, even in her present life.  She went to 
great lengths to explain her effort and success at finding her independence from her mother. 
At the same time she expressed her anger and resentment towards her mother.  She stated that 
she wished she could somehow ‘make’ her mother feel how she herself felt.  There was an 
ever present hostility and discussion alluding to revenge. 
There was another element that she did not elaborate on, however it seems to figure 
into her feeling of ‘guilt’ and need for ‘punishment’.  This is the experience of the 
termination of her first pregnancy.  Considering her strict religious upbringing this would 
have been forbidden and looked down upon.  Her resentment towards her mother, who was 
not aware of this incident in X’s life, was actually a hostility towards her ‘self’.  She stressed 
the fact that her mother was not aware of this incident as it was none of her business.  
Considering the moral values she alluded to, which were part of her upbringing this seemed 
to be an expression of guilt and shame.  Her punishment was suffering this guilt, among 
others in her isolation. However it also seemed to give her some sort of sense of power, the 
source of which was knowledge that was hers alone.  In that way no one, namely her mother 
could take it away from her.  The pain that returned repeatedly was her escape from the 
repressed feelings, memories and unresolved issue from this period in her life.  Could it also 
be that the termination represents another dimension of abuse where X puts herself in her 
mother’s place rejecting the pregnancy as if it was herself, X?  In that case the pain that 
repeatedly returned was her trying to master her perception of her mother’s aggressive 
rejection.  X’s relationship with her pain, then, was a desire for the lost child that represented 
a lost part of her self, her identity and her existence. The pain not only evoked feelings of her 
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being lost and rejected by her mother, but was also triggered repeatedly by her husband as 
well. 
The only way for her to feel whole again was to have this pain in her body.  As she 
said ‘the pain is everywhere. And sometimes I feel as if my whole body aches.’  It was the 
phantom of her experiences of loss - the phantom of the lost object – her mother – and the 
pain of that past trauma exacerbated by her present circumstances within her marriage, and 
her sense of having no other options. 
X’s hostility, which was mainly directed at her mother, seemed to give her a sense of 
power as was apparent in her animated description of her own independence. She gained a 
perverse pleasure in discussing her physical pain as if to challenge me to change it.  She 
admitted that she was depressed but insisted that it was only because she was in such great 
pain.   
X used her pain almost as an achievement and spoke of being in pain as a reward for 
the traumatic experiences of her childhood.  It was constructed in such a way as to be used as 
a fetish to ward of past trauma as well as a shield from future trauma.  However, her sense of 
pain was also a reminder of her experiences of loss – rejection and abandonment. To take 
away her pain would be to dissolve her fantasy of omnipotence. 
I as the analyst, in this case scenario, was in the position of the audience or a distant 
observer or witness to the omnipotence of X.  The actor, X, feels in-charge of the stage and 
has the power to invoke the responses as she plans and wishes. I was also in the position of 
the mother who was now perceived to be in a passive position without the power to cause any 
further harm – in other words – impotent or castrated by X who was in a position to take 
revenge.  X’s pain had given her the instrument by which to demand attention from her 
physician but, more importantly, from her mother and her husband.  She also invoked a sense 
of awe, as she explained how she continues to function in spite of this debilitating ‘illness’.   
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X, it seems, brought her chronic pain complaint to sessions as an ally or an object to 
be manipulated to keep the real issues at bay – a resistance.  It was also an effort to gain 
control or mastery over her past, as well as present, experiences.  It was seemed clear, at 
times, that in resisting any suggestion at change there was an ever present sense that there 
was a desire to prolong the experience of the chronic pain, for the pleasure of satisfaction that 
it derived.  
5.5   Pain as a Fetish  
If we pay attention to the literature on pain, including phantom pain syndrome, 
chronic pain syndrome, addictions, war and torture, sexual, physical and psychological abuse, 
there is evidence that the associated meanings of the injuries contribute to the intensity and 
chronicity of pains suffered by individuals.  In the case of X the meaning of the physical and 
emotional abuse that she suffered at the hands of her husband meant an invasion into her 
innermost sanctuary of self, her self-worth and self-image.  It was an intrusion into her space 
as she tried desperately to keep out the noxious stimulus of his words and actions.     
Individuals who come in for psychotherapy are suffering a variety of such pains.  Their 
defence mechanisms consist of varying levels of apathy and indifference, anxiety, depression, 
and a variety of physical pains without an organic basis – such as lower back pain, headaches, 
muscle fatigue, irritable bowels etc.  There are many more Xs out in the world who suffer 
their existence. 
Kierkegaard states: 
‘Just as a physician might say that there very likely is not one single living human 
being who is completely healthy, so anyone who really knows mankind might say that 
there is not one single living human being who does not despair a little, who does not 
secretly harbour an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an anxiety about an unknown 
something or a something he does not even dare to try to know, an anxiety about 
some possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself, so that, just as the physician 
speaks of going around with an illness in the body, he walks around with a sickness,  
carries around a sickness of the spirit that signals its presence at rare intervals in and 
through an anxiety he cannot explain’ (Hong and Hong 2000, p: 357). 
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 Pain is like a vital sign, as it seems to be an integral part of one’s existence.  X suffers 
the emptiness of her loss, rejection and depleted self by constructing the only thing that will 
fit the space left from her loss – pain.  However, it is also a reminder of the loss and instils 
another pain, the desire for revenge and a desire to satisfy her loss. The repeated suffering of 
her chronic pain confirms her desire to give new meaning to the psychological and emotional 
injury. Her pain is then, inevitably, such a construction.  Her frantic search for a cure for her 
chronic pain is a symptom of her neurotic behaviour.  She takes her pain with her and sits it 
down beside her.  She points to it when she needs justification for her thoughts and actions.  
Her pain gives her a sense of power to think that no professional or other can know the true 
meaning of her pain and therefore, take it away from her.  So she hangs on to it.  In her 
neurosis she escapes into the construction and behind her fetish.  
In another scenario if she was psychotic she would create a whole new reality that 
would be presented to the world as such. As Freud (1924) stated that in ‘neurosis a piece of 
reality is avoided by a sort of flight, whereas in psychosis it is remodelled’. Both states are an 
‘expression of rebellion on the part of the id against the external world’ and its incapacity to 
‘adapt itself to the exigencies of reality…’ (p:185).  As it is X presents with her pain looking 
for relief from it, though in order to get rid of her chronic pain she will need something else 
to fill the space.  She has escaped from part of her reality behind her chronic pain therefore 
ignoring her reality and denying the root cause of her problems. Her protection from this part 
of her reality is her chronic pain. In her discussions it is clear that her fantasy of revenge upon 
her mother and her husband is her sanctuary of sorts.  Freud (1924) states that,  
‘This domain has since been kept free from the demands of the exigencies of life, like 
a kind of ‘reservation’, it is not inaccessible to the ego, but is only loosely attached to 
it.  It is from this world of phantasy that the neurosis draws the material for its new 
wishful constructions, and it usually finds that material along the path of regression to 
a more satisfying real past’ (p:187). 
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 It seems that from this place of fantasy X has constructed an object, which is her pain, 
namely her chronic pain, to protect her from the trauma of her childhood loss. The pain 
protects her from threats of revictimisation from the trauma of her present life.  It is as if her 
pain is her secret weapon and a vehicle for gaining power over her loss as therefore, an object 
which also brings her a degree of satisfaction and pleasure.  In her fantasy she can exert this 
power to gain the revenge that she seeks in humiliating those who humiliated her.   
 A long way from Freud’s first postulations on perversion and fetishism, Cooper 
(1991) explains that Stoller (1974) has ‘stressed that everyone is more or less perverse.’  He 
distinguishes between ‘“perversion” as a diagnosis of a personality, dominated by sexual 
fantasy and “perversion mechanisms” universally, applied to preserve sexual gratification 
against trauma’.  Cooper (1991) further stresses Stoller’s (1974) thesis, that the core of 
perversion is hostility, vengeance and fantasy.  It is significant to consider Stoller’s work 
because he combines the concept of sexuality and the earlier emphasis on castration and 
fetishism. In doing so he forms a ‘perversion with newer concepts derived from the 
understanding of pre-oedipal narcissistic and safety needs and the problems of separation and 
individuation’ (p: 20-21). The construction of a fetish object is in aid of regaining control 
over the fear of passivity, to deny the experience of being helpless, and a way of taking 
revenge for past humiliation, rejection, abandonment and loss, (ibid, p: 24). 
The perspective of pain as a fetish is a key element in the formulation of my theory of 
the subject-pain relationship and the psychomatrix and evidences manifestations of 
experiences imprinted within the unconscious.  Gamsa’s (1994) study on pain has explored 
the implications of past trauma and has reported that, 
‘In his comprehensive reviews of the literature on the effect of abuse and neglect in 
childhood, Roy (1982, 1985) cited several studies whose findings support a 
relationship between early difficulties and pain in adulthood. The findings include 
memories of punitive mothers and rejecting fathers (Merskey ad Boyd 1978), 
traumatic events in childhood and adolescence (…)’ (p: 7). 
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Chronic pain, from a psychoanalytic perspective, is a neurotic symptom, as can be 
surmised from much of this research. In repressing the unacceptable the subject then 
constructs a way of protecting himself from his fears and anxieties of the real pain.  However, 
the phantom of what is repressed is manifested in yet another pain. He, therefore, creates and 
maintains a ‘chronic pain’. Chronic pain, in a way, is something that the individual has 
control over.  He controls the occurrences, frequency and intensity according to the anxiety 
provoking situation he finds himself in.  It is a pain, a thing that can be used whenever he 
feels that it is necessary. This is similar to what Michels (2006 ) postulated,  
‘[T]he neurotic prefers to eradicate, i.e., repress, what he cannot undo, with the result 
that the traces of the past continue to exist as erased traces, and are actually 
maintained precisely because they have been erased.  In paradoxical fashion, the 
traces have been preserved and accentuated by virtue of the fact that they have been 
wiped out.  This process also conditions the way in which the neurotic deals with his 
subjective truth, which he can often approach only via a lie’ (p: 83). 
 
Therefore, we propose that the subject approaches his past trauma with his fetish 
which is (chronic) pain.  It is that which fulfils the loss at the same time being a reminder of 
that which is lost.  It is a defence mechanism from that which is repressed in the unconscious. 
Pain is that something that is inflicted on the subject himself and for his own gains. 
As in the case scenario above, X brought her pain to the sessions to enact a 
masochistic fantasy.  She was, at times, convincing enough to draw me into the game.  If I 
showed empathy for her suffering it was satisfaction enough.  Her expressions of resentment 
toward her mother were presented in such a manner so as to solicit unconditional belief in the 
authenticity of her ‘illness’, that subsequently brought a degree of pleasure and satisfaction to 
her, that her secret was safe. 
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Conclusion 
Chronic pain becomes a disease or a disorder when the value of learning and warning 
produced from acute pain is lost.  Research evidences that chronic pain is associated with 
prolonged neuroplastic changes in nociceptive processes in the central nervous system 
(CNS). Furthermore, behavioural and psychosocial alterations may also take place’. (Sessle 
2009, p: 26)   
Chronic pain reduces the quality of life, such as disturbances in appetite and libido, 
and can even lead to further psychological and emotional disturbances.  It impacts on an 
individual’s sleep patterns, social and family life, self-esteem and motivation.  Pain of this 
sort may consume the individual’s life and they may feel ‘evicted’ from their lives and their 
bodies (Gamsa 2993, Flor 2009, Sessle 2009). 
Psychological distress influenced X’s physical state.  Her chronic pain was not based 
on a biological illness, however her psychological and emotional state was influencing her 
behaviour. Loss, rejection and anger were so embedded in her emotional make up that it 
would not allow her to progress beyond this pain.    
X’s identity seemed to relate to her desire to have fibromyalgia and if this was 
disputed it was a blow to her existence.  Her physical pain could be easily rectified and 
managed by a change in lifestyle; however it was the mental suffering that she was not ready 
to give up. Perversion is not limited to a person’s sexual behaviour, but may influence all of 
an individual’s experiences, relations, and attitudes to reality. (Abel-Hirsch, 2006, p: 99). 
However, it is a means, in the form of a fetish, to a level of gratification and satisfaction. 
There is a growing body of evidence that pain without an organic reason is based in 
the psychic mechanisms of the mind.  Pain is a human phenomenon – a symptom or a 
manifestation of the modulations of the psychosignature created within the subject’s 
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psychomatrix. Experiences from birth (or earlier) are imprinted in the matrix of the 
unconscious mind creating a signature unique to the expressions of pain.  
Why pain? We propose that pain is the first experience and therefore the first 
impression or imprint on the matrix. It is the primary emotion that one is born with from 
which all other emotions ensue. From birth, there on, the duality of the subject’s existence is 
cemented and proceeds along the road of events and experiences that continue to impress 
upon the unconscious as well as the psychomatrix. 
Pain that is ‘diagnosed’ as chronic pain is an example of how what is repressed makes 
itself known, in the attempt to deal with the dynamics of one’s multidimensional existence. 
The subject’s relationship with his pain is manifested in his sense of existence and therefore 
impacts on his sense of identity.  
 Sufferers of chronic pain find themselves in a narcissistic space of isolation where the 
focus is on self-gratification which therefore, breeds a hyper-vigilance to and with being in 
pain.  The search for the cure for chronic pain continues as some individuals go on to seek 
relief in self abusive behaviour such as, addictions and deprivation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Addiction 
 
Introduction 
An addiction, I propose, is similar to the phantom limb and chronic pain syndrome as 
all three share the common threads of persistent and unremitting, physical, chronic pain, but, 
more significantly, emotional and psychological pain and suffering. They share the elements 
of fear of loss, annihilation and rejection, as well as the desire to escape, and the subject’s 
need for reality to be concealed, such as within denial, in acts of self-preservation – be it 
perverse or other. These have been discussed in the previous chapters. Addiction, the focus of 
this chapter, is another such ‘syndrome’.  It has been theorised by some researchers that 
addiction can result in the repetitive use of a substance (or other compulsive behaviour) to 
ward off painful affective states, such as feelings of guilt, loss of self-esteem and loss of a 
sense of identity. Addiction can act to re-establish a central area of omnipotence and provides 
one with a sense of control of one’s affective state. Therefore, addiction provides a sense of 
control and power that has been lost or taken away (Dodes 1990, p: 400). It is functional 
within dysfunction.  Hence, even though drugs are taken to achieve pleasure at first, 
subsequently they are used to ward off pain (Keller 1992, p: 3). 
This chapter will discuss this phenomenon of addiction and as with the other 
scenarios it is to evidence the subject’s relationship to pain and its impact on his identity and 
existence.  When we speak of ‘an addiction’ the first thing that comes to mind is individuals 
who abuse illicit drugs/substances. This is not without good reason as the most commonly 
seen effects of addiction are from the results of drug taking behaviour.  Addictions to other 
behaviours are not generally as obvious, for example playing video games, gambling, 
overeating, shopping and sex, to name the most commonly advertised addictions.   
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The topic of addictions is a wide and complex topic with many layers of discussion.  
This chapter will not specifically focus on substance abuse or any specific addiction but the 
primary element that classifies a set of behaviours as an addiction, which is the compulsion to 
repeatedly engage in such activities to the point where it impairs the ability to form 
meaningful relationships as well as productive, effective, normal day to day functioning.  
We need to take into consideration that there do exist individuals who indulge in 
certain kinds of such activities, in secret, living their lives, from an external perspective, quite 
‘normally’ functional. 
Nevertheless, in order to discuss the subject-pain relationship within the phenomenon 
of addiction, it is essential for me to explore the most common components of addictions 
which have been generally discussed throughout research in this field.  I have found that 
these fit into three main categories: biochemical/organic/genetic, behavioural and 
psychological. In doing so, I will also examine some of the theoretical explanations within 
each component.  Each component is significant when discussing the topic of addiction 
however; my focus will be on the psychological component, and the rationale behind 
addictive behaviours. Here again will be my endeavour to evidence the subject-pain 
relationship and the role it plays within identity and existence. 
It appears that the use of mind altering substances has been part of every culture of the 
world. The theories of addiction take us from a need ‘to gain divine knowledge’ (Loose 
2001), to more recent theories of addictions being a disease. The disease theory is heading the 
scientific research and according to research by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (2010), 
it is a comorbidity with diseases of the mind therefore a ‘mental illness’. It suggests that ‘we 
need to first recognize that drug addiction is a mental illness. It is a complex brain disease 
characterized by compulsive, at times uncontrollable drug craving, seeking, and use despite 
devastating consequences – behaviours that stem from drug-induced changes in brain 
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structure and function. These changes occur in some of the same brain areas that are 
disrupted in other mental disorders, such as depression, anxiety, or schizophrenia’. Due to the 
complexities of the human condition, interactions of brain, mind and body with internal and 
external environmental influences, none of the theories, of course, comprehensively explains 
addiction. Addiction has a complexity of components from within which any given 
combination has the possibility of creating the symptoms of repetitive, compulsive, self-
destructive behaviour, (NIDA 2010, p: 1).This, we can see, can, also, be said about the 
phantom limb and chronic pain syndromes. 
Pleasure, it appears, is the reward that we desire. Freud proposed, referring to the 
reality principle, that the reality of it is that we must exercise a measure of responsibility. 
Nonetheless, the influences of our own biology, the environment and our own cognition and 
behaviour dictate how we actually respond to these desires.  The question is then, when and 
or why does this ‘seeking’ become pathological, as in addictions?  As I have stated earlier, 
addiction is ‘characterized by compulsive, at times uncontrollable (drug) craving, seeking, 
and use despite devastating consequences’. Thus it is pathological when the seeking of 
pleasure and reward is at the expense of physical, psychological and emotional health, human 
relationships, and is an effort to escape from unresolved, unconscious emotional trauma and 
other realities of life.   
Bozarth (1994), further postulates that motivation can be either a desire for 
(appetitive) fulfilment/satisfaction, pleasure seeking, and behaviour directed toward goals 
such as sex and food; or an aversion to a condition that is unpleasant, such as pain.   
‘The notion that hedonic mechanisms might provide direction to behavior can be 
traced at least to the Greeks (e.g., Epicurus); Spencer (1880) formalized this notion 
into psychological theory and suggested that two fundamental forces governed 
motivation—pleasure and pain. Troland (1928) suggested that pleasure was associated 
with beneception, events that contributed to the survival of the organism (or species) 
and thus 'benefited' the organism from an evolutionary biology perspective; pain was 
suggested to be associated with nociception, events that had undesirable consequences 
for the organism’ (p: 5). 
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This speaks to the focus of Freud’s work as well, who expressed a similar opinion 
about pleasure and pain; he also stated that both are necessary in order for one to fulfil desire.  
Knowing only pleasure or only pain, besides being impossible, would defeat the purpose of 
desire.  
I will explore the psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious (underlying) and 
unresolved, emotional issues of pain that the subject strives to relieve or escape from by 
whatever means he can find.  I will also examine the components of self-preservation, 
defence of affect (managing intolerable states) and self-regulation and elements of 
narcissism, neurosis and perversion.  
It will be evidenced that the subject’s relationship with his pain is, at times, too 
overwhelming to manage in any other way accept to try to run away from it.  However, in the 
process pain is perpetuated and as according to Loose (2011) ‘addiction is a choice for 
Jouissance that is administered independent of the structure that determines the social bond 
with other people’ (p: 5). The desire for a quick fix waylays the need for developing human 
relationships, as well as long term gains from creating an emotionally stable and productive 
life. The unbearable material from the past is repressed, however as they press to the surface 
the pain of these emotional issues increases with every attempt at escape. I propose that 
behaviour, such as found in addiction, paralyses or even amputates part of the subject’s sense 
of identity and meaning of existence. The phantom remains as it begs to be acknowledged 
within the chronicity of symptoms. 
What is this compulsion to repetitive, destructive behaviour symptomatic of, or has it 
become the illness itself, such as the gangrenous leg that needs to be amputated or a 
fibromyalgia, without a specific cause, which becomes perpetuated within the lifestyle of the 
individual, who remains in denial? This begs the question, then, how does one ‘amputate’ a 
behaviour or remove the ‘ache’?  I propose that compulsive behaviour, such as an addiction, 
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can only be managed if the root illness can be uncovered, treated, managed and reconciled. 
Otherwise, the phantom of desire and denial continues to struggle to keep the lid on erupting, 
unresolved emotional trauma.  
6.1      Definition of Addiction 
The most commonly found definition of addiction is that it is an uncontrollable compulsion to 
repeat a certain set of behaviours regardless of its negative consequences.  Using drugs, or 
participating in certain types of behaviour, can precipitate a pattern of conditions recognized as 
addiction, which include a craving for more of the drug or behaviour, increased physiological 
tolerance to exposure, and withdrawal symptoms in the absence of the stimulus. Most drugs and 
behaviours that directly provide either pleasure or relief from pain pose a risk of dependency.  
‘Addictions, whether they are to substances or behaviours, share these characteristics: 
Denial - an inability to realistically admit the negative consequences that result from 
the activity or substance; Compulsion - an excessive preoccupation with seeking out 
or recovering from the substance or activity; Loss of control - setting limits that you 
are unable to stick with’ (NIDA 2011, www.aboutdrugtreatment.org). 
Addictions can also be influenced by the opponent process reactions (Solomon 1980). 
For example the terror of jumping out of an airplane is rewarded with intense pleasure when 
the parachute opens. Because of opponent process, criminal behaviour, running, stealing, 
violence, acting, test taking, gambling, self-harm as in deprivation or drug taking, can 
become habit forming. 
Addiction can be said to be a state of being enslaved to a habit or practice or to 
something that is psychologically and or physically habit-forming to such an extent that its 
cessation causes severe trauma.  
6.2 Components and Theories of Addiction 
Biochemical/Organic/Genetic Components 
It is a well-known suspicion that the search for pleasure is one of the most 
fundamental reasons why individuals resort to drugs and substances of abuse.  This is also 
one of the most influential reasons why some of those people become addicted. However, 
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even when we speak of the neurobiological processes in the brain, we see that at first the drug 
achieves the pleasure. On the other side of the trip, though, it becomes a quest to escape the 
pain.  
How the reward systems in the brain functions, when triggered by noxious substances, 
is the neurobiological processes which explains a factor in addiction. The brain produces the 
biochemical process that induces euphoria which also impacts on one’s behavioural as well 
as psychological responses.  Bozarth (1994) explains that there is, 
‘…a biological mechanism mediating behavior motivated by events commonly 
associated with pleasure in humans. These events are termed "rewards" and are 
viewed as primary factors governing normal behavior. The subjective impact of 
rewards (e.g., pleasure) can be considered essential (e.g., Young, 1959) or irrelevant 
(e.g., Skinner, 1953) to their effect on behavior, but the motivational effect of rewards 
on behavior is universally acknowledged by experimental psychologists’ (p: 5). 
 
Research on genetics and the brain, conducted at the University of Utah, under the 
auspices of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA 2006), has evidenced that addiction 
is a ‘chronic disease’.  This is based on findings that in fact drug use (and other compulsive, 
addictive behaviour) affects changes in the brain which results in a compulsive desire to use a 
drug or engage in repetitive, high risk behaviour.  There are a number of factors, such as 
genetics, environment and behaviour that influence an individual’s risk of addiction, lending 
to the view that addiction is a complex disease.   The research has shown that scientists 
usually look for biological differences that make an individual more or less vulnerable to 
addiction. There is no one particular ‘addiction gene’ that has been discovered.  However, 
there are a number of genetic values that influence this susceptibility in certain individuals.  It 
is important to remember, though, that just because someone has a susceptibility to addiction 
does not mean that it is inevitable that he or she will have an addiction problem in their lives. 
There is a possibility that an individual with a certain gene make up is more (or less) 
vulnerable to an addiction, or experiences varying degrees of severity to withdrawal 
symptoms if they try to quit. On the other hand, there may be genetic factors that make it 
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more difficult for someone to become addicted, for example an individual may experience 
nausea from a drug that makes others feel good. Addiction is a complexity of factors and as 
Glen Hanson stated, in a video presentation,  
‘Scientists will never find just one single addiction gene. Susceptibility to addiction is 
the result of many interacting genes. Social and environmental factors contribute to 
this risk of addiction. It is becoming increasingly clear that genetic factors also weigh 
in. Like other behavioral diseases, addiction vulnerability is a very complex trait. 
Many factors determine the likelihood that someone will become an addict’ (Genetic 
Science Learning Center, University of Utah 2006). 
 
Of all the people who experiment with drugs, research shows that roughly ten per cent 
become addicted.  There is a combination of environmental and genetic factors that influence 
the likelihood of addiction. There are many elements within the environment, just as there are 
within the genetic make-up of an individual, which will impact on an individual’s decision 
making process towards using drugs.  There are environmental influences, such as family 
circumstances (divorce, conflict and abuse within the family) and whether or not a parent has 
a favourable attitude toward drug use. Other environmental factors are those of school and 
friends/peers, such as those who engage in anti-social behaviour and favour drug use.  There 
is the community and its socioeconomic status, for example a community’s attitude toward 
drug use,  low neighbourhood attachment and community disorganizations, where there is 
nothing for kids to do after school, and no opportunities for young people to get involved in 
productive activities to learn to be part of their community.  
All of these factors place a young person, as well as adults, at risk of addiction. The 
risk of addiction can develop in any of these environmental domains. Studies on the 
vulnerability to alcoholism for example, show that there is evidence that such genes are 
genetically transmitted, however it is not to discount that the environmental domains have 
their own set of influences.  This is evidence to suggest that there is increased vulnerability 
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due to biochemical changes caused by many substances of abuse (Genetic Science Learning 
Center, University of Utah 2006). 
From a neurobiological perspective, drugs cause sudden and dramatic changes to the 
synapses in the brain. They bypass the five senses, smell, touch, sight, hearing and taste, and 
directly target and activate the brain’s pleasure and reward centre (dopamine system) causing 
a dramatic and intense surge of pleasure. This places the brain in a compensatory process 
where it reduces the number of dopamine receptors at the synapse. Consequently, the action 
leaves an increase of the dopamine in the nucleus acumens which is what causes the surge of 
pleasure – a high. The uptake of the dopamine is hindered by the drug which occupies and 
fools the cells into releasing high levels of dopamine into the synapse where there is, 
consequently, a lack of uptake receptors.  
As the effects of the drug wears off the individual needs more of the drug to achieve 
the same surge of pleasure or high. This is commonly known as ‘tolerance’.  
‘As the brain continues to adapt to the presence of the drug, regions outside of the 
reward pathway are also affected. Brain regions responsible for judgment, learning 
and memory begin to physically change or become "hard-wired." Once this happens, 
drug-seeking behavior becomes driven by habit, almost reflex. This is how a drug 
user becomes transformed into a drug addict’ (Genetic Science Learning Center, 
University of Utah 2006). 
There are a variety of substances available that are used and abused for their effects as 
explained above.  Each one behaves in a similar manner albeit in varying degrees. Keller 
(1992) states that ‘The addicted person is vulnerable not only to genetic influence, but also to 
many substances of abuse that cause biochemical changes resulting in habituation and 
physiological dependence, changes that are more or less powerful depending on the 
substance’ ( p:3). 
Research conducted by Bejerot (1980), suggests that addiction represents a newly 
acquired drive state arising from exposure to chemical substances that affect brain chemistry.  
The new drive state can overpower natural drive states such as hunger and sex, (p: 246-255). 
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 Behavioural Components 
 Environmental factors tend to have a significant impact on the risk of addiction, 
particularly in a predisposition of genetic factors. The NIDA Research Monograph 30 has 
supported an extensive amount of research on the several theories and perspectives on 
addictions. Regarding this particular component, for example it cites a research study, ‘An 
Interactional Approach to Narcotic Addiction’ conducted by Ausubel (1980, p: 4-8). It 
evidences the influence of environmental factors that precipitate narcotic addiction.  The 
study suggests two significant factors. One significant factor is the degree of access to the 
drugs.  It explains, for example, that the risk of addiction to narcotics is higher in urban slums 
than in middle-class suburbs, due to the influence of economics and the family and 
community environment and attitudes toward behaviours, such as drug use.  It also explains 
one of the reasons why drug addiction was virtually zero during World War II while normal 
commercial channels for illicit drug trade were disrupted. The article states,  
‘[T]hus, no matter how great the cultural attitudinal tolerance for addictive practices 
is, or how strong individual personality predispositions are, nobody can become 
addicted to narcotic drugs without access to them. Hence the logic of a law 
enforcement component in prevention’ (p: 4). 
The second and most important predisposing factor in the aetiology of narcotic 
addiction is the impact of prevailing degrees of attitudinal tolerance toward the practice in the 
individual’s cultural, subculture, racial, ethnic, and social class milieu. This factor explains 
the various differences in incidence rates between lower and middle class groups, Europeans, 
Americans, some Orientals as well as between members of the medical and allied health 
professions. Ausubel (1980) states that, 
‘The crucial and determinative predisposing factor, which, therefore, constitutes the 
most acceptable basis for the nosological categorizing of narcotic addicts, is the 
possession of those idiosyncratic or developmental personality traits for which 
narcotic drugs have adjustive properties. Thus it is obvious that narcotic drugs are 
more addictive than, say, milk of magnesia, because their greater psychotropic effects 
have adjustive value for these personality traits. Chief among these effects is 
euphoria, which is highly adjustive for inadequate personalities, i.e., motivationally 
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immature individuals lacking in such criteria of ego maturity as long-range goals, a 
sense of responsibility, self-reliance and initiative, volitional and executive 
independence, frustration tolerance, and the ability to defer the gratification of 
immediate hedonistic needs for the sake of achieving long-term goals’ (ibid, p: 4-5). 
Thus, this is one example that there is a powerful behavioural component to the 
addiction syndrome.  The behaviour can result from positive as well as negative 
reinforcement of that behaviour.  The neurobiological processes are influential in 
perpetuating compulsive drug using behaviour; however we cannot discount the significance 
of environmental factors.  As I have discussed above, upon administration a drug bypasses all 
five senses and goes right to the brain affecting the reward centre (the dopamine system).  
The individual experiences a surge of intense pleasure (positive reinforcement), however 
during the period of ‘coming down’ from this ‘high’ the experience is the direct opposite of 
pleasure (negative reinforcement). There is an intense desire to repeat the experience. This 
behaviour is in response to the decrease in pleasure and increase in pain. Another point to 
consider, for the benefit of the discussions in the thesis regarding subject-pain relationship, is 
that the more intense the pain the more intense the desire for what is beyond the pleasure. 
There are a variety of reasons for why an individual becomes involved in this type of 
behaviour, for example, this could be due to stress, childhood and other traumas and grief, 
anxiety, or depression. Any of these factors could be associated with different underlying 
psychopathology.  There is a feeling of wellbeing, which is positive reinforcement for the 
behaviour which perpetuates the compulsive, repetitive behaviour.  When an individual 
becomes so involved in the drug use that it is the only form of managing unfulfilled needs 
and wishes, it develops into an addiction. The negative consequences are feelings of guilt, 
loss of self-esteem and loss of identity, results in repetitive drug use to overcome these 
feelings – at first to achieve pleasure; however it becomes a quest to escape the pain (Keller 
1992, p: 3). 
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Identifying types of drug/substance users would also identify the continuum of 
addiction or compulsive behaviour, around which society generally exists. Research has 
shown that users fall into certain categories, and as Wurmser (1974) has identified, there are, 
generally, three types of illicit drug users. This would also apply to those other behaviours, as 
mentioned above.  On a continuum of use the first category of users is the experimental or 
casual user who will use either out of curiosity, or to fulfil an initiation into a peer group, but 
does not feel the need for the consequential effects. The second is the recreational user whose 
aim is, basically, occasional or frequent intoxication. Within the third category falls the 
compulsive user who feels that the high provides him with what is missing, and is unable to 
give up the ‘high’ regardless of the dangers and risks.  Although it is, generally, the case that 
the casual or recreational drug user is the focus of attention in the media, perpetuating the 
vast amounts of wide speculations (p: 822-823).  
When considering the behavioural component of addictions one of the most 
significant domains in the environment to assess is the family.  Within this domain the 
considerations should be focused on the on-going behaviour in the family context, changes 
and/or repetitive patterns during certain periods of time, and the interpersonal and contextual 
functions of drug abuse. Stanton (1980), states that symptoms of addiction occur within a 
context and serve certain functions within the context of the family domain not only for the 
drug user, but also for others in that environment (p: 147). 
Families generally progress through similar developmental life stages, such as birth of 
first child, attending school, leaving home, death of parent/s or spouse and so on. Each one of 
these events is a ‘crisis point’ as inevitable changes occur to progress development.  
However, these critical points, albeit at times difficult, are generally managed and got 
through. On the other hand there are those families who become ‘stuck’ at a particular stage, 
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and ‘like a broken record’ they go through the same processes repetitively developing and 
perpetuating problems and unable to progress beyond the crisis.   
This is applied to and is significant especially within families where patterns of 
compulsive drug using behaviour are found. Research indicates that these families have 
experienced some kind of premature loss or separation during the family development cycle. 
There are correlations between drug addiction and immigration, or parent-child cultural 
disparity. There is evidence in research which indicates that the rate of addiction for offspring 
of people who immigrated either from another country or from a different section of the 
country was considerably higher than the rate for the immigrants themselves.  
‘It might be added that immigrant parents are also faced both with the “loss” of the 
family they left in their original culture and their own possible feelings of guilt or 
disloyalty for having deserted these other members. In any case, what appears to 
happen is that many immigrant parents tend to depend on their children for emotional 
and other kinds of support, clinging to them and becoming terrified when the off-
springs reach adolescence and start to individuate with non-immigrant families of 
drug abusers, a high proportion show traumatic, untimely, or unexpected loss of a 
family member, experiencing more such early deaths or tragic losses than would be 
actuarially expected (…). This has led to the idea that the high rate of death, suicide, 
and self-destruction among addicts is actually a family phenomenon in which the 
addict’s role is to die, or to come close to death, as part of the family’s attempt to 
work through the trauma of the loss; in a sense, addicts are sacrificial and rather noble 
figures who martyr themselves for the sake of their families…’ (Stanton 1980, p: 147-
149). 
 
There is also the element of intense fear of loss and separation found among these 
families.  There is a sense that the addict does not function effectively due to their high level 
of neediness, and dependence and lack of a sense of responsibility. However, closer 
observation of the whole family generally reveals that when addicts begin to succeed (in a 
career and/or in treatment or in other areas of their lives) they are in fact developing more 
autonomy and are moving away from this dependent pattern.  At this point in time it is almost 
inevitable that a crisis occurs in the family. Thus providing an environment for the addict to 
revert to some kind of failure behaviour, and the family problem dissipates. 
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‘The implication is that not only does the addict fear separation from the family, but 
that the reverse is also true. It is an interdependent process in which failure serves a 
protective function of maintaining family closeness. The family’s need for the addict 
is greater than or equal to the addict’s need for them, and they cling to each other for 
confirmation or, perhaps, a sense of “completeness” or “worth”’ (ibid, p:149). 
 
 The dynamics of the behavioural component within addiction are intriguing when 
viewed through the lens of this knowledge.  In day to day evaluation and assessment of 
children and families, as a mental health clinician, although not restricted to but mostly from 
lower socioeconomic status, I see evidence of these very roles and functions of the individual 
as well as the family. Many families come in with presenting issues of drug abuse.  Further 
assessment reveals a high rate of domestic violence, sexual, physical and emotional abuse 
within these families.  A compelling piece of this puzzle is that research has also indicated 
that a high proportion of individuals who engage in compulsive, addictive behaviour, have 
been severely abused, sexually, physically, emotionally as children themselves or have 
siblings who were sexually abused. It can be concluded from these indications that these 
addicts are suffering from severe post-traumatic stress disorder to some degree and their 
addiction is a means to escape. 
In the NIDA Notes publications, director Dr. Leshner (1998) comments in the 
director’s column, on the on-going research by NIDA (National Institute on Drug Addiction), 
stating that one of these efforts is the work of the research expert panel convened by NIDA in 
1996.  The panel ‘reviewed the research on the role of childhood trauma in later drug abuse. 
Among the pane1’s conclusions was that the characteristics of the trauma, the child, and the 
child's environment interact to either buffer or aggravate the impact, which subsequently can 
produce a wide range of dysfunctional behaviours that can include drug abuse’ (online 
column).  
In another sphere of the behavioural component I would like to explore another theory 
of addiction that is not far from Freud’s (1920) pleasure-pain, pain-pleasure and the 
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compulsion to repeat theory. Freud describes his theory of the pleasure-pain paradox in his 
investigations throughout his work. His investigations, no doubt, have provoked and 
propelled further research in all spheres of psychological processes in human behaviour, 
which subsequently has had its impact on many theories of addictive behaviour.  Behavioural 
psychologists, for example, have taken this paradox one step further, in modern day 
psychology, to attempt to explain why so often actions to derive pleasures turn into 
compulsive addictive behaviour and, conversely, why our painful experiences can habitually 
lead to sustained feelings of pleasure and even happiness.  
The Opponent-Process theory is one such theory that was developed by Richard 
Solomon in the 1970’s. Solomon was a behavioural psychologist, at the University of 
Pennsylvania.  His theory at the time was not seemingly appreciated, however it was 
published in 1980 in the journal American Psychologist, ‘The Opponent-Process Theory of 
Acquired Motivation: The Cost of Pleasure and the Benefits of Pain’, a paper that influenced 
the trajectory of certain research in the pleasure-pain paradox. In his paper Solomon 
evidences his finding through experiments conducted on animals as well as human subjects. 
As Freud attempted, in his Project in 1895, to map memory and motives of human behaviour, 
Solomon maps a sophisticated understanding of the physiology of the nervous system and, as 
Freud did, provides a framework of memory and motives to explain behaviours and 
emotional experiences in areas as diverse as addiction, thrill-seeking, love, job satisfaction, 
and cravings for food or exercise.  
Solomon’s theory is that we have pairs of emotions that act in opposing pairs, such 
as happiness and sadness, fear and relief, pleasure and pain. When one of these is 
experienced, the other is temporarily suppressed. This opposite emotion, however, is likely 
to re-emerge strongly and may curtail or interact with the initial emotion. Thus activating 
one emotion also activates its opposite and they interact as a linked pair. To some extent, 
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this can be used to explain drug use and other addictive behaviour, as the pleasure of the 
high is used to suppress the pain of withdrawal. 
Sometimes these two conflicting emotions may be felt at the same time as the second 
emotion intrudes before the first emotion wanes. The result is a confusing combined 
experience of two emotions being felt at the same time that normally are mutually 
exclusive. Thus we can feel happy-sad, scared-relieved, love-hate, etc. This can be 
unpleasant, but as an experiential thrill it can also have a strangely enjoyable element and 
seems to be a basis of excitement, (Solomon 1980).  
The framework suggests that the opponent-processes can be useful in adaptation and 
survival however, has the intoxicating potential to lead to compulsive, addictive and 
destructive behaviour. Motives are based on the innate needs of the libido however, 
Solomon’s theory explains how new motives can be established due to repetitive stimulation 
of innate desires such as, hunger and sex. For example, consider a drug addict’s situation: 
before addiction sets in, he experiences euphoria with use of the drug with a few painful 
consequences. However, as drug use continues he develops a tolerance to it that requires 
higher doses to acquire the same ‘high’. At the same time, cravings and feeling of distress 
increase without the drug, leading to an increase in withdrawal symptoms, such as pain (as in 
opiate use, i.e., heroin) and drug seeking behaviour.  Thus the cycle of increasing drug use 
leading to addiction. The desire for food and sex therefore becomes secondary to the desire 
for drugs and the usual innate needs of the libido and self-preservation become paralyzed. 
Another example is of couples newly in love: following a period of initial infatuation 
(pleasure/euphoria) there is an experience of a lowering of affection that leads to 
dissatisfaction, fights and sometimes breakups. However, during reconciliation a renewed 
closeness is experienced for a period of time. It seems that the more intense the infatuation 
(pleasure/euphoria) the greater the pain (craving/desire) during the period of falling out.   
 
169 
 
The behavioural component of addiction is, as we can see, influenced by the actions 
of our neurobiology as well as the various dimensions of our environment.  The most 
significant influence, though, is of a psychological nature that involves our emotions and 
feelings and how we view ourselves in relation to our internal and external environments. 
Psychological Components  
Of course all components of addiction involve the influence of the emotional and 
psychological dimension. There are some intriguing studies of medical patients who are 
exposed to narcotics as part of their treatments. Psychologist Stanton Peels suggests that 
while these patients build a physical dependence on the opioids, they are able to protect 
themselves against addiction by thinking of themselves as normal people with a temporary 
problem, rather than as addicts. He opines that even though conditioning theories provide 
guidelines to understanding addictive behaviour they are ‘limited by their ability to convey 
the meaning the individual attaches to his or her behaviour and environment’ (Peele 1998).  
It seems that the meaning one attaches to the object, such as pain (or pleasure), is 
what makes a difference to his relationship with it and how he uses it. 
In his book High Society: Mind-Altering Drugs in History and Culture, Jay (2010)  
presents an example of another investigation into the culture and history of drugs and how 
they have travelled, been used and evolved through time and societies. It indicates, as many 
other researches have, that drugs are a significant element of the human race which have a 
long cultural, political and religious history of use for their mind-altering characteristics.  
While giving a rendition of how various societies present their use of their choice of mind 
altering substances, at first glance, it paints a lazy romance of the ‘feelings’ then weaves the 
dichotomous picture of pain and pleasure. For example, he describes the morning rush of 
people with their coffees, across cities in North America, which is not too far different to the 
regular, desert pilgrimage of the Huichol people of Mexico, who continue to harvest the 
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peyote cactus for their rituals.  And yet another ‘normal’ daily scene, further along the south 
in Colombia and Brazil, where he describes the street children who intoxicate themselves 
sniffing or inhaling petrol-soaked cocaine residue and aerosol sprays, (Jay 2010, p: 1).  
Throughout history, permeating through cultures and societies, there is the need for 
mind alteration whether it is the rush needed to ease the grind of a stressful job, the pathetic 
search for something to relieve boredom and hopelessness, or the pursuit of insight from a 
higher power.  Humans seem to find it necessary to alter the psychological workings of their 
minds to give them the (emotional) courage (in their minds it is very real) to manage the 
dimensions of their lives that appear to lack power and control.  
The fundamental element for us here is ‘mind-altering’. Whenever ‘drugs’ or drug 
abuse are spoken about it is in the context of mind-altering substances.  Why do people want 
their minds to be altered? What is it that addicts people, not to drugs, but to their minds being 
altered? Drugs, of course, are the vehicles for this journey, without which the world would 
not have this topic to debate and analyse. When I think about this I realise that ‘mind-
altering’ is not so much speaking of the chemical alterations of the brain, but in fact it is the 
emotional context and dimension of the person which is in debate. This then, is more so, 
significant to my thesis as within this premise lies the issue of the subject-pain relationship. 
Jay (2010), as others have done, explores the history of drugs, where they come from 
in the world, who used/uses them, the economic, political, and cultural conundrums, is it bad 
or good, legal or illegal, and the arguments that ensue, but, what of it?  He investigates the 
subject’s relationship with drugs or his drug of choice.  I propose that it is not the subject’s 
relationship with drug but, instead it is a question of the subject’s relationship with his pain.  
Research, including that which has been discussed here, has indicated that severe 
anxiety, grief, trauma (including childhood abuse) and disasters and stress may be the cause 
of a high percentage of addictions. Trauma, biological and environmental, is the other piece 
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of the addiction puzzle, along with the susceptibility of genetic transmission, and the effects 
of the drugs (or certain behaviours) themselves.  Could we not conclude that an addiction 
may be, in fact, self-medication, an attempt at self-preservation and a defence against feelings 
of annihilation?   
All of this, which stems from the conglomerate of pain within the unconscious and a 
desire for the (lost) object, now presents as a need to be in pain in order to feel pleasure or 
what is beyond pain. The compulsive and repetitive nature of addictions is the perverse 
seeking to resolve the trauma and of that which is beyond the pleasure which is only more 
pain. Pain - that may ensue, which in turn could achieve a level of the pleasure pursued.  It is 
a relentless cycle which perpetuates a desire for that which cannot be satiated. The subject’s 
relationship with his pain is that of interminable desire contained within a narcissistic space.     
As Wurmser (1974) proposes, compulsive drug use is a primary symptom of 
underlying disturbances, not the illness itself. In his paper ‘Psychoanalytic Considerations of 
the Etiology of Compulsive Drug Use’ he describes the rationale for this proposal from 
observations of individuals whose drug of choice is removed.  In these circumstances the 
individual would quickly replace that drug with others in order to achieve a similar objective 
– relief from depression, suicidal attempts, violence, and anxiety attacks etc., issues that were 
most likely present prior to the introduction of drugs.  These symptoms would reappear with 
a vengeance when the subject is deprived of his drug of choice, throwing him into a desperate 
search for another drug to give him a similar relief.  In these cases it has been shown that 
withdrawal from the drug had little bearing on the success of treatment unless the 
psychological and emotional issues were addressed, (1974:822-823).  
Throughout his writings Freud (1895, 1916, 1909, 1917, 1920, 1926) discussed that 
the cause of the subject’s pain is a response to the same, unconscious, unresolved emotional 
trauma. As has been discussed previously in this thesis, the unconscious hoards the pain of 
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loss, abandonment and rejection, provoking subjective responses, at varying degrees 
throughout one’s developmental stages. This pain is at the root of an addiction which 
perpetuates unhealthy habits or rituals of compulsive behaviours that paralyses the 
progression to physical, emotional and psychological wellbeing. What does this mean? 
Addiction is an obsession to a compulsive set of behaviours to achieve one outcome – 
pleasure at the expense of all else, even if it means creating more pain. If whatever is causing 
the pain is not addressed it perpetuates the pain by keeping the problem rooted in the 
unconscious, emotional dimensions of the mind.  
Confronting the pain does not mean that it will evaporate into thin air and disappear. 
It means taking responsibility for one’s actions and behaviours, and the consequences, which 
implicates not only one’s self but also others. Pain, at a certain level, remains as part of the 
‘hum’ of reality.  It is a part of one’s conscious awareness as a distinctive qualitative 
experience.  We can go so far as to say that it derives its character from a combination of one 
or several conscious experiences such as emotions and sense of self. Chalmers (1997) says 
that ‘pain is a paradigm example of conscious experience…’ (p: 9). 
However, in addiction the sense of self becomes imprisoned within the ‘self’. The 
sense of self within the pain experience in addiction seems to reside within a space that is not 
allowed to transcend beyond the bounds of its desire.  It has in effect given up its outward 
transcendence to an illusory self within.  Loose (2002) postulates that, 
‘[A]ddiction is an independence of the Other. That means that if the relationship 
between the subject and the Other is one thing, addiction is something else (and 
somewhere else).  In other words, symbolic castration and lack can be accepted (but 
repressed), disavowed or rejected (foreclosed) by the subject, but one way or another, 
addiction seeks administration. Anxiety and guilt are hidden at times, but 
paradoxically maintain an “obvious” (hidden) presence’ (p: 217). 
 
In being ‘something else’ I propose that it is clear evidence of the relationship 
between the subject and his pain.  Pain becomes the Other as it is objectified by the subject in 
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his submission as he seeks to placate it with pleasure.  I propose that when we are confronted 
with the symptoms of addiction we experience great fear as the repetitive compulsions instil a 
sense of profound loss. The subject’s cry of anxiety turns toward the alienation of addiction.  
Pontalis (1981) explains the blurring of this boundary as he explains:  
‘…narcissistic cathexis following effraction – and now we are bordering on 
traumatism; or object cathexis following loss – and now we are bordering on 
mourning.  Here again, too strict a division would not be pertinent, the very property 
of pain being to blur the frontiers.  No doubt psychic pain depends – in the final 
analysis – on object-loss, whether real or fantasmic – but to recognize the fact does 
not get us any further, for this loss is also the origin of anxiety…and of desire.  In the 
case of pain, the object ceases to function as a possible surety; he is, at best, a 
substitute, and behind this substitute, there is always another one. Infinite 
‘transference’. Irremediably lost but eternally maintained, the object cannot be 
recovered through representation, which renders present another:  the same yet 
different. Where there is pain, it is the absent, lost object that is present; it is the 
actual, present object that is absent. Consequently the pain of separation appears to be 
secondary to a naked, absolute pain.  The psychic scene is populated only by 
shadows, the psychic reality is elsewhere, not so much repressed as encysted’ (p:199-
201). 
 
From some psychoanalytic perspectives, substance abuse is considered a symptom 
associated with the oral or most primitive stage of development and represents an attempt to 
establish a need-gratifying symbiotic state.  Addiction is also a result of impairments of the 
ego, and disturbances in the sense of self, involving difficulties with drive and affects 
defense, self-care/self-preservation, dependency, and need satisfaction (Wurmser 1974, 
Khantzian and Mack 1983 and Dodes 1990). 
Khantzian and Mack (1983) take this a step further to add that the key desire is self-
preservation.  They explain that there are a set of complex functions that have been 
designated as ‘self-care’, ‘self-protection’ and ‘survival’, and that the failure and impairments 
in the natural development of these ego functions explain a wide range of problematic human 
behaviours. They state that, although denial, conscious and unconscious self-destructiveness, 
psychological surrender, and other determinants can explain some human self-destructive 
behaviour and impulsivity, we have been equally impressed that the ‘personality structure 
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and character pathology of certain individuals leave them vulnerable and susceptible to 
various dangers that result in personal injury, ill-health, physical deterioration, and death. We 
believe such people are often not so much compelled or driven in their behaviour as they are 
impaired or deficient in self-care functions that are otherwise present in the more mature ego’ 
(p: 209).  
Here, again, it is evidenced that addiction is an interaction of more than just one 
component.  There are several variables, even within the psychological component, that 
impact and influence an individual’s character and personality, causing them to be 
susceptible to addictions – not least those of genetics and the environment. 
The theory of self-care as a developed system of functions includes elements of 
libidinal investment in self-worth, care and protection of oneself, a capacity to anticipate 
danger and to respond to the cues, the ability to control impulses in the face of known, 
harmful consequences, satisfaction and pleasure in appropriately overcoming situations that 
present risk or danger, sense of self sufficiency and insight about one’s external and internal 
environments, ability that is assertive or aggressive enough to protect oneself and developing 
skills in ‘object relations, especially the ability to choose others who ideally, will enhance 
one’s protection, or at least will not jeopardize one’s existence’ (ibid, p:210). 
Considering the domain of the family and its stages of development, we see the most 
significant psychological influences.  The ability for self-care and self-preservation is 
developed within the stages of development in relation to the family’s development. 
Psychoanalytic research suggests that during the early stages of development children depend 
on external objects for self-preservation and could at the same time experience real threats to 
their ‘survival as a result of external dangers, injury, insult, and aggression’ (ibid, p: 212).  
This research further indicates that the instinct of self-preservation is present early in 
development than has been supposed.  It indicates that small children manifest early concerns 
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about death and self-preservation. The capacity for self-preservation begins earlier in human 
development and the ‘importance of quality and quantity of nurturance and care in the earliest 
phases of mother-infant relationship’ has been stressed by researchers such as Winnicott 
(1953 and 1960) and Mahler (1968), cited in Khantzian and Mack (1983, p:2 12-214). 
Within the structural theory of the mind, Freud (1913) formulated the fundamental 
functions of the ego. Self-preservation was a part of the ego instincts and he referred to these 
as instincts which serve the ‘preservation of the individual’ not those which ‘serve the 
survival of the species’ (p: 182).  He explained, initially, that within narcissism the ego 
instincts are non-libidinal aspects of narcissism, however he ultimately rejected this view in 
favour of the perspective that self-preservation is itself erotic in a narcissistic sense stating 
that ‘the instinct of self-preservation is certainly of an erotic kind, but it must nevertheless 
have an aggressiveness at its disposal if it is to fulfil its purpose’ (Freud 1933b, p: 209).  
Khantzian and Mack (1983) considered the perspective that addictive behaviour 
serves as an attempt at (aggressive) mastery over poorly understood and passively 
experienced suffering, in an attempt at self-preservation.  A failure in, particularly, maternal 
nurturing can leave certain individuals ‘ill-equipped to maintain and regulate’ their self-
regard and self-esteem because of impairments in ego-ideal formations. This leads further 
into the element of narcissism in addiction. (p: 214).   
Dodes (1990) states that addicts have a sense of profound powerlessness, which 
betrays a specific narcissistic impairment.  Addiction in this instance strives to restore or re-
establish a sense of power and is correspondingly, impelled by narcissistic rage. ‘This rage 
gives to addiction some of its clinical properties’ (p: 397).  He states that, 
‘…in light of the core narcissistic importance of maintaining psychic control, it is 
significant that drugs are a device par excellence of altering, through one’s intentional 
control,  one’s affective state. (…) addictive behavior may serve to restore a sense of 
control when there is a perception that control or power has been lost or taken away’ 
(p: 400). 
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The neurotic part of all of this is that addictive behaviour is in itself inherently a 
matter of being out of control, a paradox of ego functioning as well as loss of elements of ego 
functioning. (ibid, p: 401). 
This ‘being out of control’ betrays underlying problems and is a means to deflect from 
facing those problems - a desire for the gratification or satisfaction of needs and on the other 
hand a desire to escape the pain of this desire.  
I suggest that throughout Freud’s work it is quite clear that he pursued a wide 
perspective of knowledge to uncover the roots of the subject’s psychological and emotional 
pain that influences his behaviour.  Beginning with his discussions in his Project (1895) of 
the body/brain’s neuronal system and chemical activity, and throughout his subsequent work 
in psychoanalysis, all roads led to pleasure but first to desire (pain).  It is apparent, in 
investigating Freud’s work, that he was eluding to the influences of the neurobiological, 
behavioural and psychological domains that impact on human behaviour. Self-preservation, it 
seems, is a fundamental element in psychosocial development that impacts one’s sense of self 
and the meaning and worth of his existence.  This process begins in infancy during the 
primary narcissistic stage that is essential to future development of ego functioning. 
 It seems clear that his endeavours were to pin point the relationship that the subject 
has with his pain. His attempt to master his pain is an attempt at maintaining a sense of self-
preservation. Freud (1920) presents an example, to evidence his theory, in a game (Fort/Da)   
of repetition. He explains that the compulsion to repeat is an effort, on the subject’s part, to 
gain mastery over his pain by re-creating the experience repeatedly.  It is not the actual event, 
but a metaphor that symbolises the content of the event, such as the loss of a loved one, so as 
to create an emotional response (satisfaction/pleasure) within the state of pain. Once the pain 
is gained another action is then taken to satisfy that pain in order to gain pleasure.   The little 
boy throws the spool that is tied to a string away from him, out of sight (loss/pain) then, reels 
 
177 
 
it back to re-find it (pleasure).  The little boy is in control of losing as well as finding the 
object in recreating the occasion of his mother leaving, a distressing moment, and then 
returning, a pleasurable moment.  However, he does not have any control on when she leaves 
and when she returns – no power or control to choose or demand otherwise.  Hence, the 
process of the game is in order for him to feel in control, (p: 14-17). 
The key in this, I propose, is that there are some things that are beyond one’s control. 
However, in some subjects this is an unacceptable notion (failure of development of ego 
functioning during early stages), creating a susceptibility to a compulsion to repeat, such as in 
addiction, in order to create an illusion of complete control.  The state of ultimate equilibrium 
and satisfaction is the cessation of one’s existence (and all pain) in death. Most people, we 
assume, do not wish death upon themselves. However, what they do wish for is to experience 
an emotional space (in their minds) that brings them as close to that equilibrium as possible. 
I could make an assumption that in this game the little boy’s relationship with his pain 
(loss) is that of master and slave.  Pain initially is the master as it makes the subject feel out 
of control.  The subject is then in control as he re-enacts the pain experience to gain 
control/pleasure and master pain. However, pain continues to overshadow the situation as the 
subject is not in control of every element of his situation. On the other hand, pain is a 
necessary motivator to achieve pleasure, (ibid). 
Another suggestion in response to this assumption is that, perhaps, the subject’s 
relationship to his pain is co-dependence, which expresses itself in a desire to be controlled 
by something other than oneself, within the confines of compulsive behaviour. The subject 
attempts to relate to his pain through such mediums, as the ‘chronic pain syndrome’ or the 
‘phantom pain syndrome’, as well as ‘the addiction syndrome’.   
The emotional state of the mind is influenced by biochemical changes induced by 
repetitive use of drugs, however it can also be altered by repetition of certain cognitive 
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processes (catastrophic thinking and attitude towards a particular problem or issue) and 
behaviours, such as gambling or playing video games. These may create a co-dependent 
process in the mind.  With regards to this co-dependence, it has been evidenced to indicate 
that in cases of ‘catastrophizing’ subjects, there has actually been alteration in the neuronal 
and brain chemical activity. For example, in a case of chronic pain, Haythornthwaite (2009) 
has investigated how (among other factors) ‘catastrophizing’ in patients with chronic pain 
alters neuronal activity and states to perpetuate the pain.  She states that, 
‘[P]ain related catastrophizing comprises a set of negative emotional and cognitive 
responses to pain that include helplessness, magnification of pain, and rumination. 
(…) Pain-related catastrophizing appears to amplify central nervous system 
processing of noxious input via alterations in spinal and cortical modulatory systems’ 
(p: 271-280). 
As far as changes in the processes of the brain which are further influenced by 
cognitive and psychological processes, Ramachandran, as previously discussed in this thesis, 
has investigated the brain’s ability to compensate for missing limbs due to ‘remapping’, and 
states that ‘the brain abounds with maps’  and that, 
‘These maps are largely stable throughout life, thus helping to ensure that perception 
is usually accurate and reliable. But (…) they are also being constantly updated and 
refined in response to vagaries of sensory input’ (1999, p: 40). 
In a co-dependent relationship to pain we can see the impact of certain kinds of 
catastrophic thinking within the realms of feelings of helplessness and powerlessness. As we 
have seen, addiction alters the neurobiological as well as the emotional processes of the brain 
and mind, setting the process of cognition and behaviours on an altered trajectory. The addict 
will do anything to alleviate the pain and to achieve pleasure. Therefore, he will do anything 
to master pain in order to keep it as close to him as he can for he knows only too well that the 
(repetitive) release from pain will gain him pleasure.  As Keller has suggested, drugs may be 
taken, initially, to achieve pleasure however consequently they are used to ward off pain, 
(1992, p: 3). 
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 In the grips of addiction we can see that there is a need for pain to resolve another 
pain. Is pain a sort of a defence mechanism such as Freud’s theory of ‘conversion’?   
‘[I]n hysteria, the incompatible idea is rendered innocuous by its sum of excitation 
being transformed into something somatic. For this I should like to propose the name 
conversion’ (1894, p: 49). 
Freud further states that,  
‘[T]he excitation which is forced into a wrong channel (into somatic innervations) 
now and then finds its way back to the idea from which it has been detached, and it 
then compels the subject either to work over the idea associatively or to get rid of it in 
hysterical attacks - as we see in the familiar contrast between attacks and chronic 
symptoms’ (ibid, p: 50). 
 
Apart from the neuronal changes in the brain there is another element that changes, 
the emotions and the processes in the mind.  Therefore, the idea of ‘mind-altering’ in the 
context of addictions is significant.  This thesis suggests that this very element is a 
fundamental concern within addictions and consequently the subject’s relationship to pain.  
According to Freud (1894), conversion disorder is where unacceptable emotional 
instincts and desires are converted to physical symptoms.  And as expressed by Ford and 
Folks (1985) conversion is where unconscious drives, such as sexuality, aggression and 
dependency, that have been prohibited internally, find expression in physical symptoms. 
Physical
 
symptoms allow for the expression of the forbidden wish or urge
 
but also disguise it. 
Other psychoanalytic explanations focus
 
on the need to suffer, or identification with a lost 
object (Ford and Folks 1985). 
An event triggers the prohibited and repressed emotional instinct that threatens to 
invade the conscious and destroy the ego’s control.  The ego allows the repressed to make 
itself known by the increase in excitation; however to relieve the unbearable impact on the 
conscious emotions it allows the process of conversion.  In so doing the subject is able to gain 
control of his suffering. It is easier to say that he has a physical pain than to say that he has a 
psychical pain. The (physical) pain can thus be controlled freely, and for that moment, side 
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steps the threat of reliving a past emotional trauma. In addiction mental and emotional pain 
are transferred to the experience of the whole body giving the impression of the body lost in 
the experience of pleasure, oblivious to all else. 
The state of intoxication creates a space in consciousness that is medicated, so as not 
to feel the pain of the whole impact of what is repressed.  The effect is the conscious being 
split between feelings of euphoria as well as the physical, physiological reactions of the body.  
The high and euphoria from the administration of the drug fulfils the prohibited, repressed 
emotional desire for the lost object without having to actually depend on the other to fulfil its 
desire, (Loose, 2001).  
Freud (1894) postulated that repression or ‘intentional forgetting’ leads to 
pathological reactions such as hysteria, obsessions or hallucinatory psychosis, and are bound 
up with the splitting of the consciousness. The ego is split between decreasing the emotional 
potency of the ‘incompatible idea’ of what has been impressed in the memory, and 
converting this energy to the somatic sphere (p: 48-49).  
Therefore, even though, a symptom of physical suffering has been created the 
phantom, of the prohibited emotional and unresolved instinct or desire, remains in the 
conscious mind. Freud (1894) explains that, 
‘[I]f someone with a disposition [to neurosis] lacks the aptitude for conversion, but if, 
nevertheless, in order to fend off an incompatible idea, he sets about separating its 
affect, then that effect is obliged to remain in the psychical sphere. The idea, now 
weakened, is still left in consciousness, separated from all association.  But its affect, 
which has become free, attaches itself to other ideas which are not in themselves 
incompatible; and thanks to this ‘false connection’, those ideas turn into obsessional 
ideas’ (p:51-52).  
 
The ‘obsessional ideas’ are the defence of the ego against threats of the repressed. The 
ego resists making connections with the repressed material.  If, in analysis, this resistance is 
removed, it is important to keep in mind that the repressions remain, still, to be undone and 
worked through.  The compulsion to repeat certain behaviours, to continue to gain control 
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over the resistance of the unconscious, ‘repressed instinctual processes’, is ever present 
(Freud 1926, p: 158-160). 
As Pontalis (1981) expresses,  
 
‘Where there is pain, it is the absent, lost object that is present; it is the actual, present 
object that is absent. Consequently the pain of separation appears to be secondary to a 
naked, absolute pain.  The psychic scene is populated only by shadows, the psychic 
reality is elsewhere, not so much repressed as encysted’ (p: 199-201). 
 
The compulsion to repeat certain behaviours is to relieve that part of the conscious 
that is split, but remains in the psychic sphere. Since the symptom causes some kind of 
incapacity, the ego appears to, in some way take revenge, by what Freud (1926) calls a ‘gain 
from illness’ (p: 98-99).  For example, in the case of some alcoholics and drug abusers (from 
the point of view of it being an incapacitating disease), they are unable to find employment 
due to the restrictions of their chronic ‘illness’. This is similar to Freud’s example of the war 
veteran who had got his leg shot off in the war so that he did not have to work anymore, 
(ibid).  He goes on to state that it is ‘very rare that the physical process of ‘healing’ round a 
foreign body follows such a course as this’ (ibid).  It is here that there is an idea of Freud’s 
opinion around the successful treatment of addiction within the process of psychoanalysis. 
This process of the ego places it within a ‘narcissistic’ space as it fulfils its need for 
appreciation and self-preservation.  The ego accepts the symptom instead of allowing the 
repressed material to the surface.  The ego puts up its resistance in a ‘gain from illness’, as if 
there is nothing that can be done to relieve the symptom, but it does not fool the superego 
into the same illusion.  The superego has its own resistance ‘that seems to originate from the 
sense of guilt or the need for punishment; and it opposes every move towards success (…)’ 
(ibid, p: 160).   
Between the two there is the id that demands attention in its ‘compulsion to repeat’ 
behaviours, as in repetitive drug use, to gain or regain control, satisfaction and pleasure by re-
enacting the event that triggered the behaviour in the first place.   
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The experience of helplessness or powerlessness, are central factors for addicts.  The 
treatment that Alcoholics Anonymous offers within their twelve step recovery programme 
focuses on these factors. The focus of the first ‘step’ of recovery states: ‘we admitted we 
were powerless over alcohol…’ (Dodes 1990, p: 4). 
I can conclude, therefore, that although there is merit in exploring the many types of 
mind-altering drugs available on the various international markets, how they react in the body 
and the brain and what they do to the mind and the need of the conscious mind to keep 
repressed, prohibited, emotions at bay, it is also imperative to explore the correlations within 
the processes of mind-alteration. These would be in conjunction with the contributions of the 
external environment, genetics as well as behavioural and psychological factors.  
The processes in the mind that are active in repression are altered by drug addiction 
and/or repetitive, compulsive behaviours.  Loose (2001) suggests that ‘Freud was opening up 
the possibility (…) that addiction and masturbation, as pleasure producing activities, could be 
related to mental pain as the cause of these activities’ (p:33).  However, he speaks in the 
context of the subject’s relationship to drugs.  The compulsion to repeat, as in the case of an 
addiction which is a symptom, is a ‘substitute satisfaction’.   
Loose (2001) explains that,  
‘Freud began to realise that the hysterical symptoms contain an element of pleasure.  
This made him think that the first traumatic scenes might perhaps have been 
somewhat pleasurable for the infant. Freud had stumbled upon the elements of 
infantile sexuality.  The infant must have experienced a conflict between the pain of 
trauma and something pleasurable’ (ibid) 
 
I would like to speculate here that, on another level, it is the pain that the subject 
relates to which is the primary addiction.  Pain is the object of desire and in the attempts to 
prevent the pain or ease the pain, pleasure ensues. When the pleasure (high) wears off, the 
move is then to avoid pain.  However, without the pain there would not be the need to seek 
pleasure. Freud states that ‘pain occurs in the first place (…). The transition from physical 
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pain to mental pain corresponds to a change from narcissistic cathexis to object cathexis.’ 
(1926, p: 171). 
The object that has been created by the subject then, is pain to which inevitably he 
lives in relation to.  His behaviour, therefore it follows, is contingent upon this relationship.  
6.3 Addiction: A Neurosis 
Neuroses, generally, comes about from the frustrations of basic instincts. These are 
situations where the ego’s effort to repress its instinctive desires has failed.  The subject 
suffering neurosis is one whose ego has lost the capacity to allocate his libido in some way. 
The demands of what is repressed and the failure of the ego’s capacity creates a symptom that 
has the potential to be worse than the original conflict that it is trying to replace. The 
symptom allows the ego to waylay the conflict between ego and id and that allows him to 
experience pleasure; however, it is in a way one which is often debilitating. 
Neurosis can be caused by either internal emotional impulses not properly repressed 
by the ego, manifesting in other ways, or external traumatic experiences such as childhood 
traumas, usually of a sexual nature. However, it is usually a combination of the two that will 
manifest in a neurosis. 
A neurosis, then, looks like a symptom or a set of symptoms that betray unresolved, 
unconscious emotional trauma.  This is experienced by an individual as psychic pain – pain 
that was experienced in earlier life, and which he has not been able to process or work 
through, consciously.  The repression that resulted was an unconscious process as a defence 
against the unbearable emotions and there is, possibly, no conscious memory of the event or 
occurrence.  The nature of the past traumas could be of a variety of incidents that could be 
perceived as traumatic incidents.  There is usually no conscious recollection of the event. 
However, instead the subject will develop nervous symptoms which are experienced as an 
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illness or disorder. The symptoms could be those of drug abuse among others, such as eating 
disorders, self-harm, anxiety, depression, and sexual problems. 
I would conclude that a neurosis is the formation of behavioural or psychosomatic 
symptoms as a result of the return of the repressed.  According to Freud there are those cases 
in which the solution of a conflict by a neurosis is harmless and tolerable, socially. He argued 
that even healthy life mingles with certain trivial and unimportant ‘symptoms’.  He went on 
to say that the neurotic who needs treatment simply has more debilitating symptom-
formations that prevent enjoyment and active achievement in life, (Freud 1905, 1916, 1926, 
1930).  
Freud (1905) did make a connection between neurosis and addiction in saying that, 
‘[I]t must suffice us to hold firmly to what is essential in this view of the sexual 
processes: the assumption that substances of a peculiar kind arise from the sexual 
metabolism.  For this apparently arbitrary supposition is supported by a fact which has 
received little attention but deserves the closest consideration.  The neurosis, which 
can be derived only from disturbances of sexual life, show the greatest clinical 
similarity to the phenomenon of intoxication and abstinence that arise from the 
habitual use of toxic, pleasure-producing substances (alkaloids)’ (p: 215-216). 
 
It seems that here he is alluding to the process of compulsive use of drugs  which lead 
to the achievement of pleasure, initially; however this then turns into attempts to ward off 
pain.  This in turn leads to consequences of the subject’s disconnection from his external 
environment as he is preoccupied with the compulsive behaviour of acquisition and 
administration of drugs.  Freud, I suggest, is comparing this to actual neurosis where the 
subject is preoccupied with warding off painful, repressed material and ‘disturbances’ of 
earlier sexual development. 
Freud (1930[1929]) expressed that trauma caused by relationships to others are the 
biggest threat and barrier to people’s achievement of happiness.  Thus isolating oneself from 
social interactions with others can be one way of solving the problem.  On the other hand this 
produces another problem.  In avoiding others one also avoids social connection and 
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fulfilment.  An alternative would be to resort to something that will achieve a similar 
satisfaction. However, this pleasure has a short life and quickly brings on the negative and 
opposite affects that perpetuates addictions.  Initially the drug use is to achieve pleasure and 
consequently to avoid pain. In this way addiction compares to neurosis in that it manifests in 
symptoms to defend against the pain of repressed, past trauma, (p: 78) 
6.4     Perversion in Addiction: A Degree of Self Preservation 
When speaking of perversions in the context of this thesis I should clarify that it is the 
perversion mechanism that is the consideration and not the disorder. As such we propose that 
addiction (or self-destructive, repetitive compulsive behaviour) is a perversion mechanism.  
Although, having said that, it would appear that, individuals caught up in a lifestyle of 
addictions (and other self-harming, self-abusive behaviour) present with symptoms that may 
very well represent a diagnosis of a disorder.  As Stoller (1986) points out, as with neurotic 
mechanisms, so perversion mechanisms serve to preserve sexual gratification against 
childhood intrapsychic trauma and conflict. He states that,   
‘Either way, since the original sexual impulse must be thwarted, disguised, and 
reinvented and the whole process perpetuated, since anxiety and risk-taking, violence, 
and revenge are hidden in the symptomatology, one must use a word that connotes 
this intense dynamic tension’(p: 111). 
 
Addiction seems to be a complex, symptomatic manifestation of fear of loss, rejection 
and abandonment, anger, hostility, humility and a desire for escape and revenge. It affects, 
not only the individual, but also all others who come in contact with him or her. The need for 
self-preservation gone terribly wrong, it seems as if the subject is lost in a void that separates 
desire and self. The subject endeavours to maintain a separation by an object that he has 
created, and maintains, by his entering into the realms of addiction – destructive, repetitive, 
compulsive drug use (or other such behaviours).  Kahn (1979) states that, ‘the pervert puts an 
impersonal object between his desire and his accomplice. This object can be a stereotype 
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fantasy, a gadget or a pornographic image. All three alienate the pervert from himself, as alas 
from the object of his desire’ (p: 9).  
The addict uses the drug to reach the high that gives him the illusion of satisfaction 
and power over the object. 
Addiction is an obsession with pain.  Pain gives the subject a sense of having a 
‘meaning’ to his existence, however it is not without a sense of a desire for revenge upon the 
object of his desire, which perpetuates itself within compulsive behaviour. It is an angry 
admission that the object cannot be re-found in its original form, to avenge himself by 
gaining the satisfaction (as he reaches a ‘high’), and that the only way to achieve the ultimate 
equilibrium is to get back to the place before existence - death.  He cannot have the object of 
his desire, and he cannot move beyond his desire in order to achieve success. Since the object 
is inaccessible the subject creates an allusion to it by re-enacting the ‘original’ pain that was 
created by the conflict, during the infantile stages of development. Stoller (1986) stated that, 
‘Freud did not believe that trauma caused perversion of sexual development until it 
caused conflict; conflict is awareness of the need to choose between alternatives and 
requires a development advanced enough that memory, judgment, and perhaps fantasy 
are beginning to influence behaviour’ (p: 34). 
 
The conflicts that arose during the libidinal developmental stages are the causes of the 
subject’s perversions. These perversions, consequently, arose as a defence against unbearable 
emotional and intrapsychic conflicts. Freud believed that perversion in males was due to the 
fear of castration due to his desire for his mother. Castration would make the boy 
anatomically inferior and the same as a girl.  In females, he believed that perversion was the 
result of her lack of ability to accept that she is already castrated resulting in her 
overemphasis on the value of her clitoris. This, in turn, prevents her from shifting to the more 
feminine vagina or makes her unwilling to turn to her father, in other words to 
heterosexuality, and therefore she fails to enter into the oedipal conflict as a feminine person 
who wants a baby – to replace the penis.  She renounces her identification with her mother in 
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this manner. ‘Perversion may mark failure at any step in the process of this oedipal 
[interpersonal] theory’ (ibid, p: 35). 
The elements of hostility, aggression and revenge that are manifested in risk taking 
behaviours come into play in the perversion mechanism of addiction due to its unique 
relationship with loss, rejection, annihilation and identification. ‘The risk that one will again 
fully experience the early childhood trauma is the primary one that energizes perversion 
formation’ (ibid, 115).  For some people this is more terrifying than risking death or being 
arrested. Risk is part of the manifest content of the perverse act, as in masochistic (or 
sadistic), and is inherent in the dynamics of revenge. This brings to mind a statement that 
Loose (2007) makes, referring to an article by Rado, 
‘Drugs provide a kind of satisfaction that by-passes the erotogenic zones. (…). 
Addiction, so to speak, sexualizes the whole body, providing it with, what Rado 
called, an “alimentary orgasm”. What turns people into addicts is the predominance of 
an oral satisfaction that can be produced at will has all the hallmarks of an orgasm 
invading the body’ (p:103). 
This brings in the consideration of the desire for control of the ‘object’ that stands for 
the ‘object of desire’, the external object. The subject will control the pain and the pleasure, 
and he has at his disposal his own body to achieve this. As Stoller (2003) stated, perversion is 
the erotic form of hatred. 
The original trauma can be enacted within a fantasy to achieve an outcome of 
‘triumph’ – as in an act of revenge. However, there is a thin line between fantasy and reality.  
In addiction the fantasy becomes a reality in that the pestilence is put upon the subject’s own 
body as if to purge the body of its desire and to avenge feelings of hatred, rejection and 
humiliation. The subject’s own body becomes the object.  The challenge is in the need to 
destroy the object as well as to achieve triumph over it by taking what is desired. Here, again, 
we see pleasure and pain become accomplices it the quest for satisfaction. There is also an 
element of omnipotence in the act of the addict as there is a sense that he can achieve all his 
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desires without the other, therefore rejecting the object as he was rejected.  Loose (2007), not 
too far off from Stoller’s (1991) ideas, indicates that addiction is a search for sexual 
satisfaction that belongs to the stages of early infantile development. Hence, the addict’s 
avoidance of normal sexual relationships. He goes on to say that, 
‘…Addicts are fixated to a form of satisfaction that belongs to the oral perversion that 
provides the direct satisfaction on an unconscious infantile drive that, for some 
reason, was never properly overcome or sublimated; so drugs and alcohol can 
function as substitutes for the gratification of infantile sexual wishes’ (2007, p:101) 
 One of the essential characteristics of addicts, he suggests, is their inability to deal 
with frustrations and demand immediate gratification.  They satisfy this demand for 
immediate pleasure, through their compulsive use of drugs. It is significant to note his 
reference to the research by others who have identified connections ‘with narcissism, 
depression, mania, and paranoia’ (ibid, p.101). It speaks to the complexity of addictions as it 
implicates the neurobiological but, most significantly the psychosocial systems of the subject. 
The ‘compulsion to repeat’ is a narcissistic endeavour toward self-preservation at the 
expense of all else. It is a narcissistic seeking to fulfil the self’s desire for pleasure from the 
mastery of the past emotional pain caused by loss, rejection, fear, anger. This can become a 
lifelong endeavour. Drug taking, and self-abusive behaviour, share similar patterns found in 
chronic pain sufferers. Pain is needed to perpetuate more pain/desire to gain pleasure. 
Somewhere in the unconscious of the individual lies the imprint of traumatic events and 
experiences that have the potential to awaken emotions that are painful and unbearable.  
Somewhere in the unconscious lurks the possibility of an emotional illness, whether drugs, or 
other behaviours/activities, are introduced or not.  Addiction is a manifest symptom of this 
disturbance, on the one hand, and on the other hand it is the disturbance. 
As Loose (2002) has stated, Freud 
‘…had discovered fantasy, infantile sexuality, the structuring effect of the Oedipus 
Complex and the importance of language for an understanding of the psyche.  Above 
all, he had discovered that human suffering was not caused in the first place by a 
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clearly locatable external trauma but by a disturbing element within the psychic 
economy of the subject which ex-ists like an unprocessed remainder.  Neurotics are 
no longer innocent victims of an external cause; something disturbs them from within’ 
(p: 30). 
In more recent studies it is evidenced that trauma can be repeated on many levels, 
such as, emotional, physiologic and behavioural, causing a variety of individual as well as 
social suffering. Anger can be directed at the self or at others.  This is a key problem in 
people who have experienced a violation of some kind. This aggression is in itself a repetition 
of past traumatic events. Trauma occurs when external and internal resources are lacking or 
inadequate.  This brings us back to discussions about the importance of nurturing, during the 
infantile stages of developmental, where a failure of this can leave individuals ill-equipped to 
maintain and regulate self-care and self-esteem.  The implications for the development of the 
ability to care for oneself, as in self-preservation, during the initial stages of infantile 
development are crucial.  A failure at these key stages sets the functional environment up for 
a variety of anxieties and the possibility of destructive, repetitive, compulsive behaviours 
(Khantzian and Mack 1983, p: 209-214). 
A compulsion to repeat, as in addiction, is an unconscious desire to overcome trauma 
or to master the traumatic event and takes us back to infantile stages of development.  No 
matter how we view this compulsion it appears to be an aggression upon the self, as we see 
from our discussions already.  On the other hand it is a desire to gain control of one’s self and 
is an effort at self- preservation. It is a perverse need to take revenge, according to Stoller 
(2003), on the primary object (the mother). However, there is also an element of a desire to 
punish the self for being deficient, without adequate resources for protection from trauma in 
the first place. Within the complexities of unconscious emotions and unconscious guilt, 
addiction, as in other chronic pain, is evidence of a desire for revenge on the object, on the 
one hand and guilt and the need for punishing the self, on the other hand. 
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It is clearer today than ever before that the subject’s life is influenced by suffering 
through the powerful forces of nature (natural disasters such as the Tsunami), his own 
weaknesses and feebleness of his own body (old age, incurable diseases such as cancer and 
schizophrenia), and the complex dynamics of relationships within the family and society 
(attachment, loss, poverty, war and terrorism, abuse). As regards the first two, Freud (1930) 
further explains that we will never completely master nature, and our bodily organism, that is 
itself a part of that nature and will always remain a transient structure with limitations.  
Instead of this being a negative element it actually presents a positive element to life as it not 
only makes us aware of our human limitations but gives us clues regarding our capacity.  He 
states that ‘If we cannot remove all suffering, we can remove some, and we can mitigate 
some’ (p: 86).  Regarding the third point on the social source of suffering he stated: 
‘…our attitude is a different one. We do not admit it at all; we cannot see why the 
regulations made by ourselves should not, on the contrary, be a protection and a 
benefit for every one of us.  And yet, when we consider how unsuccessful we have 
been in precisely this field of prevention of suffering, a suspicion may lie behind – 
this time a piece of our own psychical constitution’ (Freud 1930 [1929], p: 86). 
 
Could it be that pain is the object which we desire?  Addiction appears to be such a 
phenomenon. It is clear evidence of how unsuccessful we have been in precisely this field of 
prevention of suffering. And for the reason, namely, that addiction is ‘something’ (or a lack 
of something) ‘in our own psychical constitution’. There is a barrier that prevents the 
problem of addiction to be fully addressed and therefore, resolved.   
Addiction ties the physical and the psychological processes in a relentless bind. When 
examining the state of addiction the question of whether or not drug use, or a ‘compulsion’ to 
repeatedly engage in mind altering and, possibly, mind and body destroying behaviour, has 
any physical influence or is it at all psychological, arises time and again. Studies have shown 
that even though there is an element of physical influence, it is certainly less significant than 
the psychological and emotional elements of compulsive behaviour.  The body becomes a 
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sort of a holding cell for the desire of fulfilment, and its preservation becomes secondary to 
the preservation of desire and achieving pleasure.  The body endures the pain for the sake of 
gaining satisfaction/pleasure. Therefore, addiction ‘inevitably…very often’ induces ‘a 
physiological dependence…’ (Wurmser 1974, p: 823). 
 Freud’s (1920) determination to seek out the workings of the human being, and his 
desire to find balance, took him to his concept of the pleasure principle and beyond the 
pleasure principle. Freud’s will to pleasure was dictated throughout his work as well as his 
own personal experiences. It brings into the conscious realm, to some degree, his desire to 
use his addiction, and pain, to inspire him ever onward in the quest to boldly excavate the 
complex and contradictory realms of sexuality and the unconscious. ‘Freud observed on his 
own person that cocaine could paralyze some disturbing element and thus release his full 
normal vitality. He (…) was puzzled why in other people it led to addiction, (…). His 
conclusion was right, that they had within them some morbid element of which he was free, 
although it was many years before he was able to determine what precisely that was’ (Byck 
1974, p: 201-202). 
 ‘It was psychoanalysis that several decades later brought the first insight into the 
nature of addiction and its complex relationship to the effect of the drugs.  In 1885, 
when Freud met the problem, he thought of the hunger for stimuli, of mental 
weakness, of lack of self-control as the decisive factors’ (ibid, p: 347). 
Loose expresses that Freud’s relationship with cocaine was a ‘symptom’ (2002, p: 
11), and we propose that his addiction was a manifestation of his relationship with his 
(psychic) pain.  What is significant, in his work toward uncovering and relieving psychic 
pain, is that psychoanalysis, as with other therapies, is not a cure for pain, but a reminder that 
we have pain due to (the various theories of causes), most significantly, loss and rejection – 
unresolved emotional trauma and a need for satisfaction and a sense of fulfilment and self-
preservation.   
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Similar to the symptom of neurosis, addiction shuts out the unconscious, acting as a 
repression.  However the cost of this is high. Eagle (1998) states that,  
‘… Freud made clear his observation and belief that repression both exacted a cost 
and bestowed certain benefits. Thus, early on, he writes that banishing an unwanted 
mental content from consciousness both frees the ego from “incompatibilities,” – a 
benefit, - and produces hysterical conversion symptoms – a cost.  Furthermore, in his 
later writings, Freud (1915) also refers to the work of repression, - “a persistent 
expenditure of force” (p151), - and suggests that repression entails continual psychic 
effort and exacts a cost on the personality’ (p: 88). 
 
The paradox of addiction is that while it can act as a protective shield against the 
feelings of a loss of control over one’s unconscious emotions – restoring a sense of control – 
it is also behaviour of being out of control that engages a self-destruct button. 
‘Simultaneously, then addiction reflects both ego functioning and a loss of elements of ego 
functioning’ (Dodes 1990, p: 401). 
6.5 The Addiction of Deprivation   
Addiction is similar to other diseases, such as those that affect the heart and the brain. 
They disrupt the normal, healthy functioning of the underlying organs and if left untreated, 
can become a lifetime of terrible pain and at times have tragic consequences.  On the positive 
side is the fact that these diseases are preventable and treatable, (NIDA 2010). 
According to Marrazzi & Luby (1986) eating disorders are similar to an addiction. In 
fact it has been identified that anorexia may represent a profound psychiatric disorder that 
may give rise to an addiction to deprivation. This is the topic I will discuss in this section.  
It is significant to consider the interaction between the neurobiological system and the 
psychological system when we speak about pain being relieved by another pain, for example 
psychological pain relieved by conversion to a physiological pain. However, a further serious 
correlation is when the neurological system of the body takes over the psychological systems 
in order to compensate for deprivation and therefore switching to survival mode. This is 
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particularly seen in research that has been conducted with patients suffering from anorexia 
nervosa.  
It seems that the initial stages of anorexia are certainly compelled by deep seated 
psychological and emotional trauma in early development.  However, the later stages are 
perpetuated by the neurobiology of the body adjusting its processes to compensate for the 
state of deprivation, as will be explained further on in this section, (Marrazzi & Luby 1986). 
In exploring various scenarios where destructive, repetitive, compulsive behaviour is 
found, it seems that the complexities of one’s internal and external environments have 
implications which impact the ego functioning of an individual. In most cases of addiction we 
have come across unrelenting influences of past psychological trauma caused by, i.e., 
childhood sexual abuse, domestic violence (physical, psychological, and emotional), and 
other dysfunctional family and/or community dynamics, war, terrorism, poverty - to name 
only a few.  
I would like to examine an example of childhood sexual abuse, as the prevalence of 
these cases, in my own work, seems to be on an increase. It comes clear, on one level, how 
perversion mechanisms, such as an addiction to pain through behaviours of self-abuse, can 
set in when the subject is faced with intrapsychic trauma and conflict, during the early stages 
of development. This is a unique case with a vast array of complexities, the most significant 
being that the subject is a nun who lives in a cloistered convent. Sister Marie Therese of the 
Cross (2008) suffered childhood sexual abuse from the age of two to eleven, at the hands of 
her grandfather. 
First of all it is of significance to note Anna Freud’s (1981) summation of ego-
psychological perspectives on incest expressing how molestation (childhood sexual abuse) 
disrupts the normal developmental stages of childhood sexuality and prevents the overcoming 
of the Oedipus Complex and the subsequent transition to latency: 
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‘Far from existing as a phantasy, incest is thus also a fact (…). Where the chances of 
harming a child’s normal developmental growth are concerned, it ranks higher than 
abandonment, neglect, physical maltreatment or any other form of abuse. It would be 
a fatal mistake to underestimate either the importance or the frequency of its actual 
occurrence’ (p. 34). 
 
It is also important to make note that the following is my analysis and assumption 
about the details of this case. I will look at some of the key elements from a psychoanalytical 
perspective that the manifestations of self destructive, repetitive, compulsive behaviour are a 
form of addiction, following the destruction of ego functioning in early development. 
Anorexia is a complex illness; particularly when there are issues of childhood sexual abuse (it 
is not exclusive to this as childhood damage, from other forms of abuse and trauma, are 
equally as significant, in many cases of anorexia). For the sake of brevity I would like to look 
at only a few of the key factors, in order to evidence my assumption that this is a form of a 
perverse mechanism as found in addiction. The case is mainly significant in evidencing the 
level of impact the individual’s relationship with pain has on their existence and identity. 
Sister Marie is of White Irish ethnicity and was born in London. She is a fifty nine 
year old, Carmelite nun whose given name is Sheila. At the time of my interviews with her 
she was fifty six years old. She chose the name Marie Therese of the Cross upon accepting 
her vows into the cloistered order of the Sisters of Carmel. Sister Marie had been abused by 
her grandfather from the age of two up until the age of eleven (the year during which he 
died). She was devastated when he died, and hated him for leaving her with her ‘broken 
body’. She hated him but, at the same time she loved him because after all she was ‘his little 
girl’ and they shared a special secret. She stated, ‘although I was grateful I did not have to 
face the horrors of the abuse, I felt desperately alone with the consequences of it. Grandad 
had betrayed my love and trust, leaving me with a body I was ashamed to own.  It seemed to 
be all my own fault. (…) he had made me promise not to tell anyone – still I was so afraid 
 
195 
 
lest anyone found out.  (…) I hated myself for being granddad’s little girl and I cried it all 
deep inside’ (2008, p: 15-16). 
The development of her sense of self-preservation had not only been interrupted but 
intruded upon. Sister Marie realised very quickly that this was a secret that could never be 
told and the reason, the tremendous emotional trauma of intrusion upon her body, was buried 
deep within her.  She hated her grandfather for leaving her with a broken body that she could 
not appreciate and share with any other person, as it was now unworthy of love.  She was 
humiliated and ashamed and at eleven years old words made themselves available for her to 
formulate the tragedy of her experiences, which she was left with.  She felt that the only way 
that she could protect herself now was to destroy the ‘bad little girl inside’ so that she could 
be free.  
Sister Marie recounts that she had realised at around the same age of eleven that she 
had a desire to ‘devote herself to the church’. She encountered moments of realisation that 
confirmed to her that her dream was to become a nun and that she wanted to enter into the 
cloistered Carmelite order. One of these moments was when she saw one of the nuns from the 
convent walk across the street – in her long brown habit.  She knew that she wanted to go 
away to the convent – to a place that she never had to leave. It was then that her struggle, and 
attempts to escape, began.  She did not believe that she was worthy of becoming a nun, 
however she had decided that she would do whatever she had to, to make herself worthy.  
Sister Marie’s account in her book, ‘The Silent Struggle’, details this very struggle with her 
‘vocation’ and her tremendous struggle with her deeply buried secret and her anorexia that on 
the one hand protected her from her memories, and on the other hand punished her for them: 
‘I hated my body and did not want to eat anything that was good for it.  I would never be 
good enough to become any sort of nun so I would have to die if I wanted to go to God’ 
(2008, p: 25). 
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Sister Marie’s ailment began with binging and purging that eventually worked its way 
to anorexia nervosa. According to Lacanian theory this state of anorexia-bulimia could be 
understood more effectively from the perspective of Jouissance.  The behaviour calls into 
view the theory of beyond the pleasure principle and the reality principle. ‘It is a very fine 
and delicate elaboration of the dynamic between anxiety and the Demand of the Other that 
can serve as a compass in this field’ (Aguirre 2011, p: 180). 
Placing severe restrictions on her food intake was clearly taking control of the 
traumatic events in her past.  She felt that it was her fault that the abuse continued because 
she loved her grandfather and this somehow made her ‘evil’. She wanted to punish the ‘little 
girl’ for her terrible sin and so placed grave restrictions on her obtaining ‘comfort’.  Sister 
Marie believed that in order to gain the reward of ‘Heaven’ she needed to be rid of her 
‘broken body’ and was seemingly on the road to chronic suicide. In speaking about 
destructive behaviour in addiction Khantzian and Mack (1983) stated that Freud’s theory of a 
death instinct could best account for the ‘varied and manifold forms of human self-
destructiveness, such as asceticism, martyrdom, (…).  He considered such problems as forms 
of ‘chronic suicide’ (p: 211).   
Shortly after her grandfather died Sister Marie began suffering with symptoms of an 
eating disorder that quickly worked into a full blown anorexia.  Here she recounts the details 
of binging and purging, including taking laxatives, and inducing vomiting. Soon she would 
eat very little, restricting her food intake to the bare minimum, but then purge herself by 
vomiting and the use of laxatives. Her body began to deteriorate and she went from one 
extreme to the other – to the point of near death - as the organs within her body began to 
deteriorate. From the outside she looked as if her body could not support any of its functions. 
Which bodes with Aguirre’s (2011, p: 178) suggestion that ‘[T]here is that quality of the 
mortification of the body which is often encountered in the clinic of anorexia’.  
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Neuroscientific research conducted by Margules (1979) is cited by Marrazzi & Luby 
(1986) to explain that the fuel created by blood glucose is critical to brain function and 
activity.  Therefore, during starvation the neurobiological systems switch to survival mode to 
protect the brain from glucose deficiency by maintaining the blood glucose level at the 
expense of other organs, (p: 196). 
In one of my interviews with Sister Marie she stated that anorexia was her ‘friend’. It 
knew her secret so deeply that she felt as if she had to be true to it, this friend, who took care 
of her. She saw her life through this relationship with ‘her’ Anorexia – her pain. This pain 
embodied her life that consisted of her experiences of sexual abuse at the hands of her 
grandfather from the age of two to eleven. This is where she ‘lived’ every day trying to figure 
out how to ‘destroy’ the little girl who had had these experiences, trying to control this period 
of her life as she was powerless to do at the time. Anorexia gave her the control that she 
needed.  It made her deprive that ‘bad little girl’ who had allowed her grandfather to sexually 
abuse her.  
She let him do that to her and, then, still loved him and missed him after he died. She 
stated that when she vomited or took laxatives that helped her purge her body and made her 
feel good.  So much so that she wanted, actually needed, to do this to herself every time she 
felt the pain of her past.  Anorexia let her objectify her pain and allowed her to distance 
herself from it. She separated the little girl who had been abused and who represented the 
terrible pain in her life, from her self. The pain thus became an external entity that she could 
control and manipulate.  This way she also justified her punishment of herself.  She stated 
that she needed anorexia to protect her from what had happened in her past, but she knew that 
it was also destroying her.  
Sister Marie said that being in the treatment centre had taught her to understand her 
past trauma, her feelings and her behaviour. Over time this had helped her to manage her 
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anorexia. However, one thing that she realised is that her obsessive preoccupation with 
destroying herself through deprivation was like an addiction, except that instead of indulging 
your body with drugs to get a high you deprive it of sustenance and abuse it. Every time she 
vomited she felt relief, a sense of satisfaction that was a sort of a high as it relieved her pain. 
Research has evidenced that during starvation or food deprivation the body compensates by 
producing opioids to protect itself from the ‘pangs’ of hunger. According to Marrazzi & Luby 
(1986) opioids are released and mobilized during states of prolonged deprivation.  They 
hypothesize that this could be an underlying cause for an ‘auto-addictive process’ for a 
relentless chronic anorexia nervosa, (p: 191). 
The deprivation gave her a sense of control over her past circumstances.  She needed 
that sense of power and control over her life in the present so as to have the courage to be 
able to purge herself from any sin in order to be worthy of being a nun – she was determined 
to be a nun but more importantly she wanted to be a cloistered nun. Sister Marie realised her 
dream of entering the Carmelite Order, however not without great sacrifice as she struggled 
within the grips which the disease of anorexia had on her, physically and psychologically.  
From a young age she ‘befriended Jesus’ and turned to him for comfort.  She looked 
to him to forgive her so that she could remain in her dream – at the convent as a nun – 
devoted to her calling.  Her sense of martyrdom was indestructible as she sacrificed her own 
body bit by bit in order to be worthy of her ‘vocation’ to God – as she felt that she had been 
chosen for a life of poverty, chastity and obedience – to Him. In this way her suffering held 
meaning for her and helped her on her mission to become a nun and to work as a nurse in the 
infirmary. 
Her anorexia became worse, as the years progressed, and she had to succumb to going 
into a residential treatment centre – threatened by the fear that she would have to leave the 
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convent if she did not.  After a long, difficult struggle in treatment she finally began to learn 
how to manage her anorexic illness. Here she had to disclose and face her past. 
At this time she was faced with her reality - that she hated the little girl inside of her, 
who was abused by her grandfather, and wanted to destroy her.  Her anorexia became her 
accomplice in her mission to destroy this damaged little girl. From the age of eleven to fifty 
six Sister Marie inflicted abuse upon herself to separate her self from her desire that was a 
complexity of emotional pain. This was a kind of ‘chronic suicide’ (1983) that accounted for 
her tendency for anger and aggression that was manifested in her self-destructive behaviour.  
Anorexia is a neurosis, in that it betrayed childhood sexual trauma.  However, it goes 
beyond that.  It is the subject’s intense hatred of (her) self, the guilt and shame of her past 
experiences that can never be overcome. The symptoms of anorexia were a set of compulsive 
behaviours repeatedly unleashed upon the body.  This seemed to be in an effort to separate 
the ‘little girl’ with the secret and an already ‘broken body’, and the person whose desire was 
to take revenge and to regain control of her helplessness and her powerlessness.  Her desire to 
be a nun gave her a sense of omnipotence and magical thinking, as if by being in the realm of 
‘God’, she had a champion. Being a nun would put her in this realm of power.  She secretly 
believed that if she could only destroy this bad little girl the good person would emerge.  
From a neurobiological perspective research evidences that once the body’s survival 
system is mobilised past a certain level, anorexia becomes a lifelong battle.  The reasons why 
an individual sets upon this route is complex. It has been shown that the beginning stages are 
no doubt psychological, for example, a sense of unworthiness and dissatisfaction with body 
image due to a multidimensional complexity of causes. However, as the behaviours continue 
the illness develops into a chemical disorder. It seems that there is not only a 
psychopathology of anorexia nervosa but, also, a pathophysiology.  Psychodynamic concepts, 
such as, psychoanalysis, suffice to explain the initial and acute stages of anorexia; however 
 
200 
 
fail to explain its chronicity and the nature of its resistance to treatment and sometimes fatal 
prognosis, (Marrazzi & Luby 1986, p: 200). 
The neurobiology of anorexia nervosa is significant, then, and has been evidenced to 
explain the chemical reaction and changes within the body that could perpetuate the illness. 
However the psychological bases of the dysfunction remain primarily significant. The 
psychological and emotional trauma that impacts the subject’s intrapsychic processes is what 
triggers the behaviour.  Therefore, treatment rests in the effective management of emotional 
pain. The question of what does success mean within a treatment programme has been 
debated, as it has been when considering other addiction treatments. The general paradigm is 
shifting to allow for how well one manages this (chronic pain) illness, (Marrazzi & Luby 
1986). 
In the case of Sister Marie there was clear evidence in her book, The Silent Struggle 
(2008), as well as during our discussions, that her emotional pain was great yet that she had 
gained a certain power over it.  On the other hand she continues to battle with the damage 
that her behaviour, due to anorexia, has caused to her body.   To see the impact and transition 
of how the illness can become a life long struggle one needs to consider the stages that 
anorexia can travel through. She explained how the anorexia has caused her reproductive 
organs to fail as her body had ceased to create the hormones that were needed.  This further 
complicated the normal functioning of other organs in her body.  She talked about what she 
had learned during her treatment and continues to learn, and her desire to share this 
knowledge with others who may be suffering similar pain.   
Marrazzi & Luby (1986) have found that during prolonged deprivation of nutrition the 
body begins to alter its functions in order to conserve bodily resources, in the first stage of the 
illness.  It then proceeds to alter its functions further by beginning to decrease the metabolic 
rate of the system and, hence, the metabolic needs of the body.  In the advanced stages it 
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further alters its functions to reduce ‘species survival functions, which are not necessary to 
the preservation of individual organisms. These homeostatic adjustments, together with 
opiate analgesia and inhibition of sympathetic arousal, seem to represent a broad adaptation 
to the stress of starvation’ (p: 195). 
In further examination of the psychoanalytical concepts of anorexia it appears that the 
development of ego functioning toward self-care, self-protection and survival had been 
interrupted in Sister Marie’s early developmental years.  The violation of the sexual abuse by 
her grandfather destroyed her sense of safety and left her vulnerable.  Sister Marie felt that 
the cloistered convent would be a ‘sanctuary’ that would create an inner sense of safety. She 
was preoccupied with this thought daily, on the one hand, while she performed the self harm, 
on the other, as she fought her sense of shame, guilt and punishment. She was preoccupied 
with her desire for her grandfather as well as her hatred of him. In doing so she abused her 
body, it seems, in the same way that her grandfather did.  The pain that she felt from her 
deteriorating body was the pain that she felt while being sexually abused. However, the pain 
of her actions also released a sense of ‘wellbeing’ and control unlike when she was young, 
while her grandfather abused her. She wanted to be loved by her grandfather but did not 
know, at the time, how to protect herself from what he was doing. Even though she did not 
know, at the present time, how to protect herself from her own self-destructive behaviour, it 
was this behaviour that was also a defence and protection from those traumatic memories and 
emotions.  She inflicted herself with pain, however the pain then provoked pleasure that 
perpetuated the desire for pain and so the cycle goes on. 
At one point during her treatment Sister Marie said that she was ‘heartbroken’.  At the 
time she had begun to understand her illness and one way of doing this was to address 
‘Sheila’.  This was her given name and the name of that ‘broken little girl’ inside. She was 
afraid that she would never find Sister Marie Therese again. ‘Now, I had to accept the little 
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girl I so wanted to disappear’. She could no longer hide inside her habit feeling she had no 
right to be there, (2008, p: 215). 
Anorexia may also be viewed as a perverse mechanism, which is an attempt through 
destructive, repetitive, compulsive behaviours, to preserve sexual gratification against 
trauma.  It consists of the subject’s pursuit of gratification through hostility and vengeance, 
mystery, and danger that surround the traumatic attachment to the mother (Cooper 1991, p: 
20).  
Perversion as such, in other words, is ‘sin’. The idea of sin presents a sense of risk 
taking as in the pursuit of forbidden pleasures.  The elements of guilt to compensate this then 
turns to punishment and a sense of vengeance and hostility directed toward the self but, then 
it becomes apparent that it is directed toward the mother. Stoller (1991) states that with sin, 
‘the excitement comes from an awareness - conscious or unconscious - that one is harming, 
needs to harm, wants to harm. More precisely, the harm done is an act of humiliating in 
revenge for one’s having been humiliated’ (p: 37). 
Sister Marie relates that before her grandfather came to live with them (she was two 
years old) she felt that she was always in the way and was beaten if she cried and her father 
was always ‘yelling’ at her.  Her mother seemed to be relieved when she could leave her in 
her grandfather’s care.  Her grandfather seemed to want to take care of her and seemed to be 
the only one that loved her (2008, p: 10-12). She even felt at the time that her father would be 
jealous since she was now her grandfather’s little girl.  
The first time that her grandfather did something to hurt her (she was four years old) 
she yelled out loud from the pain and her mother ran upstairs to see what had happened.  Her 
grandfather said something to her mother who then proceeded to beat her. She felt at that 
moment abandoned, rejected and humiliated. The pain of the humiliation was so much worse.  
Later her grandfather threatened her saying, ‘you ever make that noise again you will get 
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worse’ (ibid, p: 12). Her mother had abandoned her and failed to protect her, and she would 
carry it with her, in spite of her treatment successes. She depended on her mother’s help, yet 
she wished to be away from her.  She punished her own body as if punishing her mother for 
humiliating her, as if wishing her past experiences on her mother.  
By the time Sister Marie began the process of her treatment for anorexia, in the 
residential unit at Springfield Hospital, her mother had died.  Her mother had been giving her 
all the attention that she desired, and she felt that she was special to her.  However, this was a 
double edged sword with one side a ‘triumph’ and the other side guilt and a need for 
punishment.  She was determined, more than ever, to remain in the convent, and recalled her 
mother’s distress at her interest in such a career.  She learned to manage her anorexia enough 
to be able to return to the convent during and following her treatment phases. 
Sister Marie’s internal conflict lay in a trauma inflicted upon her by someone in her 
external environment.  It was an act that was inflicted upon the child from the outside thus, 
rendering her powerless. As a child, and as is natural for a child, she was completely 
dependent on the adults around her for protection and a sense of wellbeing. The abuse was an 
intruder upon this sense of safety and self-preservation creating within her a sense of 
confusion and loss of control. (Joyce 1995). 
Similar to the destructive, repetitive, compulsive behaviours of addiction, there is in 
self-abuse, as in anorexia, the aspect of superego pathology, where the faulty ideal formation 
is underlined. In addictions, the archaic forms of shame and guilt and the very primitive and 
global fears of humiliation and revenge play a dominant role in the social interactions of 
these patients. It appears that the aim of these destructive behaviours is to gain an affect that 
increases a sense of self-esteem, and control and the ‘re-creation of a regressive narcissistic 
state of self-satisfaction’ is consistent. These behaviours are particularly evident during a 
‘narcissistic crisis’ that would entail a particular intense disappointment in others, in oneself, 
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or in both – ‘so intense because of the exaggerated hopes, and so malignant because of its 
history’s reaching back to very early times’. Such crises are usually found in family crises 
coinciding during stages of maturation and adolescence, (Wurmser 1974, p: 838-839).   
It was at the beginning of adolescence, age eleven, when Sister Marie’s grandfather 
died that her struggle with anorexia began.  There were many other struggles that her family 
were going through yet, she had become preoccupied with herself.  Everything Sister Marie 
achieved, from participating in family responsibilities to gaining entry into the convent 
seemed to be through the haze of her anorexia.  Her constant battle was how, when and where 
she could do what she needed to do to fulfil her desire to maintain her body in the dilapidated 
state that it was – protecting herself from her guilt and shame. 
She wanted to enter the cloister so that she would never have to interact with ‘normal 
society’ again lest it re-victimise her. She had lost all trust in her environment and social 
relationships.  She was so afraid of being powerless in the face of her past experiences. Her 
struggle continues with anorexic tendencies within her daily life yet, she is learning how to 
control the anorexia as she had allowed anorexia to control her. 
 Sister Marie’s destructive behaviour served to ward off a sense of helplessness and 
powerlessness through the control she exerted over her body in order to control the pain that 
her memories gave her.  She created pain through her behaviour in order to separate her from 
her desire – for the lost object.  This drive, as in addiction, to re-establish a sense of power 
corresponds to the subject’s sense of powerlessness and is ‘impelled by narcissistic rage’ 
(Dodes 1990, p: 397). 
 According to Stoller, perversion is a result of mixtures of three key unconscious 
fantasies constructed in the perverse defence against fears of passivity when confronted with 
rejection, loss and abandonment from the maternal object.  At the basis of the subject’s 
behaviour is the fantasy that gives him a sense of control and power.  Within these fantasies 
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are efforts to deny the experience of being the helpless and needy infant that is at the mercy 
of a frustrating and cruel mother. 
‘(…) They erase passivity by denying human maternal control of oneself as human, 
by defensively converting active to passive, and by extracting pleasure out of being 
controlled. (…) Regardless of whether sexual pleasure is consciously an aspect of the 
activity and regardless of the prominence of the fetish object, the perversion dynamic 
is in action whenever the body is treated as not human and mixtures of these three 
fantasies are present’ (1991, p: 24-25). 
 
From this perspective the destructive, repetitive and compulsive behaviours of 
addiction –addiction to drugs or other types of self-harm – have elements of perversion as the 
body is used as a vehicle for revenge and defence against infantile emotional trauma, 
violation and conflict. 
The concept of ‘unconscious guilt’ and an ‘unconscious need for punishment’ has the 
greatest influence on the initiation of self-abuse, as in drug use, as well as in relapse and 
relapse prevention. One of the theories of addiction by Kohut (1971), cited in Dodes (1990), 
discusses that addictive behaviour is seen as a gratification of instinctual needs or a reunion 
with a ‘forgiving parental object or an activation of “all-good” self and object images’. Kohut 
referred to addictions as,  
‘“narcissistic behaviour disorders”. (…) disturbances in addicts as due to the mother’s 
failure to function as an adequate idealized self-object, and saw drugs serving “not as 
a substitute for loved or loving objects, or for a relationship with them, but as a 
replacement for a defect in the psychological structure”. Wurmser (1974) also 
emphasised a “narcissistic crisis” in drug abusers, in which the collapse of a grandiose 
self or an idealized object leads to feelings for which drug use is an attempted 
response. (…) “an archaic overvaluation of the self or of others [leads to] the abysmal 
sense of frustration and let-down if these hopes are shattered…and thus to the 
addictive search”’, (p: 400). 
 
The most important elements in addictions and other self harming behaviour, such as 
within the complexities of anorexia, are the roles of power, helplessness and rage and 
consequently the role that these behaviours play in managing the sense of  loss of 
omnipotence over one’s own affective state. It is clear that the loss of control over one’s 
emotions and feelings is highlighted by the loss of this control in psychic or mental trauma. 
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The sense of helplessness is imposed on the ego and it is overwhelmed by an instinctual drive 
(affect) which it cannot manage without excessive anxiety.  This sense of powerlessness and 
helplessness is what amounts to ‘psychic trauma’. ‘The ability to be powerful over oneself 
and one’s internal state may also be described as an inherent aspect of narcissism’ (Dodes 
1990, p: 400).  He further explains that according to Spruiell (1975, p: 590) narcissism is “the 
pleasure in efficient mental functioning…the regulation of mood…and…a sense of inner 
safety and reliability” (ibid). 
I have seen in cases of addiction, as well as in other cases of self-abuse, the role of 
these behaviours is an attempts to achieve this ‘efficient mental functioning’ and to restore a 
sense of control. The addict will use drugs and an anorexic will starve herself or vomit or take 
laxatives to purge herself of painful desires to achieve a sense of inner safety and reliability. 
These individuals covet their feelings and have a need to possesses them, not wishing to 
expose them to the world – there are his or her feelings (of pain) alone to enjoy (or despise), 
in the privacy of his or her mind. The excitement of the risk of these behaviours, and doing 
something that is outside of the constrictions of conformity, or committing a ‘sin’, first of all, 
add to pleasures sought by these individuals who are involved in addictive, self-harming 
behaviours. And secondly it adds to the complex issues of treatment.   
What is verbalised by the individual is rarely the exact truth; in an effort to keep this 
pleasure and pain hidden, lest it be taken away and they lose the device for self-preservation 
and gratification.  The need for this is to fill the emptiness and lack of wholeness and lack of 
control. As Sister Marie stated, if she gave up anorexia she would have admitted defeat and 
lost the last remnants of her sense of control over her past. The need for control is clear, as 
discussed earlier. Even in the middle of an assessment or treatment the individual will 
continue to hide behind words and behaviour that he thinks will protect her and her activities.  
 
207 
 
The issue of building a trustful relationship with another is one of the essential elements 
within any such treatment even before treatment can begin. 
As I have been discussing, addiction seems to be tied intimately to an individual’s 
attempt to cope with his or her internal emotional and external social and physical 
environment. It is a result of severe ego impairments and disturbances in the sense of self, 
involving difficulties with drive and affect defence, self-care, dependency and need for 
satisfaction.  
Mental pain, as has been discussed, stems from loss – namely loss during the infantile 
stage of development – of the primary object, the mother, the breast, and the fulfilment of 
primary desire.  Freud (1905) indicated that addiction can be related to a fixation in the oral 
stage of libidinal development and, by implication, he hinted at a possible connection 
between addiction and perversion, (p: 182).  
‘…the avoidance of the so-called normal sexual encounter with the Other indicates 
the search for a sexual satisfaction that belongs to an earlier stage of infantile sexual 
development.  Addicts are fixated to a form of satisfaction that belongs to the oral 
stage of sexual development, with addiction being a kind of oral perversion that 
provides the direct satisfaction of an unconscious infantile drive that, for some reason, 
was never properly overcome or sublimated; so drugs and alcohol can function as 
substitutes for the gratification of infantile sexual wishes’ (ibid, p: 101). 
 
There is a desire to cover up this deficiency and compensate for it with the repeated 
use of substances and other forms of self-abuse. I have learned as well that there is pathology 
present within the narcissistic sense of self.  Disruptions and disturbances in a person’s early 
development, particularly around infantile stages, where there is the highest dependence on 
being nurtured, are the roots of the breakdown.  Here there is found to be a narcissistic 
vulnerability and overcompensation for self-preservation. Drugs are used, in this case, as a 
compensation for this lack.  
Defences are set up in order to contain the unconscious longings and aspirations of the 
individual. It is because of this disavowal and ‘massive repression of these needs that such 
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individuals feel cut off, hollow and empty…[and that the]…addicts inability to acknowledge 
and pursue actively their needs to be admired, and to love and be loved, leave them 
vulnerable to reversion to narcotics’ (Khantzian 1978, p: 196). 
Sister Marie’s (Sheila) case is unique compared to other cases of self-harm and 
addiction as such, in that in examining the details one is rather cautious about the elements of 
the unconscious desires of ones sexuality. Nuns are a Holy community who dedicate their 
lives to God, taking vows of chastity, poverty and obedience. Albeit Sister Marie was a nun 
who was dedicated to her work she was also a woman who had experienced not just sexual 
relations, but a sexual relationship of childhood abuse and violation.  The struggle for her was 
twofold. Firstly it was an effort to live up to her commitments and vows.  In order to do so 
she felt that she must get rid of her previous life and what she had learnt about human sexual 
relationships, through the acts of abuse, which she was a victim of. 
Secondly, I propose that her guilt for feeling a desire for not just her grandfather’s 
love, but for desiring him sexually, was what drove her to punishing herself.  The perverse, 
repetitive behaviour, which she was committed to in an addictive process, was a defence 
against her guilt, which she had reconciled to, as being insurmountable struggle and her  
cross to bear and the pain which she desired in order to gain the ultimate pleasure that she 
called Heaven. Her relationship with pain was such that it was the toll she had to pay for the 
passage to being worthy of her calling. 
6.6 The case of ‘B’ 
This second case study will also be examined from a framework of the 
psychoanalytical theories discussed in this chapter. We will consider Wurmser’s (1974) 
theory that the specific reason for the onset of compulsive drug use lies in an ‘acute crisis’ in 
which the underlying narcissistic conflicts are mobilized and the affects connected with these 
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conflicts break in with overwhelming force and cannot be coped with without the help of an 
artificial ‘affect defense’ (p: 838). 
I could also apply some of Khantzian and Mack’s (1983) theory of self-preservation 
and self-care where they describe these as a set of ego functions, and suggest that failures and 
impairments in the development of these functions can explain a range of troubled human 
behaviour. (p: 209).  Dodes’ (1990) theory of addiction being a set of behaviours that serves 
to ward of a sense of helplessness or powerlessness via controlling and regulating ones 
affective state, can be particularly relevant to the following case, (p: 397). 
Addiction, being an aspect of the dimensions of human existence, presents a highly 
complex set of behaviours. It is impacted and influenced by any number of variations of 
physical, psychological and biological elements. It is important to keep in mind that there is a 
spectrum of drug use.  On the one end there are those who are the occasional and recreational 
users and on the other end are those whose mental suffering is so intense that it manifests in a 
pathological compulsion to repetitive, relentless drug use.   
Considering the challenges of its complexity I acknowledge that this is an on-going 
battle to know what really works best. It is also important to note that many an addict has 
come out ‘clean’, and has changed his or her life around, on their own without any particular 
addiction/mental health intervention. To say here that the war on drugs is a rather useless 
exercise, is to stress the point that it should really be the quest for treating emotional pain as 
in mental suffering and not a war on drugs. (Peele, 1998) 
This topic of addiction is, also significant to my thesis as it further illustrates the 
subject’s relationship with pain.   
Throughout the treatment sessions with B I identified three major needs, which were: 
(1) his need to feel safe and to survive; (2) his need to preserve his emotional state, and to 
feel in control over his life; to overcome his intense fear of annihilation, to find meaning in 
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his existence and pain and (3) a need to be compensated for loss, rejection, abandonment and 
humiliation. He desired to fulfil his sense of loss and longing and to regain a sense of 
omnipotence (as in power and control) over his environment that had caused him his 
suffering. The complexities lay in the subject’s experiences in his early childhood and his 
progression through life up to the present. 
I was one of the mental health/addictions therapists at the treatment centre were B 
presented, and where we offered assessments and person centred analysis and therapy to our 
clients.  This case was of interest to me due to his unique presentation, as well as his 
progression through his process of change, mostly, due to his own convictions and working 
closely with strategies that he created for himself.  He relapsed a number of times, yet every 
time he came out he was even more determined to get to the goal that he had set himself. It 
was as if he needed to master his pain and use it to his benefit.  
This example shall address some of the factors that may have caused the phase of 
addiction which this individual experienced. His addiction seems to have been due to a sense 
of loss during his earlier stages of development and his endeavour to (re)find the ‘object’ that 
would satisfy this loss.  He experienced feelings of being out of control, a lack of identity, 
humiliation and meaninglessness in his life. This resulted in feelings of emptiness, of a 
vacuum within which he experienced phases of unrelenting desire for satisfaction and 
fulfilment – humiliation, anger, guilt, a need for revenge and a sense that he deserved to feel 
good. 
Presenting symptoms 
B presented with concerns regarding depression and anxiety and feelings of 
hopelessness.  He confirmed the use of various substances, but no indication of suicidal 
ideation at that time. He was in his early twenties, of mixed Latin/European ethnicity, and an 
only child.  In the initial interview B stated that he did not think he needed any help; he knew 
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what he had to do to deal with his problems, and had only come in to the clinic on the 
insistence of his doctor.  
As the sessions progressed, B expressed a fear of having a heart attack (a fear of 
dying) due to his periodic experiences of tachycardia (racing heart beat), and sleeplessness. 
Medical examinations, by his doctor, ruled out any irregularities in his physical health. 
Therefore, it came down to the fact (as he admitted) that he was using drugs on a regular 
basis, and experienced severe withdrawal symptoms including, nausea, tachycardia, 
headaches, irritability and anxiety attacks. 
B was an articulate and pleasant young man with a good sense of humour and laughed 
easily, even at himself. However, he also tended to giggle, even during serious discussions, as 
if there was a need to hide from his problems.  He expressed his shame and guilt around his 
drug use and, initially, appeared impatient with the questions that were put to him. However, 
gradually he seemed comfortable enough to relate his story. It seems that B’s bursts of 
giggling were an effort to waylay some of the anxiety that he experienced when in the 
sessions.   
This particular aspect of B’s presentation seemed significant; particularly to his 
progress though treatment, and later recovery. The benefits of laughter have been generally 
accepted, especially in its effect on the release of pent up pressure.  It releases endorphins in 
the brain that naturally tend to ease pain, and built up pressure. Humour plays a stress-
moderating role. Much research has been done into the benefit of humour and its correlations 
to health and wellbeing.  Freud (1905, 1927) regarded humour as the highest of the defensive 
processes (a defence mechanism), and that humour provided a savings of emotional energy.  
The essence of it is that one protects oneself from affects that would have naturally arisen, 
during a stressful situation, by overriding the affect, and emotional reaction, with humour. 
This is a beneficial process due to its liberating elements signifying the triumph not only of 
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the ego, but also of the pleasure principle, which is strong enough to assert itself here in the 
face of the adverse real circumstances. Martin & Lefcourt (1983) state that,  
‘[E]nthusiastic acclamations of humor as a healthful coping strategy have been 
expressed by a number of theorists since Freud. Allport (1950), for example, states 
that “the neurotic who learns to laugh at himself may be on the way to self-
management, perhaps to cure” (p. 92). Rollo May (1953) states that humor has the 
function of “preserving the sense of self. . . . It is the healthy way of feeling a 
‘distance’ between one’s self and the problem, a way of standing off and looking at 
one’s problem with perspective (p. 61)’  (p:1314). 
 
B indeed made use of this ‘defence mechanism’ and may have very well been a 
coping strategy that helped him on the way to ‘self-management’ and success.  
Historical background 
B stated that up until he was about four years old his parents seemed to be happy and 
he felt loved.  In spite of the history, he has a good relationship with each parent. However, 
when he was about four years old things began to change as his parents begun to have a 
traumatic, emotionally abusive relationship.  They eventually got divorced when he was 
twelve. His mother had suffered a slight breakdown during and after the divorce, and had 
gone through a period of depression, and had attempted to take her own life several times.  
He expressed that his mother did her best, but was not able to overcome the emotional abuse 
from his father. He stated that he wished that she had left his father earlier to avoid the 
trauma, and near self-destruction, of what she had been through. B stated that watching his 
mother go through this caused him the greatest anguish accompanied by feelings of fear of 
losing her and complete helplessness.   
B stated that during the twelve years that his parents were together he had wished that 
they would break up.  He felt that he went through his early life being a passive victim of his 
parents’ abusive relationship, and experiencing feelings of extreme anxiety.  He likened this 
to being a victim of ‘second hand smoke’.  
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He related that there were times when all he wanted to do was to run away, to escape 
all of the fighting.  In an effort to ‘escape’ he had invented a game that he would play (by 
himself).  It was an ‘imagination game’ that was like ‘a game of chess in the sky with live 
monsters’.  He was able to control the ‘pawns’ and in this way he would create an ‘escape to 
another world to get away’ from the trauma of his parents’ fights.   
The fantasy game  
This was clearly an effort on B’s part to escape the intensely traumatic situation. At 
four years old he felt forgotten and abandoned, while his parents fought. There was a grave 
sense of vulnerability, and he had no one to protect him from what he saw and heard.  He 
remembered being terrified.   
The ‘fantasy chess game’ is significant in the analysis as it seemed to be his effort to 
objectify his pain and to have a sense of control over his situation. It was also, I suggest, a 
precursor to the self-destructive use of drugs to escape his past and to ease his anxieties.  It 
was a way of soothing and comforting himself. It was as if he had created this game out of his 
emotional trauma where he took his pain and transformed it into a game and set it outside of 
himself.  In separating himself from it as such, he was able to control its various aspects and 
in this way he was safe. 
In the safety of his mind he endeavoured to gain some level of control over his 
situation.  The game consisted of two teams of monsters.  The monsters were like the pieces 
of a game of chess that he controlled and moved.  Each pawn represented a person in his life 
and he ‘moved’ them according to his rules placing the monsters in whatever strategic 
position he chose and moved them accordingly.  He was the master in this fantasy and was 
bigger than these monsters, and the sense of omnipotence was significant to his survival.   
He controlled his environment and preserved his existence in this space that was only 
known to him.  Dodes’ (1990) states that the ability to be ‘powerful over oneself and one’s 
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internal state may also be described as an inherent aspect of narcissism. (…) among the 
strands of narcissism is “the pleasure in efficient mental functioning”, (…) the regulation of 
mood (…) and (…) a sense of inner safety and reliability’ (p: 400).  
This was apparent in B’s creation of the fantasy game, which he returned to every 
time he was faced with an external situation, namely that of his parents fighting and the fear 
and anger that he experienced, which he could not control. 
B stated that he was not able to speak about this fantasy before as it seemed like 
‘something weird’ that he could not explain. However, on the other hand he stated that he 
was quite impressed with himself for creating this game and it was a space in his head where 
he could escape to. During his discussion about this fantasy B came upon the idea that the 
drugs were a substitute for this game. Since the game was a tool that he used when he was 
much younger the drugs, now, were a ‘progression’ to the next level.  
The drug use was a ‘real’ way to take revenge on those who had put him in the 
position to want to escape. It was a way of saying ‘to hell with you, I’ll do what I please’.  
During our discussions B expressed that using drugs was a way of releasing his anger and 
aggression and feeling out of control and at the same time it was a reparative effort to regain 
control and mastery. 
Dodes’ (1991) further explains the significance of a,  
‘steadily regulable, containable affect for the development and organization of self-
experience, without which affects become traumatic. (…) the narcissistic importance 
of being in control of one’s mind. (…) a person may become enraged because “he is 
suddenly not in control of his own thought processes, of a function which [we] 
consider to (…) [belong] to the core of our self, and we refuse to admit that we may 
not be in control of [it], (Ibid, p: 400). 
 
B expressed a sense of rage at himself for feeling powerless and vulnerable to 
humiliation, loss and rejection.  There was also rage at his parents, namely his mother, for not 
protecting him against these feelings. His need to be in control was apparent throughout his 
discussion.  He refused to admit defeat and said so in so many words.   
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He giggled at the most serious points during his sessions. It seemed to be an effort to 
waylay any risk of losing control. There were periods of time when he would dismiss any 
fear of demise. Freud’s (1927) theory on humour may be applied to this scenario:  
‘The grandeur in it clearly lies in the triumph of narcissism, the victorious assertion of 
the ego’s invulnerability.  The ego refuses to be distressed by the provocations of 
reality, to let itself be compelled to suffer.  It insists that it cannot be affected by the 
traumas of the external world; it shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more than 
occasions for it to gain pleasure’ (p:163). 
 
B saw his mother sink further and further into insecurity, losing her confidence and 
becoming depressed. He recalled how his mother stammered and stated, towards the end of 
our sessions, that his mother has not stammered for many years and he thinks that it was 
because she gradually, over the years, was able to ‘get away from all the abuse’ and live her 
own life.   
He said that he wanted to help, but he felt helpless.  He expressed that, from time to 
time, he is aware that he will also stammer in the middle of a stressful conversation, and that 
his life at the present was like a period of ‘stammering’  – where he was stuck and felt 
confused as to how to go on. It was like trying to get a certain word out and being stuck at the 
beginning of it in the stammer. 
His mother’s distress overwhelmed him.  The periods when he stammered he felt as if 
he was imitating his mother in an effort to know how to help her – as if he identified with her 
somehow. However, the sense of inadequacy that he felt caused him to stammer even more 
which made him frustrated and afraid of being humiliated.  His desire to have control over his 
life was as great as his feelings of powerlessness.  During the session where he related this he 
began to stammer.  He would stop speaking and point out that he was stammering.  He would 
then giggle and joke about it for a few minutes. It seemed that at these times he needed to 
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take a break from the intensity of his conversation.  He would laugh to relieve his tension and 
regain his composure. 
B stated that it hurt him to see his mother in so much pain. He speculated that his 
mother was affected by the experiences of rejection from her own family as well as her 
marriage, that it seemed as if she could not think for herself and had no power over her own 
life and circumstances.  He developed a resentment towards his other family members and 
expressed that he even resented his mother for not standing up for herself. He resented her 
weakness because he felt that he had to look after her and was not able to do so.  
He felt that he was robbed of a free and happy childhood and did not wish to be so 
powerless and to be controlled by others.  It was clear that from the age of four to about 
twelve his expectations of his parents, especially of his mother, became frustrated and he felt 
let down and his hopes shattered. 
The trauma of his mother’s second marriage brought back fears and anxiety of his 
past.  He struggled in school and eventually left without completing his grades to his 
mother’s dismay but, at that point, he did not want to care. He felt betrayed. He felt 
mistrusted regardless of his efforts. He felt as if he was ‘nowhere and going nowhere’ and 
that there was no point in worrying about ‘doing the right thing’ anymore.  He did not care 
and just wanted to escape from his reality.  
 Here it seems that what Wurmser (1974) stated seems consistent with what was 
occurring in B’s life at this time:  
‘[W]e find an emotional illness brewing independently, whether the drug enters or 
not.  The specificity for its outbreak in manifest form lies in an experience of 
overwhelming crisis, accompanied by intense emotions like disillusionment and rage, 
depression, or anxiety, in an actualization of a lifelong massive conflict about 
omnipotence and grandiosity, meaning and trust – what we have just described as a 
narcissistic conflict. This actualization inevitably leads to massive emotional 
disruption and thus to the addictive search’ (p: 825). 
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B quit school determined to work and be independent. He left his mother’s home and 
moved a number of times between relatives until they discovered that he was smoking 
marijuana.  They told him that they would not tolerate these kinds of activities. 
Shortly thereafter, B moved back in with his father.  He said that his father did not 
seem to be interested in him or in what he was doing.  He felt, increasingly, as if he did not 
belong to anyone or anywhere. He became involved with weight lifting and this activity 
brought him a sense of satisfaction. At the same time he realized that on the one hand he was 
trying to keep fit and on the other hand he was destroying what he was achieving due to his 
drug taking activities which, also, included the use of steroids.   
B admitted that he had been using not only marijuana, but had also tried a number of 
other drugs including cocaine and ecstasy.  In the last year he had gone from working full 
time to giving up his job due to his circumstances, as a result of his drug use. B was out of 
work and money and this took him to the depths of depression where he started going to all-
night dance clubs and the drug taking became a regular activity. 
B stated that he worked odd jobs to maintain his drug habit. His doctor had diagnosed 
him with hypertension and high blood pressure.  He admitted that he knew that he was 
destroying his body and wanted to stop doing what he was doing.  However, being high was 
his only release from his thoughts and his life.  He felt that he had no direction in life.  He 
had nothing to talk about with anyone, family especially, so he avoided seeing them.  He 
stated that his life felt empty and many a time he had asked himself, ‘is this it’ and ‘is this all 
that life is about – nothingness’?  B stated that he did not know what he wanted and where he 
wanted to go.  He had tried to quit using drugs, but he felt that his thoughts haunted him and 
the emptiness was unbearable. 
He felt guilty, embarrassed and confused about what had happened to his family and 
felt powerless to fix any of it.  At the same time he felt ‘forgotten’. It seemed clear at this 
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point that B was using drugs as an attempt at self-medication. As Wurmser stated, the 
importance of the effect of the drugs ‘in the inner life of these patients can perhaps be best 
explained as an artificial or surrogate defense against overwhelming affects’ (1974, p: 828). 
Freud (1930) also, described drugs as a means of coping with pain and 
disillusionment. As B stated, he still felt empty and lonely when he was taking drugs, but, at 
least, it did not seem to matter as much.   
The dream 
B also talked about a recurring dream that he had had during his teens especially 
when he started using drugs daily.  He had sometimes thought about it and it made him 
afraid.  He could not figure out why his thoughts kept returning to it:  He said that he dreamt 
of what appeared to be a gathering at a funeral hall.  It was a large room filled with people 
dressed in black and many of them crying quietly.  He said that, in his dream, he tries to get 
through the crowd to see who it was.  No one seemed to notice him.  He finally pushed 
through the crowd and saw a coffin.  He stopped and was afraid to go any further.  When 
asked why, he stated that he was afraid because he knew that the person in the coffin was 
him. 
B’s mental suffering and his fear of being lost and ignored are prominent elements in 
his dream.  He stated that he, actually, did not want to be noticed ‘like this’, because he was 
embarrassed of his life.  He knew better and felt guilty for going against his values.  He felt 
as if he was dead to the ‘normal world’ and no one noticed him, which is what he felt in 
reality.   
He had isolated or ‘separated himself’ from people who loved him and cared for him.  
He was alone, even in the room full of people, in his dream. He was afraid of the coffin, 
which represented his fear of being powerless over a sense of total annihilation.  What he 
feared most is that seeing himself dead in his dream may have meant that that is what he 
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really desired. He did want to escape, but not to die. Within all of this fear there was, at the 
same time, a perverse (almost sadistic) sense of satisfaction in knowing that those who had 
caused him to have a ‘tragic life’ would now grieve their loss. It was a kind of vengeance.  
Here, as in the fantasy game, it seems as if the dream was a vehicle to gaining a sense 
of control over his pain.  B was caught up in compulsive drug use that was, clearly, a 
manifestation of his mental suffering and pain.  In its recurring nature it seemed to be a 
deliberate repetition by his unconscious to gain a sense of omnipotence over his life.  As in 
the fantasy game, the dream was his endeavour to objectify his pain and to control it. 
He stated that he sought pleasure from his drug use and his rationale was that he 
deserved to feel pleasure by any means. He, however, felt alone and caught up in a vicious 
cycle that perpetuated this behaviour and a ‘compulsion to repeat’.   
It seemed that his wish to master his deep emotional suffering was fulfilled by the 
pleasurable effect achieved by the drugs.  On the other hand the guilt and shame of his 
behaviour seemed to be ‘punishment’ for this very behaviour.  The coffin in a way also 
represented the womb and was in turn, also, of his mother whom he felt he had disappointed, 
but who had also disappointed him. The other side of the sword was that he wanted to take 
revenge on her for not preventing his life of suffering and for, emotionally, abandoning him. 
It was interesting that even though B was involved, heavily at times, in drug taking 
behaviour, he was also obsessed with his image.  He never missed a day at the gym.  He 
explained that lifting the heavy weights was painful, especially, when he had lost a lot of his 
body weight due to drugs.  In spite of this he never stopped.  The pain of guilt and 
punishment were all wrapped up in this ‘system’ of his to survive and overcome the 
instability of the reality of his life.   
B stated that when he felt the pain of his muscles being ‘ripped’ there was also a sense 
of pleasure and satisfaction.  He was focused on the sensations of his body and his mind 
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looking only for instant gratification.  Loose (2002) quotes Rado who explained that ‘[D]rugs 
provide a kind of satisfaction that by-pass the erotogenic zones.  In that passing movement it 
avoids the complications inherent in the sexual usages of these zones.  Addiction so to speak, 
sexualizes the whole body, providing it with, what Rado called, an “alimentary orgasm” (p: 
103). 
B was clearly insightful about his life and his behaviour and expressed a desire to 
make changes so that he could ‘clean himself and his life up’. When asked what the reasons 
were for him to use drugs he stated that it gives him what he needs, which is not only escape 
but also the pleasure of the escape.  But, the pleasure soon becomes pain and that is when he 
becomes depressed and looks for another opportunity to escape. The ‘cause’ of the addiction 
was a desire for pleasure and the ‘effect’ of it was desire for more pleasure. Loose (2002) 
states that: ‘Addiction incarnates the essence of the psychoanalytic symptom.  Addiction 
incarnates – and openly demonstrates – the beyond of pleasure that is contained within the 
symptom; a beyond to which the subject is profoundly attached’ (p: 110). 
It was clear that the pain which B was suffering came from what was buried in his 
unconscious.  His sense of fear of losing control and appearing weak and powerless was 
always at the forefront of his presentation.  In many drug users I have observed a sense of 
fear in their own behaviour.  And, any discussion veering close to the seriousness of their 
drug use and the social and health dangers would set them on a track of trying to minimise 
the risks of what they were doing. B, in a similar fashion, would begin to giggle, or laugh out 
loud, at something that was said in the session.  
He spent a whole session speaking about the dream and its contents and his own 
interpretations of it and why he was having the dream. It was not possible to delve into an 
analysis of the dream.  However, because it seemed to affect such an emotional response in 
the client, it has been mentioned here. In one stance it seemed to serve a similar purpose as 
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his giggling did, which was to objectify his pain and to separate himself from the reality of 
his situation.  
B stated that the dream may have been an extension of his fantasy game. The only 
difference is that in his fantasy game he felt in complete control because he was awake, and 
in the dream he felt a lack of control because he was asleep.  He stated that there was a sense 
of anxiety of not knowing whether or not he would suddenly disappear into ‘thin air’. He 
stated that his anxiety was so great at times that it prevented him from sleeping.  
It is quite clear to trace the pain that developed in B’s life.  He felt lost and empty; 
ashamed of his life as he admitted that no one close to him, that he knew, came from a 
‘broken home’. They were ‘normal’ and he came from an ‘abnormal and dysfunctional 
family’, but he said that he had no idea how to be ‘normal’.  So much so that it seemed easy 
to ‘get wrapped up with the bad crowd’.  When he was ‘high’ it did not matter and he seemed 
to fit in.  But this did not last long.   
Interestingly enough he said, at one point that he felt that he deserved to feel good. 
And since all his life he had felt ‘bad’ he was going to do whatever it took to feel good and to 
escape his problems.   
The impact of B’s traumatic experiences, with his parents, as a young child had 
impacted his sense of security, existence and identity. B stated that he felt ‘lost and empty’ 
and that he was ‘no one’ and ‘going nowhere’. The pain of his mental suffering became a part 
of his existence that he wanted to escape.  There was the unconscious emotional trauma of 
loss and rejection and a sense of worthlessness. 
More significantly, I propose that the existence of his relationship with his suffering 
or being in pain was that of a sense of ‘being owed’ something from life which had dealt him 
an unfair deal.  It was a determination to make pleasure out of his pain (to use his pain) to 
fulfil his desires to fill the void. There is a clear sense of loss of the first object of his desire 
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(his mother) and his guilt and shame at not being able to ‘fix things’.  At the same time he 
was in a desperate search for independence not only from his mother, but also from memories 
of his past painful experiences of abandonment.   
His fixation was on fulfilling his desire which was filling the emptiness or void within 
his psychic functioning.  His search was obvious in his explanation as were the pain of loss 
and fear of annihilation.  Even though he ‘hung around with the wrong crowd’, he was alone.  
His drugs were his ‘friends’.  His drug taking was in isolation as was the pleasure that he 
derived from it.  He did not need anyone, as he had said, ‘I did not need anyone to make me 
feel bad anymore’ therefore; he separated himself from any meaningful relationships.   
‘The encounter with others always implies an element of risk, of anxiety and, above 
all, of unpredictability.  To be part of human culture and to take part in the social 
bond also implies that there is a price to pay.  This price is the loss of total pleasure 
when castration cuts the child out of the unity with the mother and replaces it with an 
ordinary or limited kind of pleasure.  Addiction creates the illusion that this total 
pleasure is attainable again (…)’ Loose (2002, p: 32). 
 
The perversion of drug taking behaviour ‘indicates the search for a sexual satisfaction 
that belongs to an earlier stage of infantile sexual development’.  This is the oral stage and 
‘addiction being a kind of oral perversion’.  Drugs can provide the instant gratification of 
infantile sexual wishes, (ibid, p: 101).  I agree with Loose in that when faced with frustration 
the addict will reach for the drug that will instantly gratify his needs. It is psychic pain that 
seems to cause and perpetuate drug taking behaviour.   
The depression and anxiety of guilt, shame and emptiness, as in the case of B are 
clearly elements that triggered repeated drug use.  However, in B’s case it is this psychic pain 
and mental suffering that created a fear of annihilation within him. Not only the pain of 
suffering, but also the pain of fear and anxiety, of the unknown, that seemed to motivate him 
to seek help and to make changes in his life. 
B had stated that he knew that his drug taking was a rebellious action, but he deserved 
to feel good.  He felt sorry for his mother and his father, but it was not up to him to solve 
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their problems – he was the child and deserved to have ‘normal parents’.  He did not care 
about them anymore and wanted only to get his own life straightened out, but he would do 
this on his own terms and no one was going to tell him otherwise. His sense of humour and 
ability to laugh at himself and giggle (uncontrollably) at times seemed to work as a 
mechanism that helped him to separate himself from his pain in such a way in which he was 
able to control it.  He was able to understand it thus and learn to manage it to, eventually, 
reach a drug free lifestyle.  It was a struggle that he took on board with an obsession to 
succeed. 
Conclusion 
There are several theories on the causes of drug addiction and we have examined only 
a sample of them in this chapter. The search for the real roots of addiction and its cure is an 
on-going endeavour.  A cure for addiction is not possible unless the emotional pain is faced.  
There are as many varieties of causes for addiction, as there are individuals, and the influence 
and impact of their particular psychological, biological, environmental and behavioural 
elements figure prominently in their subjective experiences.   
The dynamics of addictions run as deep and wide as the workings of the human mind, 
body and brain.  The very concept of the unconscious and what is brought into it, or what our 
minds allow to be brought into consciousness adds to the multidimensional complexities of a 
problem like addiction. 
To underscore the arguments in this thesis, addiction is a state of chronic pain – 
impacted by either indulgence or deprivation – imposed on the body.  It invokes a sense of 
being alienated from the external world. It is a neurosis that stems from the conflicts of 
unconscious, sexual desires, emotional, mental suffering and pain.  Self-destructive, 
repetitive compulsive behaviour such as drug abuse, and other forms of self-harm such as, 
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deprivation, as in anorexia nervosa, are expressions of this suffering, as are other types of 
chronic pain.  
Addictive behaviour is conducted in isolation. There is no trust in the other to bring 
satisfaction as it is the other (the first object of desire – the mother) that has caused the 
subject to be in a state of constant craving.   
Pain becomes the object of desire for the subject.  Unless there is a state of pain the 
state of pleasure is a vague and ambiguous idea.  However, within this simple deduction there 
are the deep complexities of the desire for self-preservation that bring with it the unconscious 
emotions of fear, guilt, shame and revenge manifested in feelings of isolation, rejection, loss, 
aggression and abandonment and of being out of control and powerless.  
Is the addiction the ‘symptom’ defined psychoanalytically as a ‘solution for 
underlying conflict’– or is it the ‘chronic pain’ that is the symptom? Loose (2002), in his 
description of a symptom states that, 
‘…the symptom is a solution to an underlying conflict.  This definition, of course, 
implies that the solution is not perfect: it does not resolve anything.  The symptom is 
only a symptom in so far as it is repeated.  If subjects repeat symptoms, there must be 
something in the symptom that the subject does not want to let go of, despite the fact 
that it causes suffering.  This is precisely the issue that Freud tried to resolve with his 
theoretical concept of the death-drive’ (p: 109). 
 
Pain is expressed in a variety of ailments such as withdrawal and the management of 
depression, anxiety, paranoia, abuse, trauma, grief and immense cravings that need to be 
addressed, along with diseases of the liver, lungs and joints.  There are also external conflicts 
of family, relationships and financial complications. Addiction is, on the one hand, a solution 
against unconscious suffering and, on the other hand, a defence mechanism that creates the 
pain which is needed to sustain that defence. Pain is, therefore the desired object and the 
symptom.  It is the pain that the subject does not want to let go of.  Addictive behaviour gives 
rise to a world of fantasy where pain is overcome by the dominance of pleasure. Here pain 
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(unconscious mental suffering and its manifest behaviours) is manipulated to achieve 
pleasure.   
Addictive behaviour allows the subject to escape into a narcissistic realm of self-
preservation and a blurred state of constant pain and pleasure. It is his compulsion to repeat 
that which he believes he can control – in order to gain mastery over his pain. Thus he 
continues to repress his internal suffering and conflict setting up his defences in addictive, 
self-destructive behaviour perpetuating his fantasy of omnipotence, revenge and dominance 
over his loss and the object that caused his loss.  
Dodes (1990) states that it is essential to consider the role of addiction in managing, 
 
‘…omnipotence over one’s own affective state. The central importance of being in 
control of one’s affective state is highlighted by the loss of this control in psychic 
trauma: i.e., the imposition of a state of helplessness on the ego when it is 
overwhelmed by an instinctual drive (affect) which it cannot manage without 
excessive anxiety (Freud 1926).  It is the sense of powerlessness or helplessness in 
this situation which (…) constitutes the essence of psychic trauma’ (p: 399-400). 
 
Whether the addiction is indulgence in mind altering drugs or deprivation, underlying 
emotional trauma lies at the heart of the cause.  The subject’s life revolves around this 
chronic emotional pain that is manifested within behaviours such as repetitive self-harm.  
The metaphor of the phantom can be applied here, as well.  There is a profound sense 
of loss within the addicted subject.  It is a loss a kin to the loss of a limb. He tries to fill the 
void with his behaviour only to perpetuate pain within the space. The neurosignatures (and 
the psychosignatures) attempt to repair the breach, as in the case of an amputation, the only 
difference is that the whole body is experiencing a physical as well as a psychological and 
emotional non-existence or fragmented ‘whole’. On the one hand the signatures attempt to 
find what is missing and to repress the loss, and on the other hand they try to compensate for 
it. 
Neurobiology and psychology, of course work in tandem and the two must meet 
somewhere however, as Freud found in his Project (1895) that not all psychological pain and 
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suffering can be explained away through ‘scientific’ evidence. Nevertheless, it gives us a 
wider perspective and a place to begin to understand the complexities of human behaviour, 
which I argue, is contingent upon the subject’s relationship with his pain and, in turn, impacts 
his identity and existence. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this thesis I have endeavoured to put together a mosaic of perspectives 
from which to begin to formulate a response to my curiosity – as well as my concern from a 
clinical perspective – regarding a more effective framework for viewing the painful issues 
which my clients bring into the counselling arena. I would like to endeavour to draw together 
the various dimensions of my discussions throughout the thesis in order to establish 
feasibility for my proposal which states that the subject has a relationship with his pain, and 
that this relationship impacts his identity and existence.   
Pain is a topic which has been thought about, debated and discussed throughout 
history (Rey 1993, Dormandy 2006).  Schopenhauer (1969) has summarised the cause of this 
in saying that as long as we desire that which we lack, this desire exceeds the value of all 
other things in life until it is fulfilled.  However, once what is desired is acquired it loses its 
value, appearing to be something different than what was expected and ‘a similar longing 
always holds us fast, as we thirst and hanker after life’ (Vol. I, p: 318). 
He stated that we shut our eyes to the truth, that suffering is essential to life, as if it is 
a bitter medicine.  We do not wish to know that suffering is something which we carry 
around within us as a perpetual internal spring and that it is not something which is external.  
However, we insist on seeking a particular, external source or cause as if it will vindicate the 
pain that is always with us.  He compares this state of human desire to ‘the free man’ who 
‘makes for himself an idol, in order to have a master’ (ibid).  An example, from the Book of 
Exodus (32:1-30) is of the plight of the Israelites from Egypt which brought to each his own 
pain of loss and desire.  They created something that they could see, touch, feel and control. 
‘God’ had brought them what they desired. However, in receiving this, the pain of captivity 
returned as they were once again controlled by their desires. Schopenhauer goes on to say 
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that ‘we untiringly strive from desire to desire, and although every attained satisfaction, 
however much it promised, does not really satisfy us, but often stands before us as a 
mortifying error, (…)’, (ibid). 
Freud (1924[1923], 1925 [1924]) was influenced by Schopenhauer as he was by 
others which figure in the width and depth of his work from the Project for a Scientific 
Psychology (1895) to The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), the pleasure principle (1920) and 
beyond. He writes about pain that is rooted in desire due to object loss and adheres to 
Schopenhauer’s theory that desire precedes every pleasure, but that in satisfaction desire as 
well as pleasure cease.  
‘(…) when everything is finally overcome and attained, nothing can ever be gained 
but deliverance from some suffering or desire; consequently, we are only in the same 
position as we were before this suffering or desire appeared. What is immediately 
given to us is always only the want, i.e., the pain’ (Schopenhauer 1966, Vol. I, p: 
319). 
 Pain is on our minds, in our hearts and in our lives.  If it were not for pain we would 
not be curious about pleasure.  If desire and satisfaction impact the most essential dimensions 
of human existence – pleasure and pain - my argument then, that the subject has a 
relationship with his pain which, in turn, impacts his sense of identity and existence, is viable. 
The aspect of relationship is the key component to adhere to when considering psychological 
and emotional pain, as it is the relationship between the subject’s desire and what he desires - 
pain. Pain is the precedent to every pleasure.  
Throughout my thesis I have discussed Freud’s psychoanalytical theories, which I 
derived to be explored in his (1895) Project that primarily set out to investigate his 
neurological theory of pain and pain processing. In the same way I have also examined 
Melzack and Wall’s gate control theory (which began in the 1960’s) and Melzack’s theory of 
the neuromatrix (in the 1990’s), systems in the brain that modulate the experience of pain, 
and the consequent cognitive and behavioural processes.   
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The purpose of this exploration was to show that the research that Freud began in 
1895, toward a ‘scientific psychology’, was taken up by later scientists to evidence that first 
of all there is a significant correlation between neurobiological and psychological and 
emotional pain, secondly that psychological and emotional pain do not need to be derived 
from a physical or external impact and third, interestingly, that physical pain, inevitably, has 
a psychological and emotional component.  Even in cases where sensitivity to pain is absent, 
this absence has an impact on the psychological and emotional systems of the mind. Morris 
(1993) gives an example of Edward Gibson, the human Pincushion, who, due to his lack of 
sensitivity to pain, took advantage of this to create a stage act that shocked and stunned 
audiences. He stuck pins and spikes into various parts of his body, even enacting the 
Crucifixion that brought great emotional pain to his audience. Morris stated that this 
insensitivity to pain proved, to Gibson, a meaningless benefit that left him ‘indifferent’.  
Gibson could never really know what he was ‘missing’.  Even though he did not experience 
physical pain the way you or I feel he seemed to live in a world of pain.  This was a kind of 
anxiety of the unknown, and a desire to know himself, as a ‘whole’, and his reason for 
existence. ‘He could never figure out how to turn his strange gift into something more than a 
spectacle’ (p: 13). 
This investigation was inspired by the evidence that the neurological system does not 
function independently of the psychological system.  Freud identified from his project that 
emotional  pain does not need to have an external basis or ‘peripheral’ impact.  Melzack and 
Wall’s (1996) theory of the ‘neuromatrix’ explains that this is a system in the brain, from 
within which is created a ‘neurosignature’. The signature is created from innate and historical 
activities, and facilitates responses to events and experiences.  Inputs from experiences 
modulate the neurosignature, but cannot generate a new signature.  Our cognitive and 
behavioural responses are innately set. However, these are influenced and modulated by 
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external as well as internal experiences. Similarly, Freud (1895 [1950]) discussed the impact 
of and the responses to internal and external stimuli, through the nervous system.  He 
postulated that responses to the stimuli are facilitated by permeable and impermeable 
neurons.  This process creates the environment that allows for the formation of memory, 
perception and motives.   This explains how we perceive our bodies as a whole integrative 
system. 
What is significant to this thesis are Freud’s metapsychological postulations that there 
does not need to be an external cause for pain. The neuromatrix is an explanation for the 
neurobiology of pain but, it includes an appreciation that this has an impact on the subject’s 
psychology. It however, speaks from the stance that pain is a physical experience influenced 
by neurological and biological factors that can impact one’s psychological state of mind.  
My argument that there is a parallel development of a ‘psychomatrix’ is, of course, 
derived from the notion of the neuromatrix.  However, I propose that this is a matrix that does 
not exist in the brain but in the mind.  The unconscious is the matrix within which there is an 
innate psychomatrix, and similar to the neuromatrix, impacts the perception of the ‘whole’.  
The ‘whole’ in this case, however, includes an essential sense of emotional wholeness that 
connects the body’s dualism of phenomenal as well as psychological awareness and 
experience.  It is this sense of emotional balance that is achieved by the reconciliations of our 
desire for the lost object and the fulfilment of that desire and its cycle of pain and pleasure. 
Within the psychomatrix is created an innate psychosignature that is modulated by and 
responds to our experiences of emotional pain.  This is pain that is an anthology of our 
experiences that is imprinted in our unconscious mind. Freud (1900, p: 578), clearly states 
that what has been imprinted in the unconscious is never lost but comes to the surface under 
the influence of certain events and experiences. 
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What I have begun to explore within this thesis is the connection between what Freud 
started in the 19
th
 Century and what has been further understood and discovered later toward 
an understanding of the subject-pain relationship.  His research has taken the science of 
psychology into the 21
st
 Century.  I propose that in order to appreciate the nature of 
psychological and emotional pain, an investigation into the neurobiological nature of pain 
was essential. In order to answer my thesis question I needed to explore the science of 
psychology to begin to have a ‘whole’ perspective on suffering as in being in pain.  Pain that 
is ‘the precedent of every pleasure’ and further that beyond the acquisition of pleasure is, 
again, pain, (Schopenhauer 1966, p: 319). 
Therefore, it is essential to my thesis to understand the aspects of the mind/body link 
identified throughout Freud’s work, where he explains the dimensions of narcissism, 
repetition and perversion which are key components to development.  
Pertinent to an understanding of the processes of the body are other external 
influences that impact our sense of identity and existence, such as, religious and cultural 
beliefs, and the familial, social and political environments that one lives within. (Gibson 
1978, Scarry 1985, Morris 1993, Dormandy 2006).  Rey 1996), suggests that, ‘…pain 
involves a codified form of social behaviour which sets the parameters of allowable overt 
manifestations and regulates the expression of such innermost personal experiences, whether 
endured in the family bosom or alone in a solitary confrontation with the self’ (p: 5).  
I have endeavoured to evidence that the subject-pain relationship impacts his identity 
and is a means to understanding how and why he relates, not only to himself, but also to 
others. Therefore, an exploration of how internal and external factors influence the subject’s 
experience of pain, were part and parcel of this thesis. The knowledge that he is suffering 
impacts the subject’s world view in how he views himself but, most importantly, how this 
impacts his relationship with and to others as well as himself, through suffering his pain. 
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This, consequently, impacts his identity and the meaning of his existence in relation to his 
internal and external environment.  
My thesis has strived to explore the subject-pain relationship through the 
psychoanalytic formulations on neurosis, perversion, narcissism, and loss.  I examined the 
significance of how these internal mechanisms, of the unconscious and sexuality, impact on 
conscious manifestations, such as chronic pain syndrome, throughout the subject’s life.   
If Freud was right in his postulation regarding the desire of the subject, to re-find the 
object, could it not be that the subject needs to know his pain in such a way as to be able to 
know the direction in which he travels to fulfil his desire? To know his pain, then, would 
mean that he would know his pleasure and the very presence of this aspect of human 
existence, in turn, begs a relationship with his pain.   
According to Freud (1900, 1920, 1926) the most significant component within human 
development is a defence against the dark psychological and emotional experiences that 
make up ‘loss’ and the desire for that which is lost. In the scenario of the phantom limb 
syndrome we see the mechanisms at play that create a barrier to further trauma.  The brain 
reorganises its ‘map’ to compensate for the missing limb. It allows the body and the mind to 
accept the loss of the limb through a dichotomous experience of a phantom limb.  The subject 
needs to be able to feel that he is still ‘whole’ lest the emptiness, within the space that is left 
behind from the missing limb, overpowers his emotional integrity.  The neurosignature, 
within the neuromatrix, is modulated by the experiences of the patient; however it remains 
consistent in processing the response to this trauma so that the physical sense of ‘whole’ 
remains intact, (Melzack and Wall 1996). 
 I proposed that a parallel process with the psychomatrix takes place.  Once the acute 
event is stabilised it is not only the brain that goes to work, but more critically, it is the mind 
that must confront and comfort the emotional trauma of the subject.  A sense of being ‘whole’ 
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impacts the subject’s sense of identity. As is found in Freud’s (1920) theory of the pleasure 
principle, systems of the mind (and the brain) are guided by the ‘principle of constancy’ or 
keeping the ‘excitation’ in the ‘mental apparatus’ down to as low a level as possible.  The aim 
is to avoid unpleasure or stimulation over a certain limit, (p: 9).   
The phantom limb can also be used as a metaphor that can be applied to the example 
of other chronic pain as in fibromyalgia as well as addictions. It could also be applied to the 
biological lack of sensitivity to physical pain as the subject feels the phantom of that which is 
missing. Pain is caused by loss that in turn causes emotional trauma which is for the most part 
repressed in our unconscious, manifesting in a variety of forms throughout development.  As 
these emotions make themselves known via memories within the conscious, provoking 
certain behaviour, it is clear that Freud regarded memory and motive to work in tandem. 
‘Memories have no meaning or power unless there are allied with motives’, (Solms 2001, p: 
19). 
 It is the power of memories that impacts the formation of subjective identity.  
However, because memories have great reconstructive powers they also have the potential to 
(re)construct identity and meaning of existence.  Within the processes of memories there is 
the primary motive which is to fulfil a desire for that which was lost.  At the basis of this 
motive is not only loss by a need to avenge oneself from being subjected to trauma. Hence, 
the concept of ‘screen memories’ (Freud 1905), that are a compromise between repressed 
elements and the defence against them.  
It appears that the subject’s relationship to pain is steeped in a need for power and 
control.  This is a need to maintain the integrity of the ‘whole’, which is an integration of the 
physical, psychological and emotional integrity of the ‘self’.  As previously stated in this 
thesis ‘the phenomenology of self is so deep and intangible that it sometimes seems 
illusory…’ (Chalmers 1997, p: 10). Pain brings to consciousness an orchestration of 
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sensations that do not always ‘sound’ harmonious to the unities of body, brain and mind. 
However, within all of that there is the ‘background hum’ of the experience of the self and its 
relationship with pain.  The subject is conscious of his relationship as a ‘hum’ that tells him 
that he exists and that he must somehow defend this existence. Not always in the sphere of 
the conscious, indeed the self is mostly unconscious, and as Freud (1923) has expressed that 
what is conscious is only ‘the tip of the iceberg’.  
 In Chapter One, I explored  Freud’s (1895) scientific research in his Project, as well 
as that of later scientists such as Melzack and Wall (1993, 1996, 2001) and others to show 
that the mechanisms of the body and the brain are influenced by, and according to, 
biologically embedded coding, and the endogenous development of processing mechanisms.  
I have explored the theories that mapped the excitatory and inhibitory processes of 
memory and motive that are significant to the understanding of emotional and psychological 
pain. Melzack’s (1993) neuromatrix evidences that the brain perceives the body as a certain 
‘whole’. Even when there is a ‘cut’ or dismemberment, either from birth or caused during 
one’s life, the brain’s mechanism continues to perceive the body as a ‘whole’, therefore 
behaving as if it is ‘whole’ (p: 621).  This phenomenon, I believe, is what figures into the 
notion of ‘mourning a loss’. The neuromatrix allows the brain to do more than detect and 
analyse inputs as it generates perceptual experience even when no external inputs occur. 
(p:628).   
These perceptual experiences also become part of the emotional dynamics of the 
development of the subject’s relationship with pain, identification of self and meaning of 
existence.  
Through this investigation I identified that there were physical as well as 
psychological processes at work.  Some of these are conscious and some unconscious. The 
unconscious processes could be inferred by the conscious ones.  Consciousness has two 
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features, an external perception of the world and an internal perception of the inner workings 
of the mind which ‘represents the unconscious reality that lies within us in the form of 
subjective states of awareness – such as memories, beliefs, and desires’ (Solms 1998: 8). 
Thus the first key components in this thesis are the notions of memory and motive and 
the concept of the ‘whole’ self.  Memories are either activated or inhibited by a variety of 
processes as explained by Freud’s (1895) Project as well as Melzack and Wall’s (1993, 1996, 
2001) gate control theory as well as their theory of the neuromatrix that was further 
developed by Melzack (1996).  The motives for these are human progression through the 
complexities of the stages of development.  Experiences are imprinted on the mappings of the 
brain as well as the unconscious and are selectively accessed to allow certain cognitive and 
behavioural functioning. 
The metaphor of the ‘gate’ in Melzack and Wall’s  (1993) gate control theory is a 
modulation of the intensity of impacts of stimuli on the responses of the body and brain, for 
example sensory pain from a stubbed toe. This can be compared to the ego functioning of the 
mind as it modulates the materials (memories/experiences) in the mind and their impact on 
consciousness, for example repression and neurosis.  Both impacts the conscious as well as 
the unconscious as memories of internal as well as external experiences become imprinted 
within the processes of the brain as well as the mind. 
An exploration of Feud’s theory of pain, in Chapter Two, took me further through his 
concepts of the unconscious and the life and death instincts. I also examined the definitions of 
‘subject’, ‘self’, ‘relationship’, ‘identity’, ‘existence’ and ‘pain’. 
Chapter three, four and five were opportunities for me to apply these concepts to the 
scenarios of chronic pain as in the phantom limb syndrome, fibromyalgia, as well as within 
addictions. Primarily they were explorations of the processes of chronic pain.  The 
conversion between psychological pain and physical pain was significant to comprehend a 
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narcissistic to object cathexis, and the process of the mind, transforming an acute physical 
trauma into a psychological trauma, (Freud 1926 [1925] and Gamsa 1994). Physical and 
psychological traumas trigger each other, as in the opponent process theory (Solomon 1980).  
Repetition of past trauma are the reactions of the mind and body matrices – that in turn 
trigger the emotional state of ‘being in pain’ as opposed to ‘having pain’ (Pontalis 1981).   
Following what has already been expressed, I believe that it is important to also 
understand that Freud conceived that the truth of reality was influenced by our subjective 
perceptions, which flow from our unconscious and which distort or even filter the truth of 
reality. Therefore, my definition of pain as a conglomerate is necessary for then, it is 
irrelevant whether or not a memory has been distorted. What is significant is that the feeling 
experience of a past trauma continues to exist. The reality is that the subject experiences 
being in pain which is essential to his existence. The development of a relationship with pain 
is inevitable as it creates the ‘motive’ for the preservation of self.   
Within the phenomenon of chronic pains we see how pain can be objectified and used 
to either destroy or create a certain identity.  This identity, negative or positive, can, then, 
influence the subject’s sense of self and therefore, impacts his response to stimuli from the 
internal and external environments of his existence.  
My theory is that this suffering becomes embedded in the unconscious as a subjective 
memory and influences identity, existence and behaviour.  As Solms (1998) states, ‘(…) 
internal, subjective awareness is where our patients locate the suffering that they bring to us 
in psychoanalysis’ (p: 7-9). 
My final conclusion is that pain becomes an object – the object of desire – which 
compels the subject to respond accordingly and consequently. An understanding of this 
relationship is crucial as it draws out the motives for behaviour which could in turn impact 
the paradigms of pain management. To ignore ‘negative’ emotions – as in repression – 
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cannot be beneficial as psychoanalysis has evidenced, for knowing them, I agree, is the only 
way forward toward good mental health – but this does not mean being pain free. 
The truth that Freud evidenced throughout his work is that pain is who we are.  If we 
take away pain we take away who we are, and that it is not humanly possible to take away or 
cut pain out of our existence.  To be in pain is the most essential component to our survival as 
it not only fulfils our sexual instincts and desire, but is also a defence against unconscious, 
unresolved emotional trauma.  We also need to be able to comprehend the objectification of 
pain in order to see it more clearly as something that can be mastered to achieve the pleasure 
that we seek.   
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‘I'll go on. You must say words, as long as there are any - until they find me, until they say 
me. (Strange pain, strange sin!) You must go on. Perhaps it's done already. Perhaps they have 
said me already. Perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story, before the door 
that opens on my story. (That would surprise me, if it opens.) 
 
It will be I? It will be the silence, where I am? I don't know, I'll never know: in the silence 
you don't know. 
 
You must go on. 
 
I can't go on. 
 
I'll go on’. 
 
Beckett, S. (1958) ‘The Unnamable’  
 
 
 
 
